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A\ 






WAR IN DISGUISE ; 





OR, 



THE FRAUDS 



OF THli 



NEUTRAL FLAGS. 


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LONDON, Printed : 


NEIV-YQRK: Re-printed by Hopkins dr Seymour, 

fOR I. K1LEY AND CO. NEW-YORK j HUGH MAXWELL, PHILADELPHIA; ANDERSON 
AND JEFFRIES, BALTIMORE ; SAMUEL C. CARPENTER, CHARLESTON, S. C. AND 
JOHN WEST, BOSTON. 








District of JVew-York, ss. 


Be IT REMEMBERED, That on the seventh day of Janu- 
(l» s.J ar ^’ * n ^^icth year of the Independence of the 
United States of America, Isaac Riley, of the said 
District, hath deposited in this office the Title of a Book, the 
right whereof he claims as proprietor, in the words following, to 
wit: 

« War in Disguise ; or , the Frauds of the JVeutral Flags.” 

In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, 
entitled, “ An Act for the encouragement of learning, by secur- 
“ ing the copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the authors and 
« proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mention- 
ed And also, to an Act, entitled, “ An Act supplementary 
« to an Act entitled, “ An Act for the encouragement of learn- 
“ ing, by securing the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to 
“ the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times 
u therein mentioned, and extending the benefits thereof to the 
“ arts of Designing, Engravings and Etching, historical and 
u other prints.” 

EDWARD DUNSCOMB, 

Clerk of the District of Am- York • 


PREFACE 


TO THE LONDON EDITION. 


Though the following sheets have been written 
and sent to press in considerable haste, on account of 
some temporary considerations which add to the im¬ 
mediate importance of their subject, the author has 
spared no pains that could tend to guard his state¬ 
ments from mistake. His facts are for the most 
part, derived, as the reader will perceive, from those 
authentic and original sources of information, the 
records of our courts of prize: and it may therefore 
perhaps be surmised, that some practitioner in those 
courts, if not the author of the argument, has at 
least contributed his aid, in furnishing premises for 
its use. 


Adverting to the probability of such a conjecture, 
and to an erroneous notion which he knows to be 
very prevalent, namely, that the practitioners in the 
admiralty courts have an interest opposite to the 



VI 


pretensions of neutral merchants, he thinks it right 
to guard both his facts and his opinions against this 
source of jealousy, by one brief remark—contests in 
the prize jurisdiction arise almost exclusively from 
claims of property preferred by neutrals ; and there¬ 
fore, the business of the prize courts, zvoidd obvious¬ 
ly be impaired, not extended, by narrowing the legal 
confines of the neutral flags. 

If the intelligent reader should stand in no need 
of this information, he will still feel such caution in 
an anonymous writer, not to be excessive ; for how¬ 
ever sacred a national cause may be, it is become 
too common a rule, to suppose that no man exerts 
himself in it from a public motive, if a private one 
can possibly be suspected. 

October 18th> 1805. 

>. a # ' gj 


AMERICAN PREFACE. 


It was intended to have prefixed to this edi¬ 
tion, an Introduction of some length, exposing, 
in a succinct manner, some of the sophistries 
with which this singular work abounds, by way 
of putting the reader on his guard against them; 
but as it is now proposed to follow it shortly 
with a formal answer, nothing more is thought 
necessary here, than merely to apprize the 
reader of this circumstance. 


>\ ; /A'.,/ VTA 









rl 

'■in'. 

■ 

. *4.V 



WAR IN DISGUISE, 

Ke. 


The hope of Peace, which long, though faint¬ 
ly, gleamed from the North, has vanished; the 
political atmosphere of Europe is become dark¬ 
er than ever; and the storm menaces a wider 
range, as well as a lengthened duration. 

At such a period, it is natural to cast forward 
an anxious glance toward the approaching events 
of war, and to calculate anew the chances of a 
happy or disastrous issue of this momentous 
contest: but it is wise also to look backward, 
to review the plan on which the war has hither¬ 
to been conducted, and inquire, whether expe¬ 
rience has not proved it to be in some points, 
erroneous or defective. 

The season seems favourable for improve¬ 
ment, especially in our offensive measures, since 



2 


new relations will, in all probability, demand 
an important change in them: while the acqui¬ 
sition of allies, however powerful and active, 
will diminish in no degree the duty of putting 
forth our utmost exertions. 

Fatal might be that assistance in the war, 
which should lead us to cherish less carefully 
our own independent means of annoyance or de¬ 
fence. The arch enemy of the civilized world, 
in the prospect of having a new confederacy to 
contend with, like Satan when opposed to the an¬ 
gelic phalanx, is “ collecting all his might,” and 
seems to be preparing, for his continental foes 
at least, an impetuous attack; nor are their pre¬ 
parations of a character less decisive- 

“ One stroke they aim, 

“ That may determine, and not need repeat.” 

A single campaign, if disastrous to our allies, 
may realize some of the late threats of Bona¬ 
parte. He may “ acquire a new line of coast, 
“ new ports, new countries,” and then, he fair¬ 
ly tells us the consequence—“ the defeat of our 
“ confederates would be reflected back upon 
“ ourselves—would leave France more at liber- 
“ ty than ever to turn her whole attention to 
“ her war with this country, and to employ 
“ against us still augmented means of annoy- 
“ ance;” it would render our dangers, as he 
truly says, “ more imminent,” though, I trust, lie 



3 


is mistaken in the insulting conclusion, that it 
would “ ensure our fall 

The plan which this exasperated enemy has 
formed for our destruction, is of a nature far 
more formidable than that which he ostenta¬ 
tiously displayed. The flotilla at Boulogne, and 
the army of the coast, have chiefly excited 
our attention; but the restitution of his regular 
marine, and the increase of the confederated na¬ 
vies, have been the Usurper’s more rational de¬ 
pendence, and the means of war which he has 
been indefatigably labouring to provide. En¬ 
raged at the interruption of this plan by his quar¬ 
rel with Austria, he now avows in his complaints 
its real nature and magnitude : He asserts to the 
Germanic Diet, “ that he has been employing all 
“ the resources of his empire, to construct fleets, 
“ to form his marine, and to improve his ports f 
nor is the important fact unfounded, though al¬ 
leged by Bonaparte. 

These dangerous efforts may be in some mea¬ 
sure diverted by the new continental war; but 
they will not be wholly suspended; and should 
we again be left singly to sustain the contest, 


* See an official article in the Moniteur of August 16th or 17th, co¬ 
gged into the London papers of the 28th, 
f Paper presented by M. Bacher to the Diet of Ratisbon, Moniteur 
of September lltft 


they will, of course, be resumed on their former 
scale, with renovated vigour and effect. 

In preparations like these, consist the chief 
danger, not only of England, but of Europe ; for 
the fall of this country, or what would be the 
same in effect, the loss, at this perilous conjunc¬ 
ture, of our superiority at sea, would remove from 
before the ambition of France, almost every ob¬ 
stacle by which its march to universal empire 
could be finally impeded. 

Nor let us proudly disdain tp suppose the pos¬ 
sibility of such a reverse. Let us reflect, what 
the navies of France, Spain, and Holland, once 
were; let us consider that these countries form 
but a part of those vast maritime regions, the 
united resources of which are now at the com¬ 
mand of the same energetic government; and if 
these considerations are not enough to repel a 
dangerous confidence, let those great maritime 
advantages of the enemy, which the following 
pages will expose, be added to the large account; 
for I propose to show, in the encroachments and 
frauds of the neutral flags, a nursery and a refuge 
of the confederated navies; as well as the secret 
conduits of a large part of those imperial resources, 
the pernicious application of which to the restitu¬ 
tion of his'marine, the Usurper has lately boasted 
'—I propose to show in them his best hopes 
m a naval war; as well as channels of a re- 


o 

venue, which sustains the ambition of France, 
and prolongs the miseries of Europe. 

In the retrospect of the last war, and of the 
progress we have yet made in the present, one 
singular fact immediately arrests the attention. 

The finances of France appear scarcely to be 
impaired, much less exhausted, by her enormous 
military establishments and extensive enterpris¬ 
es, notwithstanding the ruin so long apparently 
imposed on her commerce. Poverty, the ordinary 
sedative of modern ambition, the common peace¬ 
maker between exasperated nations, seems no 
longer to be the growth of war. 

The humblest reader in this land of politi¬ 
cians, if he has raised his eyes so high as to the 
lore of Poor Robin’s Almanac, has learned that— 
“ War begets poverty, poverty peace, &c.”; but 
now, he may reasonably doubt the truth of this 
simple pedigree; while the statesman must be 
staggered to find the first principles of his art 
shaken by this singular case. 

In fact, political writers have been greatly em¬ 
barrassed with it , and have laboured to account 
for it by the unprecedented nature of the interior 
situation and policy of France, or from the rapa¬ 
cious conduct of her armies ; but none of these 
theories were quite satisfactory when promulg- 
ed; and they have since, either been shaken by the 
failure of those prospective consequences which 


6 


were drawn from them, or have been found in¬ 
adequate to explain the new and extended diffi¬ 
culties of the case. 

Let ample credit be taken for revolutionary 
confiscations at home, and military rapine a- 
broad, for the open subsidies, or secret contribu¬ 
tions of allies, and for the gifts or loans extorted 
from neutral powers, by invasion or the menace 
of war; still the aggregate amount, however enor¬ 
mous in the eye of justice and humanity, must 
be small when compared to the prodigious ex¬ 
penses of France. 

In aid of that ordinary revenue, of which com¬ 
merce was the most copious source, these extra¬ 
ordinary supplies may, indeed, be thought to have 
sufficed; but when we suppose the commercial 
and colonial resources of France to have been 
ruined by our hostilities during a period of near 
twelve successive years, the brief term of the late 
peace excepted; and when we remember that she 
has not only sustained, during a still longer peri¬ 
od, and with scarcely any cessation*, a w r ar ardu¬ 
ous and costly beyond all example, but has fed, 
in addition to her military myriads, those nu¬ 
merous swarms of needy and rapacious upstarts, 
who have successively fastened on her treasury. 


* A most expensive contest with the negroes in the West-Indies, 
filled up the whole interval between the last and present war. 


7 


and fattened by its spoil; I say, when these ex¬ 
hausting circumstances are taken into the account, 
the adequacy of the supply to the expenditure, 
seems, notwithstanding the guilty resources which 
have been mentioned, a paradox hard to explain. 
Were the ordinary sources of revenue really lost, 
those casual aids could no more maintain the vast 
interior and exterior expenses of France, than 
the autumnal rains in Abyssinia could fill the 
channel of the Nile, and enable it still to inun¬ 
date the plains of Egypt, if its native stream were 
drawn off. 

Besides, the commerce, and the colonial resour¬ 
ces, of Spain and Holland are, like those of France 
herself, apparently ruined by the war.—When, 
therefore, we calculated on contributions from 
these allies, this common drawback on their finan¬ 
ces should diminish our estimate of that resource. 

If we look back on the wars that preceded 
the last, the difficulties in this subject will be en¬ 
hanced. 

To impoverish our enemies used, in our former 
contests with France and Spain, to be a sure effect 
of our hostilities; and its extent was always pro¬ 
portionate to that of its grand instrument, our supe¬ 
riority at sea. We distressed their trade, we inter¬ 
cepted the produce of their colonies, and thus ex¬ 
hausted their treasuries, by cutting off their chief 
sources of revenue, as the philosopher proposed to 


8 


dry up the sea, by draining the rivers that fed it. 
By the same means, their expenditure was im¬ 
mensely increased, and wasted in defensive pur¬ 
poses. They were obliged to maintain fleets in 
distant parts of the world, and to furnish strong 
convoys for the protection of their intercourse 
with their colonies, both on the outward and 
homeward voyages. Again, the frequent capture 
of these convoys, while it enriched our seamen, 
and by the increase of import duties aided our 
revenue, obliged our enemies, at a fresh expense, 
to repair their loss of ships; and when a convoy 
outward-bound, was the subject of capture, com¬ 
pelled them either to dispatch duplicate supplies 
in the same season, at the risk of new disasters, or 
to leave their colonies in distress, and forfeit the 
benefit of their crops for the year. 

In short, their trans-marine possessions became 
expensive incuntbrances, rather than sources of 
revenue; and through the iteration of such losses, 
more than by our naval victories, or colonial con¬ 
quests, the house of Bourbon was vanquished by 
the masters of the sea. 

Have we then lost the triumphant means of 
such effectual warfare; or have the ancient fields 
of victory been neglected? 

Neither such a misfortune, nor such folly, can 
be alleged. Never was our maritime superiority 
more decisive than in the last and present war. 


9 


We are still the unresisted masters of every sea; 
and the open intercourse of our enemies with 
their colonies, was never so completely preclud¬ 
ed ; yet we do not hear that the merchants of 
France, Spain, and Holland, are ruined, or that 
their colonies are distressed, much less that their 
exchequers are empty. 

The true solution of these seeming difficul¬ 
ties, is this : The commercial and colonial inter¬ 
ests of our enemies, are now ruined in appear¬ 
ance only, not in reality. They seem to have 
retreated from the ocean, and to have abandoned 
the ports of their colonies, but it is a mere ruse de 
guerre —They have, in effect, for the most part, 
only changed their flags, chartered many vessels 
really neutral, and altered a little the former routes 
of their trade. Their trans-marine sources of re¬ 
venue, have not been for a moment destroyed 
by our hostilities, and at present are scarcely im¬ 
paired. 

Let it not, however, be supposed, that the pro¬ 
tection of the trade, and the revenue of an ene¬ 
my, from the fair effects of our arms, is the only 
prejudice we have sustained by the abuse of 
the neutral flag. To the same pestilent cause, 
are to be ascribed various other direct and col¬ 
lateral disadvantages, the effects of which we 
have severely felt in the late and present war, 
and which now menace consequences still more 
C 


10 


pernicious, both to us and our allies. Hitherto 
we have suffered the grossest invasions of our bel¬ 
ligerent rights, warrantably if not wisely; for the 
cost was all our own; and while the enemy to¬ 
tally abandoned the care of his marine, the sacri¬ 
fice could more safely be made: but now, when 
he is eagerly intent on the restitution of his navy, 
and when other powers have gallantly stood forth 
to stem the torrent of French ambition, the asser¬ 
tion of our maritime rights is become a duty to 
them as well as to ourselves: for our contribution 
to an offensive war must be weak, or far less than 
may justly be expected from such an ally as 
Great-Britain, while the shield of an insidious 
neutrality is cast between the enemy, and the 
sword of our naval power. 

In the hope of contributing to the correction of 
this great evil, I propose to consider,—* 

1st. Its origin, nature, and extent. 

2d. The remedy, and the right of applying 
it. 

3d. The prudence of that resort. 

There are few political subjects more impor¬ 
tant, and few, perhaps,' less generally understood 
by the intelligent part of the community, than 
the nature of that neutral commerce, which has 
lately in some measure excited the public atten¬ 
tion, in consequence of the invectives of Bonaparte 
and the complaints of the American merchants. 


ii 


The Moniteur asserts, that we have declared sugar 
and coffee to be contraband of war*, and some 
of our own newspapers, in their accounts of con¬ 
ferences supposed to have taken place between 
the minister, and the American resident, are 
scarcely nearer the truth. Our government has 
been stated to have recalled orders, which never 
issued, and to have promised concessions, which 
I believe were never required. 

To show what the subject of controversy, if any 
controversy actually now depends between the 
two nations, may probably be, as well as to 
make the abuses which I have undertaken to deli¬ 
neate more intelligible, I must begin with stating 
some important historical facts. 

The colonizing powers of Europe, it is well 
known, have always monopolized the trade of 
their respective colonies ; allowing no supplies to 
be carried to them under any foreign flag, or on 
account of any foreign importers ; and prohibiting 
the exportation of their produce in foreign ships, 
or to any foreign country, till it has been previously 
brought into the ports of the parent state.—Such, 
with a few trivial and temporary exceptions, has 
been the universal system in time of peace ; and, 
on a close adherence to this system, the value of 


* Moniteur of August 16th : London newspapers of the 27th. 


12 


colonies in the new world, has been supposed 
wholly to depend. 

In the war which commenced in the year 1756, 
and was ended by the peace of 1763, France, be¬ 
ing hard pressed by our maritime superiority, and 
unable with safety either to send the requisite sup¬ 
plies to her West-India Islands, or to bring their 
produce to the European market, under her own 
mercantile flag, resorted to the expedient of re¬ 
laxing her colonial monopoly; and admitted neu¬ 
tral vessels, under certain restrictions, to carry the 
produce of those islands to French or foreign ports 
in Europe. Of course it was so carried, either 
really or ostensibly, on neutral account; the object 
being to avoid capture on the passage. 

But the prize courts of Great-Britain, regard¬ 
ing this new trade as unwarranted by the rights 
of neutrality, condemned such vessels as were 
captured while engaged in it, together with their 
cargoes; however clearly the property of both 
might appear to be in those neutral merchants, on 
whose behalf they were claimed. 

As these vessels were admitted to a trade, in 
which, prior to the war, French bottoms only could 
be employed, they were considered as made French 
by adoption : but the substantial principle of the 
rule of judgment was this—“ that a neutral has 
no right to deliver a belligerent from the pressure 
of his enemy’s hostilities, by trading with his co- 


is 


lonies in time of war, in a way that was prohibited 
in time of peace.” 

When the facts which I would submit to the 
attention of the reader are fully before him, the 
justice and importance of this limitation of neu¬ 
tral commerce, which has sometimes been called, 
“ the rule of the war 17o6,” will be better under¬ 
stood. Yet a general preliminary account of the 
reasons on which it is founded, seems necessary to 
the right apprehension of some of those historical 
facts; I give it, therefore, in the language of one, 
whose ideas it is always injurious to quote in any 
words but his own. 

u The general rule is, that the neutral has a 
“ right to carry on, in time of war, his accus- 
“ tomed trade, to the utmost extent of which that 
“ accustomed trade is capable. Very different is 
<c the case of a trade which the neutral has never 
“ possessed, which he holds by no title of use and 
“ habit in times of peace ; and which, in fact, can 
“ obtain in war, by no other title, than by the 
“ success of the one belligerent against the other; 
“ and at the expense of that very belligerent 
“ under whose success he sets up his title; and 
£C such I take to be the colonial trade, generally 
<c speaking. 

“ What is the colonial trade, generally speak- 
“ ing ? It is a trade generally shut up to the ex- 
“ elusive use of the mother country, to which 


14 


the colony belongs, and this to a double use—the 
“ one that of supplying a market for the consump- 
tfc tion of native commodities, and the other, of 
“ furnishing to the mother country the peculiar 
“ commodities of the colonial regions: to these 
“ two purposes of the mother country, the gene- 
“ ral policy respecting colonies belonging to the 
“ states of Europe, has restricted them. 

“ With respect to other countries, generally 
“ speaking, the colony has no existence. It is 
“ possible that indirectly, and remotely, such co- 
“ lonies may affect the commerce of other coun- 
tries. The manufactures of Germany, may find 
“ their way into Jamaica or Guadaloupe, and the 
“ sugar of Jamaica or Guadaloupe, into the inte- 
“ rior parts of Germany; but as to any direct 
“ communication or advantages resulting there- 
“ from, Guadaloupe and Jamaica are no more to 
“ Germany, than if they were settlements in the 
“ mountains of the moon. To commercial pur- 
“ poses they are not in the same planet. If they 
“ were annihilated, it would make no chasm in 
cc the commercial map of Hamburgh. If Guada- 
“ loupe could be sunk in the sea, by the effect of 
“ hostility at the beginningof a war, it would be 
“ a mighty loss to France, as Jamaica would be to 
“ England, if it could be made the subject of a 
“ similar act of violence; but such events would 
“ find their way into the chronicles of other conn- 


15 


“ tries, as events of disinterested curiosity, and 
“ nothing more. 

“ Upon the interruption of a war, what are the 
“ rights of belligerents and neutrals respectively, 
" regarding such places ? It is an indubitable right 

of the belligerent to possess himself of such 
“ places, as of any other possession of his enemy. 
“ This is his common right; but he has the cer- 
“ tain means of carrying such a right into effect, 
cc if he has a decided superiority at sea. Such 
u colonies are dependent for their existence, as 
“ colonies, on foreign supplies; if they cannot 
“ be supplied and defended, they must fall to the 
“ belligerent of course: and if the belligerent 
“ chooses to apply his means to such an object, 
“ what right has a third party, perfectly neutral, 
<c to step in and prevent the execution ? No exist- 
cc ing interest of his, is affected by it; he can have 
“ no right to apply to his own use the beneficial 
“ consequences of the mere act of the belligerent, 
“ and to say, “ True it is you have, by force of 
“ arms, forced such places out of the exclusive 
“ possession of the enemy, but I will share the 
“ benefit of the conquest, and by sharing its be- 
“ nefits, prevent its progress. You have in effect, 
“ and by lawful means, turned the enemy out of 
“ the possession which he had exclusively main- 
“ tained against the whole world, and with whom 
^ we had never presumed to interfere; but we 


16 


“ will interpose to prevent his absolute surrender, 
“ by the means of that very opening, which the 
“ prevalence of your arms alone has effected 
<f supplies shall be sent and their products shall 
« be exported: you have lawfully destroyed his 
“ monopoly, but you ^ shall not be permitted to 
“ possess it yourself: we insist to share the fruits 
“ of your victories; and your blood and treasure 
“ have been expended, not for your own interest, 
“ but for the common benefit of others.” 

« Upon these grounds, it cannot be contended 
“ to be a right of neutrals, to intrude into a com- 
<c merce which had been uniformly shut against 
“ them, and which is now forced open merely by 
“ the pressure of war: for when the enemy, un- 
« der an entire inability to supply his colonies, 
“ and to export their products, affects to open 
“ them to neutrals, it is not his will, but his ne- 
« cessity, that changes the system: that change 
“ is the direct and unavoidable consequence of the 
“ compulsion of war; it is a measure not of French 
councils, but of British force'*.” 


* Judgment of Sir William Scott, in the case of the Immanuel, at the 
Admiralty, Nov. 1799. 

I quote from the second volume of the Reports of Dv. Robinson ; a 
work of transcendent value; and which will rise in the estimation of Eu¬ 
rope and America, in proportion as the rights and duties of nations are bet¬ 
ter known and respected. It repays the attention of the English lawyer, 
statesman, or scholar, not only by legal and political information of a 
highly important kind, and which is no where, else to be so fully and 


17 


Such were the principles of a rule first practi¬ 
cally established by the supreme Tribunal of 
Prize during the war of 17o6, only because the 
ease which demanded its application then first 
occurred; and it ought to be added, that the de¬ 
cisions of that tribunal, at the same period, were 
justly celebrated throughout Europe for their equi¬ 
ty and wisdom*. 

After France became a party to the American 
war, some captures were made, to which the same 
rule of law might, perhaps, in strictness, have been 
applied: for that power had again opened, in some 
degree, the ports of her West-India islands, to the 
ships of neutral powers. In this case, however, the 
measure preceded the commencement of her hos¬ 
tilities with Great Britain; and it was therefore spe¬ 
ciously represented on the part of the neutral claim¬ 
ants, as a genuine and permanent change in the 
commercial system of the enemy, by which they 
had a right to profit. The casein other respects also 
was much weaker than that of the war of 17o6; 
for our enemies, during the American contest, were 
never so inferior at sea, as to be unable to pro- 


c.orrectly obtained; but by exhibiting some of the happiest models of a. 
chaste judicial eloquence. 

* See Blaekstone’s Commentaries, Vol. III. 70; Montesquieu’s 
Letters, 5th March, 1753; and Vattel’s Law of Nations, Book II. 
c. 7. s. 84. 


v> 


18 


tect, in a great measure, their colonial trade from 
our hostilities. At some periods, they even possess¬ 
ed a naval superiority; especially in the West- 
Indian seas; where, in consequence, some of 
our most valuable islands fell into their hands, 
and were retained by them till the peace. France, 
therefore, could scarcely be said, in this case, to 
have rescued herself by the relaxation of her co¬ 
lonial system from actual distress, the effect of a 
maritime war. 

It waS a measure of convenience, no doubt, 
otherwise it would not have been adopted: but 
it was not an expedient which the pressure of our 
hostilities had made absolutely necessary. The 
distinction which I have first mentioned, however, 
was that which was principally insisted upon, in 
the leading cases of this class*. 

On these grounds, presumably, or on some of 
them, the ships in question, were restored by our 
Supreme Tribunal of Prize.—Perhaps the politi¬ 
cal difficulties of the day, especially the powerful, 
though injurious, influence of the first armed neu¬ 
trality, may have had some weight in those deci¬ 
sions. But whatever the motives were, the rule of 
the war 1756 was not avowedly departed from; 


* Cases of the Tiger, and the Copenhagen, at the Cockpit, 
1781. 


19 


much less expressly reversed. The most that can 
be alleged is, that in a case which, notwithstanding 
the distinctions above mentioned, may be possibly 
thought to have warranted the application of that 
rule, it was not at this time applied. 

The next war, was our late arduous contest with 
France ; in which our enemy, from the very com¬ 
mencement of hostilities, reverted to his former 
policy, without limitation or disguise.—Despairing 
of being able to dispute with us the dominion of 
the sea, the Republic, the moment she drew the 
sword against us, threw wide open to every paci¬ 
fic flag all the ports of her colonies; some of 
which had been, in fact, partially opened a little 
earlier, without her licence, by the local revolu¬ 
tionary powers; and the neutral merchants hn- 
mediately rushed in with avidity, to reap the of¬ 
fered harvest. 

Our government, on notice of the general fact, 
adopted with promptitude the course which it 
seemed proper to take. On the 6th of November, 
1793, a royal instruction to the commanders of 
his Majesty's ships of war and privateers, was is¬ 
sued, ordering them cc to stop and detain for law- 
“ ful adjudication, all vessels laden with goods the 
“ produce of any French colony, or carrying pro- 
“ visions or other supplies for the use of any such 
“ colony.” 

A new Power had now arisen on the western 


20 


shore of the Atlantic,, whose position, and mari* 
time spirit, were calculated to give new and vast 
importance to every question of neutral rights ; 
especially in the American seas. The merchants 
of the United States were the first, and by far the 
most enterprising adventurers in the new field that 
was opened to neutrals in the Antilles; and the 
ports of the French islands were speedily crowded 
with their vessels. 

Of course, the cargoes they received there, as 
well as those they delivered, were all declared by 
their papers to be neutral property; but when 
instead of rum and molasses, the ordinary and 
ample exchange in the West-India markets for the 
provisions and lumber of America, the neutral 
ship owners pretended to have acquired, in barter 
for those cheap and bulky commodities, full car¬ 
goes of sugar and coffee; the blindest credulity 
could scarcely give credit to the tale. It was 
evident, that the flag of the United States was, 
for the most part, used to protect the property 
of the French planter, not of the American mer¬ 
chant. 

The royal instruction, nevertheless, seemed to 
operate severely against the new-born neutral 
power. Great numbers of ships, under American 
colours, were taken in the West-Indies, and con¬ 
demned by the Vice Admiralty Courts. 

The fraudulent pretences of neutral property 


21 


in the cargoes were in general so gross, being 
contrived by men at that time inexpert in such 
business, that a great part of these prizes might 
have been condemned on the most satisfactory 
grounds as hostile property, had the proper [exa¬ 
minations taken place. But the Vice Admiralty 
Courts, which at that time were very badly con¬ 
stituted, regarded the illegality of the trade, as an 
infallible ground of decision ; and therefore were 
grossly remiss in taking and preserving the evi¬ 
dence on the point of property. In many cases, 
they proceeded no further in putting the standing 
interrogatories to the persons usually examined, 
than was necessary to obtain from them an avowal 
of the place of shipment or destination. The cap- 
tors, influenced by the same reliance on the 
rule of law, neglected to search for concealed 
papers; and those documents which the masters 
thought fit to produce, were often given back to 
them at their request, without the preservation of 
a copy, or any minute of their nature or con¬ 
tents: irregularities, which proved in the sequel 
highly injurious to the captors, and a cover for 
fraudulent ‘claims. 

It is needless to state particularly, the disputes 
that ensued between our government and the 
neutral powers, or the amicable arrangements by 
which they were terminated; as these facts are 
'Sufficiently known. It is however proper to re- 


22 


mark, that nothing was expressly settled by any 
convention, respecting the lawfulness of neutral 
commerce with the colonies of a belligerent state ; 
nor were any concessions made, whereby this 
country was in any degree precluded from assert¬ 
ing the rule of the war 1756, at any subsequent 
period, to its utmost practical extent. 

It was agreed, that all sentences of condem¬ 
nation founded on the instruction of November, 
1793, should be submitted to the revision of the 
appellate jurisdiction ; but that instruction was in 
January, 1794, so far repealed, that instead of the 
comprehensive order therein contained, the direc¬ 
tion only was to seize cc such vessels as were laden 
with goods the produce of the French West-India 
Islands, and coming directly from any port of the 
said Islands to Europe.” 

The latter instruction remained in force till 
January, 1798, when a new one was substituted, 
which remained unrevoked to the end of the war. 
By this last Royal Order, the direction was to 
bring in for lawful adjudication all cc vessels laden 
“ with the produce of any island or settlement 
" of France, Spain, or Flolland; and coming di- 
<c rectly from any port of the said island or set- 
w tlements to any port in Europe, not being a 
“ port of this kingdom, or of the country to which 
" the vessel, being neutral, should belong.” In 
other words, European neutrals, might, without 


23 


being liabfe to capture under this last instruction, 
bring the produce of a hostile colony to ports of 
their own country; and either these, or the citi¬ 
zens of the United States, might now carry such 
produce directly to England; either of which voy¬ 
ages would have subjected the ship to seizure un¬ 
der the Instruction of 1794. 

The decisions of the Admiralty Courts, and of 
the Lords Commissioners of Appeals, on this in¬ 
teresting subject, next demand our notice. 

Royal instructions, from the time of their pro¬ 
mulgation, of course, become law to all executive 
officers acting under his Majesty’s commission, 
so as absolutely to direct their conduct, in relation 
either to the enemy, or the neutral flag. Their 
legislative force in the prize court also, will not 
be disputed ; except that if a royal order could be 
supposed to militate plainly against the rights of 
neutral subjects, as founded on the acknowledged 
law of nations, the judge, it may be contended, 
ought not to yield obedience ; but when the so- 
verign only interposes to remit such belligerent 
rights, as he might lawfully enforce, there can be 
no room for any such question; for, “ volenti non 
Jit injuria ,” and the captor can have no rights, but 
such as he derives from the sovereign, whose com¬ 
mission he bears. 

It results from these principles, that whether a 
judgment by the prize court, condemning pro- 


24 


perty claimed as neutral, but captured pursuant to 
a prohibitory royal instruction, does or does not 
amount to a positive declaration of the opinion 
of that tribunal, on the principle of the prohibition 
itself; the restitution of property so claimed, in 
pursuance of a permissive instruction, clearly is 
no affirmation that by the general principles of 
the law of nations, independently of the will of 
the Sovereign, the captured property ought to 
have been restored. 

If this remark be kept in view, it will be 
found that the Admiralty Court, and the Lords 
Commissioners, were so far from impeaching dur¬ 
ing the late war, by any of their decisions, the 
rule of the war 1756, that they, on the contrary, 
adhered firmly to the sense of their predecessors, 
the judges of that period. They condemned all 
vessels and cargoes, taken in voyages that fell 
within the prohibitory intent of the existing in¬ 
struction, which was so far practically pursuant to 
that rule: nor did they omit in such decisions to 
declare that they considered the rule of the war 
1756, as founded 011 most incontestible principles 
of the law of nations. On the other hand, they 
restored such neutral property as was captured in 
the course of a voyage allowed by the existing 
instruction; expressly on the ground of that vo¬ 
luntary relaxation of the rule of law, which his 
Majesty had been pleased to introduce. 


25 


It should here be observed, that these royal 
orders were all couched in directory, not in pro¬ 
hibitory terms; also, that in none of them is any 
branch of the neutral intercourse with the colo¬ 
nies of our enemies, expressly permitted. But 
when the order of November, 1793, to seize all 
vessels bringing produce from the hostile colonies, 
was revoked by that of January, 1794, and in 
lieu thereof, a direction was given to seize such 
vessels when bound to Europe, an indulgence to 
neutral vessels carrying such cargoes to other 
parts of the world, was plainly implied; and in like 
manner; when the instruction of 1798 still further 
narrowed the prohibitory effect of the direction, 
confining it to vessels bound to countries in Eu¬ 
rope not their own, with the exception of Great- 
Britain, the trade to their own ports, and to ports 
of this kingdom, was by -clear implication per¬ 
mitted. 

Their lordships, and the judges of the court 
of admiralty, also followed these distinctions into 
fair analogies, in respect of the outward voyage. 
This branch of the trade, was left unnoticed in the 
two latter instructions; but as that of 1793, which 
placed the carrying supplies to a hostile colony, on 
the same footing with the bringing away its pro¬ 
duce, had been generally revoked; it would have 
been unreasonable and inconsistent not to admit, 
that a neutral vessel might allowably go to the 
E 



26 


colony, from the same port, to which she was now 
allowed to carry its produce. Such outward voy¬ 
ages therefore were held to be within the clear 
meaning of the relaxation. 

On the other hand, when neither the letter nor 
spirit of the royal instructions, could fairly be 
construed to have permitted the particular branch 
of this commerce with the hostile colonies, in re¬ 
spect of which a question arose, it was always 
held by those tribunals to be illegal. Thus, a 
voyage from any hostile country, whether in 
Europe or elsewhere, to any hostile colony; or 
vice versa; the voyage of an American'from a 
hostile colony to any port in Europe except 
Great-Britain; the voyage of a Dane or Swede 
from any hostile colony to the United States of 
America ; and their respective converses, have all 
been held to be contrary to the law of war, and 
have induced the condemnation both of the ships 
and cargoes*. 

In short, the doctrine uniformly held by the * 
lords commissioners of appeals, as well as by the 
Court of Admiralty, was such as the learned 
judge of that court, has thus comprehensively ex¬ 
pressed :— cc The true rule of the court, is the text 
“ of the instructions; what is not found therein 

* Cases of the New Adventure ■> The Charlotte, Coffin ; the* 
Volant, Bessom; the Wilhelmina, &c. &c. at the Cockpit, last 
war. 


°27 


4k permitted, is understood to be prohibited; upon 
u this plain principle, that the colony trade is ge- 
<c nerally prohibited, and that whatever is not spe- 
“ cially relaxed, continues in a state of interdic- 

tion 

The only decisions in which the supreme tri¬ 
bunal may possibly be supposed to have departed 
from the rule of the war of 1756 , on any other 
ground than that of a voluntary remission of bel¬ 
ligerent rights by the crown, were the restitu¬ 
tions of vessels and cargoes which had been cap¬ 
tured and condemned prior to the instruction of 
January 1794 3 for by that order the first legisla¬ 
tive relaxation of the general prohibitory rule was 
introduced. 

Vessels and cargoes of this description certainly 
were restored, when the voyages in which they 
were taken were found to have been such, as that 
instruction, if in force at the time, would have le¬ 
galised. 

There may be good reasons for giving to such 
orders in time of war, when they go to enlarge, not 
to restrain, the indulgence of neutral trade, a re¬ 
troactive effect upon cases still depending in judg¬ 
ment. Nor is it unjust towards captors ; for since 
they often derive from sudden changes, during the 


* Case of the Immanuel at the Admiralty, 2d Robinson’s Reports, 202. 


28 


war* in our relations with different powers, or 
from new strictness in the conduct of the war 
itself, benefits not in their contemplation at the 
time of the capture; it is reasonable that their pri¬ 
vate interest should, on the other hand, give way 
to the public good, when necessary for purposes 
of conciliation with neutral states, and to effec¬ 
tuate such arrangements with them, as may 
intervene between the capture and the judgment. 
It might be added, that a captor’s rights under 
the acts of parliament which give him the benefit 
of the prizes he makes, comprehend by express 
law, no more than property taken from the ene¬ 
my ; and are extended to neutral property con¬ 
demned for violations of the law of war, only 
through a liberal construction made by the prize 
tribunals; consequently it would be the more un¬ 
reasonable to restrain on the notion of an inchoate 
right in him prior to the definitive sentence, the 
power of the state itself to decide, how far the 
rules of that law shall be relaxed in favour of 
neutral powers. It is enough that he is indemni¬ 
fied ; and in the present case, all captors, whose 
disappointment would have been attended with 
actual loss, had reason to be satisfied with the na¬ 
tional liberality and justice. 

But in truth, the lords commissioners found 
also some equitable reasons, on behalf of the neu- 


29 


tral claimants, for giving to such of them as had 
traded with the French islands, prior to January 
179^, the benefit of that instruction. 

I presume not to develope the motives of his 
Majesty’s government for granting such large and 
truly costly indulgences as were ultimately ac¬ 
corded to neutral commerce during the last war, at 
the expense of our belligerent interests. They were 
perhaps proportionate in their weight, to the mag¬ 
nitude of the sacrifice. But the indulgent instruc¬ 
tion of 1794, was probably founded in part, on a 
consideration which avowedly weighed much with 
the lords commissioners, for giving it a retrospec¬ 
tive effect. It was found, that before the French 
actually engaged in hostilities with any maritime 
power, the revolutionary assemblies and governors 
of her West-India islands, had opened some of 
their ports, to a considerable extent, to foreign ves¬ 
sels bringing necessary supplies ; and consequent¬ 
ly that the principle of the rule of the war 1756, 
did not apply to the whole extent of the existing 
neutral commerce with those colonies *. 


As this is an important fact, of which authentic evidence is not 
easily to be found in Europe, I subjoin a proclamation of the French 
governor Behague and the colonial assembly of Martinique, by which 
certain ports of that island were opened. It is extracted from the evi¬ 
dence in a prize appeal, that of the Peter, Augustus-Robson, mas¬ 

ter, before the lords commissioners, Dec. 16, 1801. 



30 


This innovation was apparently unknown to, or 
overlooked by our government, when the instruc- 

“ PROCLAMATION. 

“ John Peter Anthony de Behague, lieutenant-general in 
“ the King’s armies, governor-general of the Windward Is- 
<{ lands, commanding in chief the forces by land and sea. 

“ Examined by us the resolution of the colonial assem- 
il bly of the 14th of this tnonth, the purport whereof fol- 
<c lows : 

w Extract of the verbal process of the resolution of the colo- 
“ nial assembly in their sitting of the fourth day of December, 
“ 1792. 

“ The colonial assembly of Martinique, after hearing the re- 
“ ports of its committee, and taking into consideration what 
“ had been done at Guadaloupe, upon opening the ports, re- 
61 solved, 

M 1st. That the ports and roads of Saint Pierre, Fort 
“ Royal, and Marin, shall be open to all strangers without 
“ exception, for the introduction of all sustenances, and 
“ other necessary articles, as well for the cultivation of lands, 
(i as the erection of buildings, and they are permitted to ex- 
“ port produce of every kind, which may be given them in re- 
“ turn. 

“ 2d. That without altering old customs in the regard to 
“ the duties on importation, those payable on exportation, 
“ as well by foreigners as Frenchmen, as also by those ship- 
“ ping either to a foreign country, or the French ports 
“ shall, from the date of the publication of these presents, 
u consist in one sole duty of three per cent.; which duty 
“ shall be borne by the shippers, independent of the addi- 

ditional duty of 27 livres per hogshead of sugar, and two 


31 


tion of November 1793, was framed ; otherwise an 
exception would probably have been made in fa- 

44 and a quarter per cent, on all other island produce^ 
44 which shall be received as before, and which are at the 
44 charge of the seller. Taffia, rum, and molasses, shall 

44 continue to be liable only to the former established du« 

w ties. 

44 3d. That the duties above alluded to shall be paid, 
44 according to the usages and forms already fixed. That all 
44 the above regulations shall continue in full force until ex- 
44 press orders to the contrary. In order that the present 
44 resolution, with the approbation of the governor, may 

44 be carried into effect without delay, 1000 copies shall be 

44 forthwith printed, affixed, published, and sent to the neighbour- 
44 ing islands, wherever it may be necessary. 

(Signed) 

44 Gilliet Charley, Vice-President. 

44 Gallet S. Aurin, President. 

u Rigordy, Secretary. 

44 Des Londes, Joint Secretary. 

44 By virtue of the powers with which we are invested, we 
44 approve, and do approve of the above decree being car- 
44 ried into execution, according to the form and effect 
4 ‘ thereof; and in consequence, and by virtue of the same 
44 powers, order, and do order, to the administration, bo- 
44 dies, and functionaries, that these presents be transcribed 
44 in our registry, read, published, and executed in the re- 
44 spective districts. Given at Fort Royal, Martinique, unde ia 
44 our seal, and the countersign of our secretary, the 15th day 
44 of December, 1792. 

(Signed) 44 Behacue. 

44 By order of the General, 

(Signed) 44 Peheiopet.*’ 




vour of such neutral vessels as were found trading 
within the limitations of the new laws, promulged 
before the war. 

It must indeed be owned, that this relaxation 
of the national monopoly, was a mere temporary 
expedient, the result of distress occasioned by re¬ 
volution and civil war in the parent state, and the 
consequent neglect of her trans-marine interests 
in general; that the legislative authority from 
which it flowed was highly questionable*; and 
that it was not even pretended by its authors, to 
be founded on any intention of permanently al¬ 
tering the established commercial relations be¬ 
tween the mother country and her colonies. 
Nor would it have been unnatural to surmise, 
that this innovation was adopted in contempla¬ 
tion of that war with the maritime powers, which 
France was determined to provoke, and which so 


* It appeared in the evidence in the same cause from which the 
above proclamation is extracted, that the royalist and republican par¬ 
ties, who alternately prevailed in the French Windward-Islands in that 
season of distraction which immediately preceded the late war, suc¬ 
cessively opened and shut the ports in opposition to each other, du¬ 
ring their brief periods of authority ; and it is remarkable that the 
party of the royalists and planters, under General Eehague, was 
that which introduced and supported this innovation.—Their oppo¬ 
nents abstained from it on motives of respect to the authority of 
the National Convention, notwithstanding the distress of the islands at 
the time. 


33 


soon after took place. If so, it was a mere stra¬ 
tagem to elude our belligerent rights; and we were 
no more bound to admit any claims of neu¬ 
tral privilege which might be deduced from it, than 
if the innovation had been made after the war 
had actually commenced. The claimants, how¬ 
ever, contended that it was not to be considered 
as a temporizing measure, but as a change of 
system to which France would permanently ad¬ 
here ; and the revolutionary spirit of the day gave 
some plausibility to the expectation, though the 
conduct of the French government, subsequent to 
the treaty of Amiens, has proved it to have been 
groundless. 

But however disputable the duty might be on 
our part, to tolerate this new trade during the late 
war, on the ground of any change that had pre^ 
viously taken place in the West-Indies, it is clear 
that the neutral merchants who had engaged in it 
prior to any notice of our hostilities with France, 
were entitled to finish their voyages without mo¬ 
lestation. This indeed was never disputed; un¬ 
less when their ships were detained on suspicion 
of having French property on board. But had 
the fact of the new colonial regulations been 
known, something more seems to have been due 
to them. Some notice ought, perhaps, to have 
been given, that this country would not acquiesce 
F 


34 


in the further prosecution of a trade so opposite to 
her belligerent rights; and this the rather, because 
we had already forborne to assert them in a case 
somewhat similar, in the last preceding war.— 
No such notice was given prior to the instruc¬ 
tion of November, 1793; and therefore the neu¬ 
tral merchants might naturally enough conclude, 
that the toleration of this commerce, which they 
experienced at the commencement of the war, 
would be extended to their future voyages. 

That these considerations were admitted by his 
Majesty’s ministers, in the discussions that ensued 
between them and the neutral powers, may be 
reasonably conjectured; but certain it is, that the 
lords commissioners of appeals, adverted to them 
as one motive of the great indulgence shown by 
their lordships to the class of claimants whose 
cases we are now reviewing ; and consequently, if 
the right to give a retroactive effect to the in¬ 
struction of January, 1794, can reasonably be 
questioned, we have here another ground, on which 
these restitutions may w r ell be reconciled with the 
rule of the war 1736. 

So far were the decisions of their lordships, even 
in these early and favourable cases, from impeach¬ 
ing the principle of that important rule, that by 
some of them it was practically affirmed. Such 
American vessels captured in the summer of 1793, 
as were laden with French colonial produce, and 


35 


bound to the ports of France, or to Europe, were 
condemned expressly on that rule of law *. 

Having stated thus generally the conduct both 
of the executive government, and of the prize tri¬ 
bunals of Great-Britain, in regard to this great 
principle of the law of nations, during the last 
war, I have to add, that on the recommencement 
of hostilities with France in 1803, the same sys¬ 
tem was with little variation pursued. 

An instruction, dated the 24th of June in that 
year, directed the commanders of his Majesty's 
ships of war and privateers “ not to seize any 
“ neutral vessels which should be found carrying 
“ on trade directly between the colonies of the 
u enemy, and the neutral country to which the 
<c vessel belonged, and laden with property of the 
“ inhabitants of such neutral country; provided 
“ that such neutral vessel should not be supply- 
“ ing, nor should have on the outward voyage sup- 
u plied, the enemy, with any articles contraband 
“ of war, and should not be trading with any 
u blockaded ports." 

This proviso had been rendered too necessary 
by the misconduct of neutrals in the former war, 
to be now omitted, and forms the only substantial 
difference between the existing instruction, and 
that of January 1798j except that the ports of 

* Cases of the Charlotte, Coffin ; the Volant, Bessom j and Betsy, 
Kinsman; 19th Dec. 180K 


So 


his kingdom are no longer permitted places of 
destination, from the hostile colonies ; and that the 
Cargo, as well as the ship, is now required to belong 
to subjects of the same neutral country to or from 
which the voyage is made. 

The general result of this historical statement 
is, that we have receded very far in practice from 
the application of the rule of the war 17^6, in some 
points, while we have adhered to it in others; but 
that the principle of that important rule in point 
of right, has never been at any time, either theo¬ 
retically or practically abandoned. 

Let us next inquire what use has been made by 
neutral merchants, of the indulgences which the 
British government has thus liberally granted.— 
We have suffered neutrals to trade with the colo¬ 
nies of our enemy, directly to or from the ports of 
their own respective countries, but not directly to 
or from any other part of the world, England, dur¬ 
ing the last war, excepted. Have they been con¬ 
tent to observe the restriction ? 

One pretext of the neutral powers, for claim¬ 
ing a right to trade with the hostile colonies, 
was the desire of supplying themselves with sugar, 
and other articles of West-India produce, for their 
own consumption; and it was speciously repre¬ 
sented as a particular hardship in the case of Ame¬ 
rica, that, though a near neighbour to the West- 
Indies, she should be precluded from buying those 


commodities in the colonial markets of our ene¬ 
mies, while shut out by law from our own. 

The argument was more plausible than sound; 
for in time of peace, this new power was subject 
to the same general exclusion; as were also the 
other neutral nations.—Besides, Denmark has co¬ 
lonies, which more than supplies her own moderate 
consumption; and as to that of Sweden, and of the 
United States, it was always exceedingly small. 
The only products of the West-Indies, that the lat¬ 
ter usually imported, a little refined sugar, and cof¬ 
fee from England excepted, were rum and molas¬ 
ses ; and with these we were willing still copious¬ 
ly to supply them from our own islands; nor would 
the importing of such articles as these from the hos¬ 
tile colonies perhaps have been thought worth a 
serious dispute. It is well known that the frugalciti- 
zens of America, make molasses for the most part 
their substitute for sugar; and have learned from 
habit to prefer it to that more costly article. 

However, this pretext was completely removed, 
when the British government gave way so far to it, 
and the other arguments of the neutral powers, as 
to allow them to carry on the trade in question, 
to their own ports. The instruction of 1794, 
indeed, seemed not to concede so much to the neu¬ 
tral states of Europe; but when it is recollected, 
that Denmark and Sweden each possessed islands 
in the West-Indies, which might be made entre - 


38 


pots between their European dominions and the 
French colonies, it will be seen that they were 
put nearly on an equal footing with the United 
States of America. 

Had the neutral powers been influenced by jus¬ 
tice and moderation, these concessions would not 
only have been satisfactory, but might have been 
guarded by reciprocal concessions, perhaps, against 
any pernicious abuse; as was attempted in the 12th 
article of our treaty with America, soon after ne- 
gociated and signed by Mr. Jay. 

The chief danger of our so far receding from the 
full extent of our belligerent rights, as to allow the 
neutral states to import directly the produce of the 
hostile colonies, was that it might be re-exported, 
and sent either to the mother country in Europe, 
or to neighbouring neutral ports, from which the 
produce itself, or its proceeds, might be easily re¬ 
mitted to the hostile country; in which case our ene¬ 
mies would scarcely feel any serious ill effect from 
the war, in regard to their colonial trade. It was 
wisely, therefore, stipulated in the American treaty, 
that West-India produce should not be re-exported 
during the war from that country; and the bet¬ 
ter to reconcile the United States to that restric¬ 
tion, they were admitted, by the same article, 
to an extensive trade, during the same period, and 
for two years longer, with the British West-India 
Islands. 


39 


Had not this equitable agreement proved abor¬ 
tive, arrangements of a like tendency would no 
doubt have been negociated with the neutral 
powers of Europe: but unfortunately, the clamor¬ 
ous voice of the French agents, and of a few self- 
interested men, in America, prevailed so much 
over the suggestions of justice, and the true per¬ 
manent interests of both countries, that in the ra¬ 
tification of the treaty by the government of the 
United States, the 12th article was excepted. 

In truth, those injurious consequences which 
formed a reasonable subject of apprehension to this 
country, were essential to the selfish views of the 
neutral merchants who had engaged in the new 
trade with the French colonies. 

To the Americans especially, whether dealing 
on their own account, or as secret agents of the 
enemy, the profit would have been comparatively 
small, and the business itself inconsiderable, had 
they not been allowed to send forward to Europe, 
at least in a circuitous way, the produce they 
brought from the islands. The obligation of first 
importing into their own country, was an incon¬ 
venience which their geographical position made of 
little moment; but the European, and not the 
American market, was that in which alone the ul¬ 
timate profit could be reaped, or the neutralizing 
commission secured. 

In the partial ratification of the treaty by Arne- 


40 


rica, our government acquiesced. No conven¬ 
tional arrangements consequently remained with 
that neutral power, and none were made with any 
other for palliating the evils likely to arise from 
the relaxing instruction; but they were left to 
operate, and progressively to increase, to that per¬ 
nicious and dangerous extent which shall be pre¬ 
sently noticed. 

War, in suspending the direct communication 
between the hostile colonies and their parent 
states, cannot dissolve those ties of property, of 
private connexion, of taste, opinion, and habit, 
which bind them to each other. The colonist still 
prefers those manufactures of his native country 
with which he has been usually supplied; and still 
wishes to lodge in her banks, or with her mer¬ 
chants, the disposable value of his produce. That 
the colonial proprietors resident in Europe, must 
desire to have their revenues remitted thither, as 
formerly, is still more obvious; and indeed such an 
adherence to the old course of things, is both with 
them and their absent brethren, in general rather 
a matter of necessity than choice; for mortgagees, 
and other creditors, in the mother country, are 
commonly entitled to receive a large part of the 
annual returns of a West-India plantation. 

The consequence is, that into whatever new chan¬ 
nels the commerce of the belligerent colonies may 
artificially be pushed by the war, it must always h ave 


41 


a most powerful tendency, to find its way from its 
former fountains to its former reservoirs. The 
colonial proprietor, if obliged to ship his goods 
in neutral bottoms, will still send them directly 
to his home in Europe, if he can ; and if not, will 
make some neutral port a mere warehouse, or at 
most a market, from which the proceeds of the 
shipment, if not the goods themselves, may be re¬ 
mitted to himself, or his agents, in the parent state. 

Such has been the event in the case before us. 
But let us see more particularly how the grand 
objects of the enemy planter and merchant, have 
been, in this respect, accomplished. 

When enabled by the royal instructions, 
to trade safely to and from neutral ports, they 
found various indirect means opened to them for 
the attainment of those ultimate ends, of which 
the best, and most generally adopted, were the two 
following:—They might either clear out for a 
neutral port, and, under cover of that pretended 
destination, make a direct voyage from the colony 
to the parent state; or they might really proceed 
to some neutral country, and from thence re¬ 
export the cargo, in the same or a different bot¬ 
tom, to whatever European market, whether neu¬ 
tral or hostile, they preferred. 

The first of these was the shortest, and most 
convenient method ; the other the most secure.— 
G 


4 2 


The former was chiefly adopted by the Dutch, on 
their homeward voyages; because a pretended 
destination for Prussian, Swedish, or Danish ports 
in the North Sea, or the Baltic, was a plausible 
mask, even in the closest approximation the ship 
might make to the Dutch coast, and to the mo¬ 
ment of her slipping into port: but the latter 
method, was commonly preferred by the Spaniards 
and French, in bringing home their colonial pro¬ 
duce; because no credible neutral destination could 
in general be pretended, that would consist with the 
geographical position and course of a ship coming 
directly from the West-Indies, if met with near 
the end of her voyage, in the latitude of their 
principal ports. 

The American flag, in particular, was a cover 
that could scarcely ever be adapted to the former 
method of eluding our hostilities; while it was 
found peculiarly convenient in the other. Such 
is the position of the United States, and such the 
effect of the trade-winds, that European vessels, 
liomeword-bound from the West-Indies, can touch 
at their ports with very little inconvenience or 
delay; and the same is the case, though in a less 
degree, in regard to vessels coming from the re¬ 
motest parts of South America or the East-Indies. 
The passage from the Gulf of Mexico, espe¬ 
cially, runs so close along the North American 
shore, that ships bound from the Havannah, from 


43 


VeraCruz, and other great Spanish ports border¬ 
ing on that Gulf, to Europe, can touch at cer¬ 
tain ports in the United States with scarcely any 
deviation. On an outward voyage to the East 
and West-Indies, indeed, the proper course is 
more to the southward, than will well consist with 
touching in North-Ameriea; yet the deviation 
for that purpose is not a very formidable incon¬ 
venience. Prior to the independency of that 
country, it was not unusual for our own outward 
bound West-Indiamen to call there, for the pur¬ 
pose of filling up their vacant room with lumber 
or provisions. 

But this new neutral country, though so hap¬ 
pily placed as an entrepot , is obviously no place 
for a fictitious destination, on any voyage between 
the colonies and Europe; because, as it lies mid¬ 
way between them, the pretext would be worn out 
long before its end was accomplished. 

From these causes it has naturally happened 
that the protection given by the American flag, 
to the intercourse between our European enemies 
and their colonies, since the instruction of Jauuary, 
1794, has chiefly been in the way of a double 
voyage, in which America has been the half-way 
house, or central point of communication. The 
fabrics and commodities of France, Spain, and 
Holland, have been brought under American co¬ 
lours to ports in the United States; and from 


44 


thence re-exporttd, under the same flag, for the 
Supply of the hostile colonies. Again, the pro¬ 
duce of those colonies has been brought, in a like 
manner, to the American ports, and from thence 
re-shipped to Europe. 

The royal instruction of 1798, however, opened 
to the enemy a new method of eluding capture 
under the American flag, and enabled it to per¬ 
form that service for him, in a more compendious 
manner. The ports of this kingdom, were now 
made legitimate places of destination, to neutrals 
coming with cargoes of produce directly from the 
hostile colonies. 

Since it w^as found necessary or prudent, 
to allow European neutrals to carry on this trade 
directly to their own countries, it was, per¬ 
haps, deemed a palliation of the evils likely to 
follow, and even some compensation for them in 
the way of commercial advantage, to obtain for 
ourselves a share of those rich imports, w hich were 
now likely to be poured more abundantly than 
ever, through our own very costly courtesy, into 
the neutral ports of Europe. We had submitted 
to a most dangerous mutilation of our belligerent 
rights, to gratify the rapacity of other nations; 
and we felt, perhaps, like a poor seaman, men¬ 
tioned by Goldsmith, who, in a famine at sea, 
being obliged to spare a certain part of his body to 
feed his hungry companions, reasonably claimed 


45 


a right to have the first steak for himself. Or, per¬ 
haps, the motive was a desire more effectually to 
conciliate America. If so, we were most ungrate¬ 
fully requited; but in the other case, the error 
flowed from a very copious source of our national 
evils, though one too plausible and popular, to be 
incidentally developed in a work like this : I mean 
a morbid excess of sensibility to immediate com¬ 
mercial profit. The Dutch, who during a siege 
sold gunpowder to their enemies, were not the 
only people who have sometimes preferred their 
trade to their political safety. 

The use immediately made by the American 
merchants of this new licence, was to make a pre¬ 
tended destination to British ports, that conve¬ 
nient cover for a voyage from the hostile colonies 
to Europe, which their flag could not otherwise 
give; and thus to rival the neutrals of the old 
world, in this method of protecting the West-India 
trade of our enemies, while they nearly engrossed 
the other. The destination of American West-In- 
diamen “ to Cowes, and a market,” became as pro¬ 
verbial a cheat in the Admiralty Courts, as ring 
dropping is at Bow-street. 

They often indeed really did call at Cowes, or 
some other port in the channel: but it was in ge¬ 
neral, only to facilitate through a communication 
with their agents here, and by correspondence with 
their principal in the hostile countries, the true 


46 


ultimate purpose of the voyage. They might even 
sell in our markets, when the prices made it clear¬ 
ly the interest of their French or Spanish employers 
to do so ; but whether Havre, Amsterdam, Ham¬ 
burgh, or London, might be the more inviting 
market, the effect of touching in England was 
commonly only that of enabling them to deter¬ 
mine, in what way the indulgence of this country 
might be used with the greatest profit to our ene¬ 
mies. 

This last extension of our ruinous liberality 
has not, in the present war, been renewed. The 
method of the double voyage, therefore, which 
was always the most prevalent, is now the only 
mode, of American neutralization in the colonial 
trade. 

It may be thought, perhaps, that this allowed 
method of eluding our hostilities, might have 
contented the French and Spaniards, and their 
neutralizing agents, as a deliverance from all the 
perils of capture, sufficiently cheap and safe, to sa¬ 
tisfy the enemies of this great maritime country, 
when they durst not show a pendant on the 
ocean. To neutrals, trading on their own ac¬ 
count, this qualified admission into the rich com¬ 
merce of both the Indies, may seem to have 
been a boon advantageous enough; when con¬ 
sidered as a gratuitous gain derived from the 
misfortunes of other nations. But moderation. 


47 


is the companion of justice, and belongs not to 
the selfish spirit of encroachment; nor is success¬ 
ful usurpation ever satisfied, while there remains 
with the injured party one unviolated, or unabdi¬ 
cated right. 

America, we have seen, like other neutral 
powers, was permitted to carry the produce of 
the hostile colonies to her own ports, and from 
thence might export it to Europe; nay, even to 
France and Spain. She was also at liberty to 
import the manufactures of those countries, and 
might afterwards export the same goods to their 
colonies; but the word directly , in the royal 
instruction, as well as the spirit of these relaxa¬ 
tions, in general, plainly required, that there 
should be a bona fide shipment from, or delivery 
in, the neutral country—in other words, that the 
voyage should actually, and not colourably, ori¬ 
ginate, or terminate, in such a way as the subsist¬ 
ing rule allowed. 

The American merchants, however, very early 
began, in their intercourse with the Spaniards, 
to elude the spirit of the restriction, by call¬ 
ing at their own ports, merely in order to ob¬ 
tain new clearances; and then proceeding for¬ 
ward to Spain with produce which they had ship¬ 
ped in her colonies; or to the latter, with supplies, 
which were taken on board in Spain. 

It seems scarcely necessary to show, that, by 






48 


this practice, the licence accorded by the Bri¬ 
tish government was grossly abused. What was 
the principle of the relaxation ?—an indulgence 
expressly to the commerce of neutral countries. 
What was the object of the restriction ?—To pre¬ 
vent, as much as consisted with that indulgence, 
the intercourse between the European enemy and 
his colonies, in neutral ships. But the mere 
touching, or stopping, of a ship at any country, 
does not make her voyage a branch of the trade 
of that country. Our East-India trade, is not the 
trade of St. Elelena. Neither was it any restraint 
on the intercourse between the enemy and his 
colonies, such as could gravely be supposed to be 
meant by the restriction, to oblige him merely to 
drop anchor, at some neutral port in his way. 

According to some recent doctrines, indeed, 
which that great champion of neutral rights, the 
murderer of the Due D’Enghein, inculcates, trade 
in a neutral vessel, be the voyage what it may, is 
neutral trade; but America does not, in the pre¬ 
sent case at least, assert that preposterous rule; for 
she tacitly professes to acquiesce in the restriction 
in question, when, in point of form, she complies 
with it; and the neutrality of the trade, in the sense 
of the royal instruction, is plainly a local idea :—it 
is the commerce, not of the ship, but of the coun¬ 
try, to which indulgence was meant to be given. 
The only question therefore, is, whether the trade 


49 


between France or Spain and their colonies, be¬ 
comes the trade of America, merely because the 
ships which conduct it, call at one of her ports 
on their way. / 

By the merchants and custom-house officers 
of the United States, the line of neutral duty in 
this case was evidently not misconceived ; for the 
departures from it, were carefully concealed, by 
artful and fraudulent contrivance. When a ship 
arrived at one of their ports, to neutralize a voy¬ 
age that fell within the restriction, e . g. from a 
Spanish colony to Spain, all her papers were im¬ 
mediately sent on shore, or destroyed. Not one 
document was left, which could disclose the fact 
that her cargo had been taken in at a colonial 
port: and new bills of lading, invoices, clearances, 
and passports, were put on board, all importing 
that it had been shipped in America. Nor were 
official certificates, or oaths wanting, to support 
the fallacious pretence. The fraudulent precau¬ 
tion of the agents often went so far, as to dis¬ 
charge all the officers and crew, and sometimes 
even the master, and to ship an entire new com¬ 
pany in their stead, who, being ignorant of the for¬ 
mer branch of the voyage, could, in case of exa¬ 
mination or capture, support the new papers by 
their declarations and oaths, as far as their know¬ 
ledge extended, with a safe conscience. Thus, 
the ship and cargo were sent to sea again, per¬ 
il 


50 


haps within eight-and-forty hours from the time 
of her arrival, in a condition to defy the scrutiny 
of any British cruizer, by which she should be 
stopped and examined in the course of her pas¬ 
sage to Europe. 

By stratagems like these, the commerce be¬ 
tween our enemies and their colonies was carried 
on even more securely, than if neutrals had been 
permitted to conduct it in the most open manner, 
in a direct and single voyage. 

In that case, both the terms of the voyage being 
hostile, and the papers put on board at the port of 
shipment, being derived from an enemy, or from 
agents in the hostile country, the suspicion of a 
visiting officer would be broad awake : and a 
strict examination, even though the vessel should 
be brought into port for the purpose, would, ge¬ 
nerally speaking, be justifiable and safe. The al¬ 
leged right of property in a neutral claimant of 
the cargo, might also in such a case be examined 
up to its acquisition in the hostile country, by the 
light of the evidence found on board. Whereas, 
in the latter branch of the voyage that has been 
described, all ordinary means of detecting the 
property of an enemy under its neutral garb, are 
as effectually withdrawn, as if the transaction had 
really begun in a neutral port. 

The illegal plan of the voyage itself is ve¬ 
ry easily concealed during its anterior branch. 


51 


since the papers then point only to the neutral 
country, as the ultimate place of destination ; and 
there is not the least necessity for hazarding a 
disclosure to the master, much less to the crew, 
that the j'eal intention is different. 

With such facilities, it is not strange that this 
fraudulent practice should have prevailed to a 
great extent, before it met the attention of our 
prize tribunals. In fact, though often since inci¬ 
dentally discovered in the course of legal pro¬ 
ceedings, it can scarcely ever be detected in the 
first instance by a captor at sea, so as to be a 
ground of seizure, unless by an accident such as 
once brought it to judicial notice. 

A ship, with a valuable cargo of sugars from 
the Havannah, on her passage to Charleston, 
the port to which she belonged, was stopped 
and examined by a British privateer. As the pa¬ 
pers were perfectly clear, and concurred with the 
master’s declaration, in showing that the cargo 
w as going on account of the American owners to 
Charleston, where the voyage was to end, the 
ship was immediately released. 

After a stay of a few days at that port, she 
sailed again with the same identical cargo, bound 
apparently to Hamburgh, perhaps, in fact, to 
Spain ; but with an entire new set of papers from 
the owners and the Custom-House, all importing 
that the cargo, not one package of which had been 


52 


in fact landed since she left the Havannah, had 
been taken on board at Charleston. The fact ab 
so was solemnly attested on oath. 

Soon after the commencement of this second 
part of her voyage, she was again brought to by a 
British cruizer; and her papers, aided by the 
master’s asseverations, would doubtless have in¬ 
duced a second dismissal, but for one awkward 
coincidence. It happened that the visiting cruiz¬ 
er, was the very same privateer by which she had 
been boarded on her voyage from the Havannah; 
and whose commander was able to recognize and 
identify both her and her cargo, as those he had 
lately examined. 

This case came by appeal before the lords 
commissioners ; who finding the above facts clear 
and undisputed, thought them a sufficient ground 
for condemning the property. They held that the 
touching at a neutral port, merely for the purpose 
of colourably commencing a new voyage, and 
thereby eluding the restrictive rule of law, in a 
branch of it not relaxed by the royal instructions, 
could not legalize the transaction; but that it 
•ought nevertheless to be considered as a direct and 
continuous voyage from the hostile colony to 
Europe, and consequently illegal *. 


* Case of the Mereury, Roberts, at the Cockpit, July 28, 1800, 
and Jan. 13, 1802. 


In this case, the detection being full and con¬ 
clusive, it would have been in vain for the claimants 
to contend that there had been an actual impor¬ 
tation into America, with an intention to land and 
sell the cargo. But other cases occurred, wherein 
the evidence taken in the prize court brought to 
light less circumstantially the fact, that the 
captured cargoes, though ostensibly shipped in 
America, had been previously brought in the same 
bottoms, and on account of the same persons, from 
Spain, or a Spanish colony; and in these cases an 
explanation was offered by the American claim¬ 
ants, to which the court of admiralty, and the lords 
commissioners, in their great indulgence,thought 
proper to listen. It was alleged, that the impor¬ 
tations into America were genuine, and were made 
with a view to the sale of the cargoes in that country; 
but that in consequence of a fall of price in the 
markets, the importers found themselves unable 
to sell without loss; and therefore were obliged, 
contrary to their original design, to re-export the 
cargoes, and send them to Europe or the West- 
Indies, according to the now acknowledged desti¬ 
nations. 

An excuse like this, had it been offered even 
in the first instance, with a gratuitous disclosure 
of the anterior branch of the transaction, might 
reasonably have been received with diffidence; 
^especially when it was considered, that the goods 


54 


composing these cargoes, were of a kind not gene¬ 
rally consumed in America, and such as could 
be in common demand there only for the purpose 
of re-exportation to that very country, to which 
they were now actually proceeding. Such is noto¬ 
riously the case, in respect of the white sugars of 
the Havannah, and also in respect of the planta¬ 
tion stores, and supplies usually sent to the foreign 
West-Indies from Europe, of which these cargoes 
were chiefly composed ; and it was evidently very 
unnatural, that a merchant, found in actual con¬ 
nexion both with the hostile colonies, and with 
the hostile or prohibited port in Europe, as an 
importer from the one, and an exporter to the 
other, should have been driven unintentionally, 
and by necessity alone, into that very convenient 
and profitable course of trade, which he was found 
actually pursuing. 

But when the studied suppression of the former 
branch of the transaction, is taken into the ac¬ 
count ; and when it is considered that this excuse 
was commonly brought forward in the last in¬ 
stance, to avert the penal consequences of a dis¬ 
covery accidentally made in the prize court; the 
pretence must be admitted to have been in the 
highest degree suspicious, if not absolutely un¬ 
worthy of credit. 

Yet such has been the extreme lenity of those 
tribunals, of whose severity the enemy and his 


55 


neutralizing agents have the effrontery to com¬ 
plain, that these excuses were not rejected as in¬ 
credible ; and the claimants were indulged, when 
necessary, with time to establish them in point of 
fact, by further proofs from America. 

When an actual attempt to sell the cargo in 
the neutral port, has been in such cases alleged, 
and in any degree verified, that fact has been held 
sufficient to support the general excuse. A cargo 
of Spanish manufactures shipped at Bilboa, and 
taken when proceeding from America to the Ha- 
vannah, on account of the same shippers, was re¬ 
stored on evidence of an attempt to sell, having 
been made by the claimant, on the ship's arrival 
at Philadelphia 3 though the cargo chiefly consist¬ 
ed of nails for sugar boxes, an article consumed 
only in the Spanish West-Indies *. 

Certain other general criteria of a bona fide im¬ 
portation into the neutral country, have been in 
these cases admitted and required. 

Those who are conversant with the business of 
the prize court, well know, that affidavits in fur¬ 
ther proof, are never wanting to support every 
case that a claimant may be allowed to set up. 
It may be even asserted with truth, that property 


* Case of the Eagle,——Weeks, at the Cockpit, May 15 th, 1802. 


56 


taken under neutral colours is scarcely ever con¬ 
demned, but by a sentence which in effect im¬ 
peaches the neutral merchants and their agents, of 
wilful and elaborate perjury. Nor is the shocking 
fact surprising, if it be considered, that every 
man who undertakes, for a commission, to cover 
the enemy’s property under neutral papers, en¬ 
gages beforehand to furnish all the perjury that 
may be necessary to support his claim in case of 
capture, as an essential part of the contract. 
Courts of prize, therefore, wisely lay much stress 
on such probable presumptions as may arise from 
undisputed facts; especially such facts as are col¬ 
lateral to the main transaction, of'a public na¬ 
ture, and not likely to have been contrived for 
the purpose of imposition. 

Accordingly, in the class of cases we are con¬ 
sidering, it was held of great importance to show, 
that the cargo had been landed in the neutral 
port, that the duties on importation had been paid, 
and that the first insurance had been made for a 
voyage to terminate in the neutral country. In 
a case of this description, which came before Sir 
William Scott early in 1800 , he laid great stress 
on these circumstances, especially the two former; 
regarding them as the clearest general indica¬ 
tions of the original intention on which he could 
found his judgment; and accordingly, on proof 
being exhibited that the goods in question had 



57 


been landed, and the duties for them paid in 
America he restored the property *. The lords 
commissioners, in subsequent cases before them, 
were of the same opinion; and therefore it became 
tacitly a general rule, that when the excuse in 
question was set up by a claimant, he must sup¬ 
port it by showing those ordinary features of a 
sincere and genuine importation. 

But, unfortunately, such practical rules as are 
devised for the better discovery of truth, and sup¬ 
pression of fraud in the prize court, are liable to 
lose their effect as soon as they become known 
in neutral countries; for persons meditating future 
imposition, will adapt their conduct prospectively 
to the rule of practice, so as to prepare the means 
of furnishing, in case of necessity, the proofs which 
they know will be required. 

The landing the cargo in America, and re-ship- 
ping it in the same bottom, were no very costly 
precautions for better securing the merchant 
against tjie peril of capture and detection in the 
latter branch of these important voyages. In fact, 
it is commonly a necessary proceeding, in or¬ 
der to clear, and refit, or repair the vessel; for 
in the West-India trade, ships must usually go into 
dock to be careened, and receive all necessary re- 


* Case of the Polly,——Lasky, at the Admiralty, Feb. 5th, 1800. 
£ Robinson’s Reports, 36. 


I 


58 


pairs, once in every voyage. American owners, 
therefore, whose ships are constantly employed in 
this circuitous commerce between the West-Indies 
and Europe, must, to maintain them in proper con¬ 
dition, either submit to the great expense and dis¬ 
advantage of careening and repairing in a foreign 
and belligerent country, or embrace the opportu¬ 
nity of doing so on the arrival at their own ports, 
either on the outward voyage from Europe, or 
the return. It is, probably, so much cheaper to 
dock their ships in America, than in Spain or the 
West-Indies, as to compensate them for the ex¬ 
pense of landing and re-shipping the cargo. 

The laying a foundation for the necessary evi¬ 
dence, in regard to insurance, was a still easier 
work: for though at first they sometimes insured 
the whole intended voyage, with liberty to touch 
in America, it was afterwards found, in conse¬ 
quence perhaps of the captures and discoveries 
we have noticed, to be much safer for the under¬ 
writers, and consequently cheaper ii\ point of 
premium to the owners, to insure separately the 
two branches of the voyage; in which case, Ame¬ 
rica necessarily appeared by the policies on the 
first branch, to be the place of ultimate destina¬ 
tion ; and on the last, to be that of original shipment. 

The payment of duties, then, was the only re¬ 
maining badge of the simulated intention for 
which the merchants had to provide; and here 


they found facilities from the port officers and 
government of the United States, such as obviated 
every inconvenience. On the arrival of a cargo 
destined for re-exportation in the course of this 
indirect commerce, they were allowed to land the 
goods, and even to put them in private ware¬ 
houses, without paying any part of the duties; 
and without any further trouble, than that of 
giving a bond, with condition that if the goods 
should not be re-exported, the duties should be 
paid. On their re-shipment and exportation, of¬ 
ficial clearances were given, in which no mention 
was made that the cargo consisted of bonded or 
debentured goods, which had previously been en¬ 
tered for re-exportation; but the same general 
forms were used, as on an original shipment of 
goods which had actually paid duties in America. 
Nor was this all; for, in the event of capture and 
further inquiry respecting the importation into 
America, the collectors and other officers were ac¬ 
commodating enough solemnly to certify, that the 
duties had been actually paid or secured to the 
United States; withholding the fact, that the 
bonds had been afterwards discharged on the pro¬ 
duction of debentures, or other official instruments, 
certifying the re-exportation of the goods. 

By these means, the American merchant, whe¬ 
ther trading on his own account, or as an agent 
for the enemy, was enabled securely to carry on 


6o 


a commerce, such as the royal instructions \tfere 
far from meaning to tolerate. If by any accident 
or inadvertency, the preceding branch of the 
voyage should be discovered, he had an excuse at 
hand, such as would be accepted by the British 
prize court; and which he was prepared to sup¬ 
port by such evidence, as he knew beforehand 
would suffice. 

But rules of practice, which have been devised 
by any court, for the guidance and assistance ot 
its own judgment on questions of fact, can evi¬ 
dently not be binding on the court itself, when 
discovered to be no longer conducive to that 
end; much less, when they are found to be 
made subservient to the purposes of imposition 
and fraud. The lords commissioners of appeal, 
therefore, finding it manifest in a recent case, 
that the alleged importation into Salem, of a 
cargo which had been shipped in Spain, and 
afterwards re-shipped for the Havannah in the 
same bottom, was wholly of a colourable kind; 
and that, notwithstanding the usual clearances 
and certificates, the duties had not been final¬ 
ly paid to the American custom-house ; re¬ 
jected the claim, and condemned the ship and 
cargo *. 

* Case of the Essex, — Orme, at the Cockpit, May 22, 1805. 

There were in this case great doubts as to the neutrality of the 
property 5 and their lordships did not express on what ground they 


61 


In this case, as in others of the same descrip¬ 
tion, there was found on board an affidavit of the 
proprietor, stating, that the goods had been 
“ laden on board from stores and wharves at Sa- 
“ lem, and that the duties thereon were secured to 
“ the United States , or paid , according to law.” 
Yet it afterwards appeared, on his own admission, 
that he had only given the usual bond on the en¬ 
try of the cargo from Barcelona; which, as we 
have seen, is a security to re-export, rather than 
to pay duties on the cargo, and which had been 
accordingly cancelled on the re-exportation. 

Two other American cases were soon after 
heard at the Admiralty, in which, under similar 
circumstances, the learned judge of that court 
made similar decrees; holding, that this mode of 
landing, and paying or securing duties on, the 
cargoes in America, was not sufficient to consti¬ 
tute an importation into the neutral country, so 
as to break the continuity of the voyage from the 
French colonies to Europe, and thereby legalize 
the transaction under the indulgent instruction 
now in force: the intention of the parties ap¬ 
parently being to elude the legal restriction *. 


decided $ but their sentence was understood at the bar to hare been 
founded on the illegality of the trade. 

* Cases of the Enoch and the Rowena, at the Admiralty, July 23, 
-1805. 


62 


It seems impossible for any man seriously to 
disapprove of these decisions, without denying 
the validity of the rule of law, which it is the 
purpose of these colourable importations into 
America to evade—a rule which, as we have seen, 
is acquiesced in by the neutral powers themselves. 

The payment or non-pajonent of duties in a 
neutral country cannot, of itself, vary our belli 
gerent rights ; nor can the mere landing and re¬ 
shipment of goods, without a change of property 
or intention, give to the owner any right of 
carriage which he did not previously possess.— 
Those circumstances consequently were never re¬ 
garded in the prize court as of any intrinsic or 
substantive importance; they were merely con¬ 
sidered as evidence of the alleged primary inten¬ 
tion of the neutral importer; and that intention 
was inquired into only for his benefit, in order to 
absolve him from strong general presumptions 
against the fairness and legality of the voyage. It 
would therefore have been inconsistent and prepos¬ 
terous, to give to any or all of those circumstances 
any justificatory effect, when they were found not 
at all to support the favourable conclusions which 
had been originally drawn from them; but ra¬ 
ther, on the contrary, to confirm the general 
adverse presumptions, which they had been once 
supposed to repel. When it was found that the 
duties had been secured, not in a way natu- 


63 


rally applicable to goods meant to be sold and 
consumed in America, but in a mode devised for 
the special convenience of importers intending a 
re-exportation, the suspicion that the claimant 
originally meant to continue the voyage, as he 
eventually did, was obviously strengthened, if not 
absolutely confirmed. 

If the justice or consistency of our prize tri¬ 
bunals in these cases, needed a further defence, it 
might be found in the great frequency, I might 
say universality, of the excuse which they had too 
indulgently allowed. The credit of the main 
pretext itself, was worn out by frequency of use. 

A man on whose person a stolen watch should 
be found, might allege that he had picked it up 
in the street, and might find probable evidence to 
satisfy a magistrate that his defence was well- 
founded : but what if he were found possessed of 
ten or twenty watches, stolen at different times, 
from different persons, and should offer in respect 
of them all, the same identical explanation ? The 
same evidence would now be reasonably regarded 
as insufficient to deliver him from the highly ag¬ 
gravated suspicion. 

Or, to borrow an illustration from a case more 
nearly parallel, and one which is practically noto¬ 
rious :— A neutral vessel is taken in the attempt 
to enter a blockaded port, which lies wide of her 
course to that place to which she is ostensibly des- 


64 


tined: the excuse offered to the captor is, that a 
storm had driven her out of her proper course; and 
that, being in distress, she was going into the block¬ 
aded port of necessity, in order to refit. For 
once, or twice, perhaps, such excuses might gain 
credit, on the oaths of the master and his people; 
but a multitude of vessels are taken in the same 
attempt; and all their masters give precisely the 
same excuse. They have all met with a storm; 
and are all obliged by distress, to put into the pro¬ 
hibited port. Surely the commanders of the block¬ 
ading squadron, and the judges of the prize courts, 
may now justifiably shut their ears to this stale 
pretext; unless it comes supported by more than 
ordinary evidence. 

So in the case before us, wdien it has been 
found, during several years, that all American 
merchants detected in carrying from their own 
country to Europe, produce which they had im¬ 
ported into the former in the same bottoms, from 
the colonies of our enemies, have exactly the 
same exculpatory facts to allege; the defence, on 
this ground alone, might justly forfeit the cre¬ 
dit which it in the first instance received. It 
would be strange indeed, if so many men had 
all been accidentally, and reluctantly, driven to 
consult their own interest to the utmost possible 
advantage, through a disappointment in their more 
abstinent views ; and compelled to go eventually 


65 


to the best markets, instead of selling, as they de¬ 
signed, at the worst. 

Too much time may perhaps appear to have 
been spent on the history of these circuitous voy¬ 
ages, which, though an extensive, form but a sin¬ 
gle branch, of the abuses I wish to expose. 

It was however not unimportant to show in it, 
the true subject of those violent clamours with 
which the public ear has been lately assailed. The 
recent invectives of the Moniteur, and the com¬ 
plaints of the American merchants, which have 
been echoed by our own newspapers, and falsely 
alleged to have produced concessions from his Ma¬ 
jesty’s government, have all had no sounder foun¬ 
dation, than the late conduct of our prize courts 
as here explained, in regard to this indirect trade. 
The sole offence is, that those tribunals, finding 
themselves to have been deceived for years past by 
fallacious evidence, have resolved to be cheated in 
the same way no longer. It is on this account 
only, and the consequent capture of some Ameri¬ 
can West-Indiamen supposed to be practising the 
old fraud, that we are accused of insulting the neu¬ 
tral powers, of innovating on the acknowledged 
law of nations, and of treating as contraband of 
war, the produce of the West-India Islands. 

Though these collusive voyages, are the most 
general abuse of the indulgence given by the 
IC 


66 


royal instructions, and are a mode of intercourse 
with the hostile colonies, peculiarly productive of 
a fraudulent carriage for the enemy on his own 
account under neutral disguise, the suppression of 
the practice would by no means remedy the enor¬ 
mous evils which result from that intercourse in 
general. 

An adherence by our prize tribunals to their 
recent precedents, will no doubt put a stop to the 
re-exportation from neutral ports, of the same co¬ 
lonial produce, in the same identical bottom, and 
on account of the same real or ostensible owners 
by whom it was imported; but a change of pro¬ 
perty in the neutral country will be a false pretence 
easily made, and not easily detected : nor will the 
substitution of a different vessel, add very much to 
the trouble or expense of the transaction. Two 
ships arriving about the same time, in the same 
harbour, may commodiously exchange their car¬ 
goes, and proceed safely with them to the same 
places of ulterior destination. In short, new me¬ 
thods of carrying the produce of the hostile colo¬ 
nies to any part of Europe, will not be wanting, nor 
will there be any dearth of means for amply sup¬ 
plying those colonies with the manufactures of 
their parent states, so long as both are permitted 
not only to be brought to, but exported from, a 
neutral country, according to the existing in¬ 
struction. 


67 


Having shown how much has been indulgently 
conceded to the neutral flag, in respect of the co¬ 
lonial trade of our enemies, and how much more 
it has licentiously and fraudulently assumed, I 
proceed to notice, as briefly as possible, the high¬ 
ly alarming effects. 

The mischief, to correct which the rule of the 
war 1756 was first applied, was of a partial and 
limited kind. In that war, neutral ships, though 
admitted into some of the colonial ports of 
France, were by no means the sole carriers of 
their produce or supplies. The enemy continued 
to employ his own commercial flag, as far as his 
inadequate power of protecting it extended ; and 
neutrals were rather partners in, than assignees of, 
the national monopoly. 

In the American war, their participation in this 
commerce, was still more limited. 

But during the last war, and in the present, a 
far more comprehensive innovation has taken 
place. France and Holland have totally ceased 
to trade under their own flags, to or from the ports 
of any of their colonies ; and have apparently as¬ 
signed the whole of these branches of their com¬ 
merce, to the merchants of neutral states. 

Spain, though with more hesitation, and by 
gradual advances, has nearly made as entire a 
transfer of all her trade with her colonies on the 
Atlantic ; and if anyTeservation now remains, it 


68 


is in respect of some part only of the specie and 
bullion, for conveying which a ship of war or tvyo 
may be occasionally risked. Even these most va¬ 
luable exports have been largely intrusted to the 
neutral flag, at Vera-Cruz, Carthagena, La Plata, 
and other ports; while the still more important 
commerce of the Havannah, and Cuba in general, 
has known no other protection *. 

Of the French colonies in the Antilles, of Cay¬ 
enne, and Dutch Guiana, while that country was 
hostile to us, of the Isles of France and Bourbon, 
of Batavia, Manilla, and of all other Asiatic settle¬ 
ments which have remained under a flag hostile 
to this country, it may be truly affirmed that neu¬ 
trals have been their only carriers. The mercan¬ 
tile colours of their respective countries, and of 
their confederates, have been absolute strangers 
in their ports. Even the gum trade of Senegal, 
has been made over to neutrals, and its garrison 
supplied by them in return f. 

But why should I enumerate the particulars of 
this unprecedented case, when it may be truly af¬ 
firmed in few words, that not a single merchant 
ship under a flag inimical to Great-Britain , now 
crosses the equator , or traverses the Atlantic 
Ocean. 

* Cases of the Flora, Arnold, Gladiator, Emelia, Vera Cruz, &o. 
&c. at the Cockpit. 

f Case of the Juliana, Carsten, at the Cockpit, 1805. 



69 


Though to the generality of my readers this 
proposition may seem extraordinary, and perhaps 
too strange to be believed, yet it forms only part 
of a still more comprehensive and singular truth— 
With the exception only of a very smalt portion of 
the coasting trade of our enemies , not a mercantile 
sail of any description , now enters , or clears from 
their ports in any part of the globe , but under neu¬ 
tral colours. My more immediate business how¬ 
ever is with that colonial trade, which subsists by 
our indulgence alone; and which fraud and per¬ 
jury could not rescue from our cruizers, if we did 
not forbear to exercise our clear belligerent 
fights. 

The commerce which thus eludes the grasp of 
our naval hostilities, is not only rich and various, 
but of a truly alarming magnitude. 

The mercantile registers at Lloyd’s alone, might 
sufficiently manifest its great extent; for they an¬ 
nounce every week, and almost every day, nu¬ 
merous arrivals of ships from America in the 
ports of Holland and France; and it is noto¬ 
rious that they are freighted, for the most part, 
with sugar, coffee, and the other rich productions 
of the French and Spanish West-Indies. Indeed, 
when the harvests of Europe have not failed so 
much as to occasion a large demand for the flour 
and grain of North America, that country has 
scarcely any native commodities, tobacco excepted, 


70 


ihat can be the subjects of such a commerce. 
These vessels return chiefly in ballast; but the 
portion of goods they obtain as return cargoes, 
are stores and manufactures, destined for the sup¬ 
ply of the hostile colonies though previously to 
pass through the neutralizing process in America. 

Enormous is the amount of the produce of the 
new world, thus poured into the south, as well as 
the north of Europe, under cover of the neutral 
flag ! At Cadiz, at Barcelona, and the other Spa¬ 
nish ports, whether within or without the Mediter¬ 
ranean, neutral vessels are perpetually importing, 
unless when interrupted by our blockades, the 
sugar of the Havannah, the cocoa, indigo, and 
hides of South America, the dollars and ingots of 
Mexico and Peru; and returning with European 
manufactures, chiefly the rivals of our own. East- 
India goods, are also imported by these com¬ 
mercial auxiliaries into Spain; but still more co¬ 
piously, into Holland and France. 

Nor is it only in their own ports, that our ene¬ 
mies receive the exports of America, and of 
Asia, in contempt of our maritime efforts.— 
Hamburgh, Altona, Embden, Gottenburgh, Co¬ 
penhagen, Lisbon, and various other neutral mar¬ 
kets, are supplied, and even glutted with the pro¬ 
duce of the West-Indies, and the fabrics of the 
East, brought from the prosperous colonies of 
powers hostile to this country. By the rivers and 


71 


canals of Germany and Flanders, they are floated 
into the warehouses of our enemies, or circulated 
for the supply of their customers in neutral 
countries. They supplant, or rival, the British 
planter and merchant, throughout the continent 
of Europe, and in all the ports of the Mediter¬ 
ranean. They supplant even the manufactures of 
Manchester, Birmingham, and Yorkshire; for the 
looms and forges of Germany are put inaction by 
the colonial produce of our enemies, and are 
rivalling us, by the ample supplies they send 
under the neutral flag, to every part of the New 
World. 

Antwerp, a happy station for the exchange of 
such merchandize, is now rapidly thriving under 
the fostering care of Bonaparte. His efforts for 
the restoration of its commerce, during the short 
interval of peace, produced no very splendid ef¬ 
fects ; but the neutral flags have proved far more | 
auspicious to the rising hopes of the Scheldt, than 
the colours of Holland and France. Its port has 
become the favourite haunt of the American West- ! 
Indiamen, and profits in various ways, by the 
sale of their valuable cargoes. 

If we look beyond the Atlantic, and into the* 
Eastern Ocean, we shall find the sources of this 
commerce, under the same benign auspices of the 
neutral flag, in the most thriving and productive 




72 


state. Bonaparte has recently boasted, that Mar¬ 
tinique and Guadaloupe are flourishing, in despite 
of our hostilities, so much beyond all former ex¬ 
perience, that, since 1789, they have actually 
doubled their population *. Had he said the 
same also of their produce, the boast perhaps 
would have been far less unfounded than his as¬ 
sertions usually are : but he ought to have added, 
that since the first notice of the war, the French 
flag has not brought them a barrel of flour, nor 
exported a hogshead of their sugar. Even the 
ships in their harbours, that had been laden before 
the new hostilities were announced, were osten¬ 
sibly transferred with their cargoes to neutral 
merchants, and sailed under neutral colours. 

He has vaunted also, and with truth, the pros¬ 
perous state of Cayenne, and of the Isles of France 
and Reunion, once called Bourbon, whose prospe¬ 
rity is owing to the same efficacious cause ; aided 
by their becoming warehouses for the commerce 
of Batavia. 

The Spanish government is not so ostentatious; 
but its colonies are quietly reaping the fruit of 
that fortunate revolution, the suspension of their 
prohibitory laws. The neutral flag gives to them 
not only protection, but advantages before un- 


* Extract from the Moniteur, in the London papers of September 
2d. 


73 


known. The gigantic infancy of agriculture in 
Cuba, far from being checked, is greatly aided 
in its portentous growth during the war, by 
the boundless liberty of trade, and the perfect 
security of carriage. Even slaves from Africa are 
copiously imported there, and doubtless also into 
the French islands, under American colours.— 
America indeed has prohibited this commerce, 
and wishes to suppress it; but our enemies can 
lind agents as little scrupulous of violating the law 
of their own country, as the law of war; and so 
wide has been our complaisance to depredators on 
our belligerent rights, that even the slave-trading 
smuggler, has been allowed to take part of the 
spoil *. 

To the Spanish continental colonies also, war has 
changed its nature: it has become the handmaid 
of commerce, and the parent of plenty. Even 
the distant province of La Plata, has been so glut¬ 
ted with European imports, that the best manu¬ 
factures have sold there at prices less than the 
prime cost in the distant country from which they 
came f. 

In short, all the hostile colonies, whether Spanish, 

* Cases of the Oxholnj, Chance, &c. at the Cockpit, 
f This fact has appeared in the evidence brought before our prize tri¬ 
bunals, in the case of the Gladiator, Turner, at the Cockpit, in 1802, and 
ia other causes, 

L 


74 


French, or Batavian, derive from the enmity of 
Great-Britain, their ancient scourge and terror, 
not inconvenience but advantage : far from being 
impoverished or distressed by our hostilities, as 
formerly, they find in war the best sources of 
supply, and new means of agricultural, as well as 
commercial prosperity. 

Happy has it been for them, and their parent 
states, that the naval superiority of their enemy 
has been too decisive to be disputed. 

“ Una salus victis, nullam sperare salutera.” 

A fortunate despair, has alone saved them from all 
the ruinous consequences of an ineffectual strug¬ 
gle; and given them advantages, greater than 
they could have hoped from a successful maritime 
war. They may say to each other as Themis- 
tocles to his children, when enriched, during his 
exile, by the Persian monarch, ‘ c We should have 
“ been ruined, if we had not been undone.” 

It is singular enough, that the same policy 
which the most celebrated French writers on co¬ 
lonial affairs, earnestly recommended to Bona¬ 
parte soon after the peace of Amiens, as the best 
mean of promoting his favourite object, the re¬ 
storation of the colonies and the marine; is that 
which the war has benignantly forced upon him *. 

* See Barre Saint Venant, Be* Colonies Modernes, &c. and Memoires 
ear les Colonies, par V. P. Malouet. 



75 


He was as hostile as they wished, to the liberty of 
the negroes ; but all their persuasion did not suf¬ 
fice, to induce him to unfetter for a while the co¬ 
lonial trade, till their powerful arguments were 
seconded by a new maritime war. 

Perhaps it may be supposed that we are at 
least able to diminish the immediate profit of 
that commerce, which we generously forbear to 
obstruct; by obliging our enemies to import their 
colonial produce on dearer terms than formerly, 
into the European markets. 

But let it be considered, that in a mercantile 
view, relative, not positive, expense on importa¬ 
tion, is the criterion of loss or gain. If the price 
of the commodity rises in proportion to the ad¬ 
vance in that expense, the importer loses no¬ 
thing : and if the war enhances the freight, and 
other charges to the British, more than to the 
French or Spanish merchant, then the latter may 
derive a positive advantage from the general rise 
in the neutral markets; while, even in respect 
of the home consumption, there will, in a national 
view, be a balance of belligerent inconvenience 
against us. 

Now I fear the fact is, however strange it may 
seem, that the advance made by the war in the 
expense of importation into this country from the 
British colonies, in respect of freight, insurance, 
and all other charges taken together, is fully 


78 


equal, if not superior, to that to which our ene¬ 
mies are subjected in their covert and circuitous 
trade. 

The average freight from the British Leeward 
Islands for sugars, immediately prior to the pre¬ 
sent war, was four shillings and sixpence per cwt.; 
it is now about eight shillings; an advance of 
above 77 per cent. 

The peace freights from the French and Spa¬ 
nish colonies, were rather higher, on an average, 
than from our own ; but I am unable to state in 
what degree they are advanced by the war: for, 
in the circuitous mode of conveyance under neu¬ 
tral colours, by which alone the produce of those 
colonies now passes to Europe, the cargo is al¬ 
ways either represented as belonging to the owner 
of the ship, and, consequently not subject to 
freight; or as laden in pursuance of a charter 
party, in which the ship is ostensibly freighted 
on account of some other neutral merchant, for 
a sum in gross. If a genuine bill of lading or 
oharter party is discovered, the freight is mixed 
up with a neutralizing commission, from which it 
cannot be distinguished. 

It may, however, be safely affirmed, that the 
freight, independently of the commission, is con¬ 
siderably less in neutral, than in British ships, on 
account of the comparative cheapness of the terms 
on which the former are purchased, fitted out, and 
insured. 


77 


A comparison of the expense of insurance, at 
these different periods, to our enemies, and to our 
own merchants respectively, will be easier and 
more material; for the advance in the rates of in¬ 
surance, when made against war risks, is a most 
decisive criterion of the effect of a maritime war. 
Here I have facts to submit to the reader, which 
an Englishman cannot state without mortification, 
though they are too important to be withheld. 

Immediately prior to the present war, the pre¬ 
mium of insurance from the Leeward Islands to 
London, in a British ship, was two per cent.; from 
Jamaica, four per cent.: at present, the former is 
eight, to return four if the ship sails with convoy 
and arrives safe; the latter ten, to return five, on 
the same condition. Single or running ships, if 
unarmed, can scarcely be insured at all—if armed, 
the premium varies so much according to the dif¬ 
ferent estimates of the risk, that an average is 
not easily taken. 

At the former period, the insurance from the 
French Windward Islands to Bourdeaux, was three 
per cent.; from St. Domingo, it was as high as five, 
and even six; from the Havannah, to Spain, four 
per cent, in ships of the respective countries. 
The existing premium on these direct voyages 
cannot be stated ; since they are never openly in¬ 
sured in this country: and as to the French and 
Spanish commercial flags, they can no where be 



78 


the subjects of insurance ; having vanished, as al¬ 
ready observed, from the ocean: but at Lloyd's 
Coffee-House, cargoes brought by the indirect 
voyage from those now hostile colonies, under 
neutral colours, is insured as follows: from Havan- 
nah, to a port in North America, 3 per cent.; from 
North America to Spain, the like premium ; to¬ 
gether, 6 per cent. *: and I apprehend there is lit¬ 
tle or no difference, in the insurance of a like cir¬ 
cuitous voyage from the French Windward Islands 
to France. Of course, when the voyage is really 
to end at a neutral, instead of a belligerent port, 
in Europe, the premium on the latter branch of 
it, is rather lessened than increased. 

The compound premium of insurance with con¬ 
voy, or the long premium, as it is called, is not 
easily reducible to its proper absolute value, for 
the purpose of this comparison; since the risk 
of missing convoy, is compounded of too many 
chances, and combinations of chances, of various 
kinds, physical, commercial, and political, to be 
averaged by any calculation : but since the as¬ 
sured, in the case of loss, as well as in that of 


* This statement has reference to the month of August last, when the 
author can with confidence assert that these were the current premiums. 
He understands that they have since been raised in consequence of the re¬ 
cent decisions in the Prize Court, which have been already noticed. 


79 


missing convoy, has no return of premium, and 
the return is always, with a deduction of the dif¬ 
ference between pounds and guineas, or 5 per 
cent, which is retained by the underwriter or bro¬ 
ker, the premium of 10 to return 5, may be esti¬ 
mated at near 7 per cent, and that of 8 to return 
4,. about one per cent, lower. 

The consequence of these premises is, that the 
sugars of Cuba are insured on their circuitous 
carriage to Spain, at a less expense by 1 per cent, 
than the sugars of Jamaica to England; and those 
of Martinique and Guadaloupe, probably, are in¬ 
sured by a like route to France, on terms nearly 
equal to the value of the long premium, on the 
direct voyage from our own Leeward Islands. 

But this is a conclusion far short of the true re¬ 
sult of the comparison ; for the English merchant 
or planter, has also to pay the convoy duty, which 
is evidently an additional price of his insurance 
from the war risks of the passage. 

The convoy duty on the outward voyage to the 
West-Indies, is no less than four per cent.; on the 
homeward voyage, there is at present no duty 
expressly for the protection of convoy; but a new 
war tax, by way of advance on the amount of 
old duties, has been imposed on sugars imported, 
and on all other articles of West-India produce; 
part of which advance was understood to be a 
substitute for an express convoy duty, and on 


80 


that priciple, it is not wholly drawn back on 
exportation. 

It would require an intricate calculation, as 
well as data not easy to obtain, to determine what 
is the amount of this charge to the importer, if 
reduced into a specific tax for the protection of 
convoy. I will, therefore, suppose it to be equal 
to the convoy duty on the outward voyage: or 
what will equally serve our purpose, let the in¬ 
surance on an outward voyage to the West-Indies 
be supposed to be the same in point of premium, 
as in fact it nearly, if not exactly is, with the in¬ 
surance homeward : then the whole price of pro¬ 
tection to the English West-India shipper, is in 
the Jamaica trade, higher by five per cent, and in 
the Leeward-Island trade, by four per cent, than 
that for which the enemy planter or merchant, is 
insured by the same underwriters, on the passage 
of his goods to or from the immediate neighbour¬ 
hood of the same islands. 

But if we separate the price of the sea risk, 
or the warranty against those dangers which are 
common both to peace and war, from the war 
risk, or price of the insurance against detention 
or capture by an enemy, the difference will be 
found still more highly adverse to that shipper, 
whose sovereign is master of the sea: for as the 
premium of insurance from Martinique to France, 
before the war, was 3 per cent, while, from the 


81 


British islands in the same part of the West-In- 
dies, it was only 2; the advance occasioned by 
the war to the British shipper, convoy duty being 
reckoned as insurance, is no less than 8 per cent.; 
while to the French it is only 3 ; and if we 
compare, on the facts before given, St. Domingo 
with J amaica, the advance to the former will be 
found to be 7, to the latter, only about 1 per cent. 

An objection here may naturally arise, to which 
I regret that a shameful but conclusive answer, 
can be given. Since the rates of insurance which 
I have mentioned as the current prices of protec¬ 
tion to the commerce of our enemies, when carri¬ 
ed on under neutral colours, are those which are 
paid in this country, to British underwriters, and 
an insurance on the property of enemies is ille¬ 
gal, the hostile proprietor may be thought, not to 
be effectually secured ; for should his secret be, 
as in the event of capture it sometimes is, disco¬ 
vered, the insurance will be void. 

Neutralizing agents, I first answer, are not so 
incautious, after twelve years experience in their 
business, and in the practice of the British prize 
courts, as to expose their constituents very fre¬ 
quently to detection. But such as this risk is, 
the masqueraders have found an effectual mean 
of avoiding it. Though a strange and opprobri¬ 
ous truth, it is at Lloyd's Coffee-House perfectly 
M 


notorious, that our underwriters consent to stand 
between the naval hostilities of their country, 
and the commerce of her disguised enemies, 
by giving them an honorary guarantee against 
the perils of capture and discovery. 

The mode of the transaction is this: A policy 
is executed, such as may be producible in any 
court of justice ; for the property is insured as 
neutral: but a private instrument is afterwards 
signed by the underwriters, by w^hich they 
pledge themselves, that they will not, in case of 
loss, dispute the neutrality of the property, or 
avail themselves of any sentence pronouncing it 
to be hostile. Sometimes, a verbal engagement 
to this effect, is thought sufficient, but it has now 
become a very general practice to reduce it into 
writing; and in the one mode, or the other, these 
releases of the warranty or representation of 
neutrality, are almost universal. It is true, such 
stipulations are not binding in point of law : but 
every one knows, that at Lloyd’s Coffee-House* 
as well as at the Stock Exchange and Newnnar- 
ket, those contracts, which the law will not en¬ 
force, are on that very account, the most sacred 
in the estimate of the parties, and the most invio¬ 
lably observed. 

The enemy, therefore, has as full security for 
his low premium, as the British importer for his 
high one; nor is the comparative result of our pre- 


83 


mises shaken by the expense of this special addi¬ 
tion to the policy; for in the rates of insurance 
which I have given, the extra charge of the hono¬ 
rary stipulation is included. For six per cent, 
the British underwriter will warrant Spanish pro¬ 
perty, knowing it to be such, from the Havannah 
to Spain, by way of America ; though he receives 
what is equal to seven, on British property, of the 
same description, carried with convoy, and in far 
better bottoms, from Jamaica to London. 

The proportion of this premium, which may 
be reckoned as the price of the secret under¬ 
taking, is, I understand, one per cent. It cannot 
be much more ; since the excess of the whole 
war premium above that which was paid on the 
direct voyage in time of peace, is only two per 
cent. The point is of no importance to our cal¬ 
culation ; but it is striking to reflect, how small 
an additional premium is enough to compensate 
the insurer for the risk of the detection of hos¬ 
tile property under the neutral cover, in this com¬ 
modious new invented eourse of the colonial 
trade. Can we wonder that Bonaparte should be 
indignant and clamorous at the late attempts of 
our prize court to restrain it ? 

The underwriters of America have pretty 
nearly agreed with our own, in the appreciation 
of the trivial danger from British hostilities, in this 
great branch of commerce. In July and August 


last, the average premiums at New-York and 
Philadelphia, on the separate branches of the 
double West-India voyage, without any war¬ 
ranty of neutrality* were about 3 per cent, or 
7 in the whole, from the West-Indies by way of 
America to Europe. Insurance in that country, 
is naturally a little dearer than in England ; and 
the rates of premiums at Lloyd’s, probably regu¬ 
late, with an advance of about one per cent, in 
general, the price of insurance in the United Slates. 

It is impossible here to abstain from some di¬ 
gressive remarks on the conduct of the British 
underwriters. They are, certainly, in general, 
very respectable men ; and comprise within their 
body, merchants of great eminence in the most 
honourable walks of commerce. It is fair to pre¬ 
sume, therefore, that their common concurrence 
in any practice contrary to the duties of good 
subjects, and upright men, can only proceed from 
inadvertency or mistake. - If so, I would con¬ 
jure them to reflect seriously, on the nature and 
consequences of these honorary engagements* 
falsely so called, into which the secret agents of 
our enemies have seduced them. 

Let me remind them of the moral obligation, 
of obeying, in substance, as well as in form, the 
law of their country; and that the rule which 
forbids the insurance of an enemy’s property, 
not having been founded solely on a regard to 


$5 


the safety of the underwriter’s purse, they have no 
private right to wave its application. 

Some persons, perhaps, may find an excuse or 
palliation of this practice, to satisfy their own con¬ 
sciences, in a doubt of the public utility of the law, 
which they thus violate or evade; for specious 
arguments have been heretofore offered, to prove 
that a belligerent state, may advantageously per¬ 
mit its subjects to insure the goods of an enemy 
from capture; and that pestilent moral heresy, 
the bane of our age, which resolves every duty 
into expediency, may possibly have its prose¬ 
lytes at Lloyd’s, as well as at Paris. With such 
men as have imbibed this most pernicious error, 
I have not time to reason on their own false 
principles; though the notion that it is politic to 
insure an enemy, against our own hostilities, is 
demonstrably erroneous ; and seems as strange a 
paradox as any that the vain predilection for 
oblique discovery ever suggested. I can only 
offer to them a short argument, which ought 
to be decisive, by observing that the wisdom of 
the legislature, and of our ablest statesmen in 
general, has concluded against these insurances 
on political grounds ; otherwise they would have 
been permitted, instead of being, as they are, 
prohibited by law*. 

* The prohibitions of the last war, 33 George II. cap. 27. s. 4, has 
not, I believe, yet been renewed. Perhaps, during the pressure of 


86 


But I conjure the British underwriters to re¬ 
flect that there is a wide difference between the 
insurance of an enemy’s property, fairly passing 
on the seas as such, in his own name ; and the in¬ 
surance of the same property under a fraudulent 
neutral disguise. By the former transaction, in¬ 
deed, the law is more openly violated ; but in the 
latter, the law-breaking and clandestine contract, 
is, in effect, a conspiracy of the underwriter with 
the enemy and his agents, to cheat our gallant and 
meritorious fellow-subjects, the naval captors; as 
well as to frustrate the best hopes of our country, 
in the present very arduous contest. 

Besides, by what immoral means is Jhe safety 
of the underwriters in these secret coi/tracts con¬ 
sulted ! It will not, it cannot, be denied, that in¬ 
stead of the paltry considerations for which they 
now consent to release the warranty of neu¬ 
trality, they would require more than double the 


parliamentary business, which has prevailed ever since the commence¬ 
ment of the present war, it has escaped the attention of government. 
The illegality of insuring hostile property, stands, however, on common 
law principles, independent of any positive statute ; as has long since 
been solemnly decided. The use of that act was not to invalidate 
the policy, but to impose specific penalties on the insurer of an 
enemy’s goods ; and if it should be revived, the indirect method 
of accomplishing the illegal object by a secret undertaking, will, 
I trust, be made at least equally penal with the direct and open 
offence. 


87 


open premium for that release, if they did not 
rely on the effect of those perjuries and forgeries 
by which capture or condemnation is avoided. 
The underwriter, therefore, who enters into the 
clandestine compact, is an accessary to those 
crimes. 

But is this all ? Does he not directly contract 
for, and suborn, as well as abet them ? For 
whose benefit, and at whose instigation, are 
those false affidavits and fictitious documents, 
transmitted from the neutral country, which are 
laid before the courts of prize in these cases, as 
evidence of the property, after a decree for fur¬ 
ther proofs ? The claimant receives the sum in¬ 
sured from the underwriter, and allows the latter 
to prosecute the claim for his own reimbursement; 
and for that purpose, the necessary evidence is 
furnished by the one, and made use of by the 
other, to support at Doctors Commons the fact of 
a representation, which at Lloyd's Coffee-House 
is known to be false. 

It may, indeed, be alleged, that there are often 
Other reasons with the assured, for asking the un¬ 
derwriter to wave the question of neutral proper¬ 
ty, than a consciousness that the goods belong in 
fact to an enemy. Courts, it may be said, are li¬ 
able to be mistaken on that point; and the delay 
attending its investigation, may be injurious. 


88 


Pretences like these can never be wanting, to 
palliate any indirect and disingenuous transaction, 
that has for its object the concealment of an illegal 
purpose. To the gamester, the stock-jobber, and 
the usurer, they are perfectly familiar. Should 
it, however, be admitted, that such specious rea¬ 
sons are sometimes the real motives of the as¬ 
sured, and that they are commonly held forth to 
the underwriters as such, (which, I admit, is pro¬ 
bable enough; for it is not likely that the enemy’s 
agent often needlessly violates decorum, so far as 
to announce openly the true character of his prin¬ 
cipal,) still the defence would be extremely weak. 
That enemies, very often at least, are the real pro¬ 
prietors in these cases, is too natural, and too fre¬ 
quently confirmed by actual detection, to be se¬ 
riously doubted: besides, our London insurers 
are not so ill informed, as to be at a loss for a 
shrewd guess in regard to the national character 
of the true owners in the policy, from the nature 
of the transaction itself, and the known connex¬ 
ions of the agents. A large part of all the pro¬ 
perty engaged in the collusive commerce which 
I have described, is insured in Great-Britain : 
and in the insurances upon it, the secret engage¬ 
ment has become almost universal. If, then, any 
considerable part of this property is known to be 
hostile; how can our underwriters be excused 
by the assertion, supposing it true, that much of it 


89 


is really neutral. They enter into a clandestine 
contract, which, though a neutral may have some 
good reasons for proposing, an enemy, it can¬ 
not be denied, is still more likely to propose; 
and which is peculiarly well adapted to the pro¬ 
tection of hostile property; a use which they well 
know too is, in fact, often made of it. The de¬ 
fence, therefore, is like that of a general receiver 
of stolen goods, who, while he deals in a way 
peculiarly fit, by its secrecy and other circum¬ 
stances, for the protection of thieves, should al¬ 
lege, that honest distressed men, from a fear of 
disgrace, often bring their watches and plate to 
his shop, in the same covert and suspicious man¬ 
ner. 

This bad and dangerous practice, is not pecu¬ 
liar to the underwriters on colonial produce and 
supplies, but extends to almost every other spe¬ 
cies of commerce, that is now fraudulently car¬ 
ried on under neutral colours. Every contest in 
our prize courts, respecting property so insured, 
becomes an unnatural struggle, between British 
captors, fairly asserting their rights under the law 
of war; and British underwriters, clandestinely 
opposing those rights under cover of foreign 
names. Every sentence of condemnation, in such 
cases, is a blow, not to the hostile proprietor, but 
to our own fellow-subjects. 

N 


90 


If the danger of disloyal correspondence, in 
order to prevent or defeat a capture; if the aug¬ 
mented means of imposition on the courts of 
prize; or if the cheap and effectual protection 
given to the enemy, be considered, in either 
view, this bad practice ought to be immediately 
abolished. 

But there is a still more important and sacred 
reason for its suppression. If neutral merchants 
will violate the obligations of truth and justice, in 
order to profit unduly by the war, the societies 
to which they belong, will soon feel the poison¬ 
ous effects, in the deterioration of private morals; 
for habits of fraud and perjury, will not terminate 
in the neutralizing employments that produced 
them. But with the profit which redounds to them 
and their employers, let them also monopolize 
the crimes. Let us not suffer, at once in our bel¬ 
ligerent interests, and, in what is far more valu¬ 
able, our private morals, by sharing the contami¬ 
nation ; let us not be the accomplices, as well as 
victims of the guilt. 

Since it is not enough, that the engagements in 
question are void in law ; they ought to be prohi¬ 
bited, under severe penalties, as well on the bro¬ 
ker who negociates, as on the underwriter who 
subscribes them. 

Returning from this digression, let us re¬ 
sume for a moment our comparative view of 


91 


English, and French or Spanish commerce, as to 
the expense of carriage during war between the 
West-Indies and Europe. 

There is one remaining head of expense at¬ 
tending the importation of colonial produce, un¬ 
der which it may possibly be supposed, that the 
enemy sustains a loss, more than equivalent to 
his comparative advantages in other respects. I 
mean the commission or factorage : for it cannot 
be disputed, that the fraudulent must be compen¬ 
sated more liberally, than the honourable ser¬ 
vice. 

I cannot pretend with certainty to state the 
average price of that collusive agency, the busi¬ 
ness of which is called “ neutralization/’ either 
in this or any other branch of trade 3 but there 
is every reason to conclude, that it is by no 
means equal to those differences in the rate of 
insurance, which have been shown to be so fa¬ 
vourable to the enemy. I am credibly informed, 
that in some European branches of trade, it is 
reduced to two, and even to one per cent, on the 
amount of the invoice; and there seems no rea¬ 
son why the price of conscience should be higher 
in one transaction of this kind than another, ex¬ 
cept in proportion to the profit derived by the 
purchaser. 

But here it may perhaps be objected, that I am 
building on an hypothesis, the truth of which has 


92 


not hitherto been proved; namely, that the co¬ 
lonial produce, the subject of the commerce in 
question, though ostensibly neutral property, is 
carried on the enemy’s account. 

Independently of the discoveries frequently 
made in the prize courts, there are strong pre¬ 
sumptive grounds for supposing that this is com¬ 
monly the case, not only in the colonial trade, but 
in every other new branch of commerce, which 
the neutral merchants have acquired during the 
war. The general views and interests of the 
parties to these transactions, must strongly in¬ 
cline them to that fraudulent course; and the 
facility of concealing it is become so great, that 
nothing, for the most part, can induce them to 
ship bona fide on neutral account, but a principle 
which, unhappily, experience proves to be ex¬ 
tremely rare among them—respect for the obli¬ 
gation of truth. 

Besides, where can America, and the other 
neutral countries, be supposed to have suddenly 
found a commercial capital, or genuine commer¬ 
cial credit, adequate to the vast magnitude of 
their present investments ? 

By what means, could the new merchants of 
the United States, for instance, be able to pur¬ 
chase all the costly exports of the Havannah, and 
the other Spanish ports in the West-Indies, 
Which now cross the Atlantic in their names? 


93 


Yet what are these, though rich and ample, 
when compared to the enormous value of that 
property which is now carried, under the flag of 
this new power, to and from every region of the 
globe ? 

Those who are but superficially acquainted 
with the subject, may perhaps be ready to sup¬ 
pose, that the frauds which they hear imputed 
to neutral merchants at this period, are like those 
which have always prevailed in every maritime 
war; but the present case, in its extent and 
grossness at least, is quite without a precedent. 

Formerly, indeed, neutrals have carried much 
of the property of our enemies; and great part 
of what they carried was always ostensibly their 
own ; but now they carry the whole of his ex¬ 
ports and imports, and allege the. whole to be 
neutral. It rarely, if ever happens, that the pro 
perty of a single bale of goods, is admitted by the 
papers to be hostile property. We are at war with 
all those who, next to ourselves, are the chief 
commercial nations of the old world; and yet 
the ocean does not sustain a single keel, ships 
of war excepted, in which we can find any 
merchandize that is allowed to be legitimate 
prize. 

France, Spain, Holland, Genoa, and the late 
Austrian Netherlands, and all the colonies and 
trans-marine dominions of those powers, do not, 
collectively, at this hour, possess a single mer- 


94 


chant ship, or a merchant, engaged on his own 
account in exterior commerce, or else the neutral 
flag is now prostituted, to a degree very far beyond 
all former example. 

Those who dispute the latter conclusion, must 
ask us to believe, that all the once eminent mer¬ 
cantile houses of the great maritime countries 
now hostile to England, are become mere fac¬ 
tors, who buy and sell on commission, for the 
mighty, though new-born merchants of Den¬ 
mark, Russia, and America; for in all the num¬ 
berless ports and territories of our enemies, 
there is not one man w r ho now openly sustains 
the character of a foreign independent trader, 
even by a single adventure. Not a pipe of 
brandy is cleared outwards, nor a hogshead of 
sugar entered inwards, in which any subject of 
those unfortunate realms, has an interest beyond 
his commission. 

If the extravagance of this general result, did 
not sufficiently show the falsehood, in a general 
view, of the items of pretence which compose it, 
I might further satisfy, and perhaps astonish the 
reader, by adducing particular examples of the 
gross fictions, by which the claims of neutral 
property are commonly sustained in the prize 
court. 

Merchants, who, immediately prior to the last 
war, were scarcely known, even in the obscure 
sea-port towns at which they resided, have sud- 


95 


denly started up as sole owners of great num¬ 
bers of ships, and sole proprietors of rich car¬ 
goes, which it would have alarmed the wealthiest 
merchants of Europe, to hazard at once on the 
chance of a market, even in peaceable times. 
A man who, at the breaking out of the war, 
was a petty shoemaker, in a small town of East 
Friesland, had, at one time, a hundred and fifty 
vessels navigating as his property, under Prussian 
colours. 

It has been quite a common case, to find 
individuals, who confessedly had but recently 
commenced business as merchants, and whose 
commercial establishments on shore were so in¬ 
significant, that they sometimes had not a single 
clerk in their employment, the claimants of nu¬ 
merous cargoes, each worth many thousand 
pounds; and all destined at the same time, with 
the same species of goods, to the same preca¬ 
rious markets *. 

The cargoes of no less than five East-Tndia- 
men, all composed of the rich exports of Batavia, 
together with three of the ships, were cotem¬ 
porary purchases, on speculation, of a single 
house at Providence in Rhode-Island, and were 
all bound, as asserted, to that American port; 

* Cases of the Bacchus, the Bedford, the London Packet, the Pi- 
gou, &c. &c. claimed for houses in Boston and George-Tovvn in Ma¬ 
ryland, at the Cockpit, last war. 


96 


where, it is scarcely necessary to add, no de¬ 
mand for their cargoes existed *. 

Adventures not less gigantic, were the subjects 
of voyages from the colonies of Dutch Guiana, 
to the neutral ports of Europe; and from the 
Spanish West-Indies, to North America. Vessels 
were sent out from the parsimonious northern 
ports of the latter country, and brought back, in 
abundance, the dollars and gold ingots, of Vera 
Cruz and La Plata. Single ships have been 
found returning with bullion on board, to the va¬ 
lue of from a hundred, to a hundred and fifty 
thousand Spanish dollars, besides valuable car¬ 
goes of other colonial exports f. 

Yet even these daring adventurers have been 
eclipsed. One neutral house has boldly con¬ 
tracted for all the merchandize of the Dutch 
East-India Company at Batavia; amounting in 
value to no less than one million seven hundred 
thousand pounds sterling J. 

But have not, it may be asked, the means of 
payment, for all the rich cargoes which have 
been captured, undergone a judicial investiga¬ 
tion ? Yes, such slender investigation as the 
prize court (which of necessity proceeds on the 
ex parte evidence of the claimants themselves) 

* Case of the Reemsdyke. 

f Case of the Gladiator, the Flora, &c. at the Cockpit. 

+ Case of the Rendsbborg, 4 Robinson, 121. 



97 


has power to institute; the effect of which has 
been, to produce a tribe of subsidiary impostures* 
not less gross than the principal frauds which they 
were adduced to support. 

Sometimes* a single outward shipment, has 
been made to fructify so exuberently in a hostile % 
market as to produce three return cargoes, far 
richer in kind than the parent stock; with two 
additional ships purchased from the enemy, to 
assist in carrying home the harvest. In other 
cases it has been pretended, that bills of ex¬ 
change, or letters of credit, remittances which 
usually travel from Europe to the colonies, and 
scarcely ever in the reverse of that direction, 
were carried to the East-Indies, or to a West- 
India island, and applied there in the purchase 
of the captured cargoes; or that the master or 
supercargo, a mere stranger perhaps in the place, 
found means to negociate drafts to a large amount 
on his owners. 

A pretence still more convenient and compre¬ 
hensive, has been in pretty general use—that 
of having an agent in the hostile port, whose 
ostensible account current may obviate all diffi¬ 
culties, by giving credit for large funds remain¬ 
ing in his hands, the imaginary proceeds of for¬ 
mer consignments, which he invests in the colo¬ 
nial exports. 


o 



In other cases, the master or supercargo, in 
order to give colour to the pretended payment, 
has really drawn bills of exchange in the colony, 
payable at the port of destination; but then 
there has been a secret undertaking that they 
shall be given up, on delivery of the cargo to 
the agent of the hostile proprietor; and some¬ 
times, to guard against breach of faith by the 
holders of such bills, and possible inconvenience 
to the drawers, they have been made payable at 
a certain period after the arrival of the ship and 
cargo; so that in the event of capture and con¬ 
demnation, they would be of no effect. 

A still grosser device has at other times been 
employed, and was in very extensive use, by the 
planters of the Dutch West-Indies resident in 
Europe, before the conquest of Surinam, and 
their other colonies in Guiana. Contracts were 
made in Holland with neutral merchants, for 
the sale of large quantities of sugar, coffee, and 
other produce, at a stipulated price, which was 
supposed to be paid in Europe; and, thereupon, 
directions were sent to the attornies or managers 
of the estate in the colony, to deliver the produce 
so sold to the order of the neutral purchasers.*— 
Vessels, chartered by the latter, were sent out, 
''chiefly in ballast, with a competent number of 
these orders on board; by means of which, the 



99 


valuable cargoes of produce received in the co« 
lon3 r were ostensibly acquired. The same pre¬ 
tences were also adopted by some Spanish colo¬ 
nists of Cuba. 

A man must be profoundly ignorant of the na¬ 
ture of such commodities, and of the colonial trade 
ill general, to suppose that these contracts could 
be sincere. Such are the varieties in the quality, 
and, consequently, in the value of sugar and other 
West-India produce; and so greatly unequal are 
different parcels, the growth even of the same 
plantation and season, to each other; that, to fix 
the price while the particular quality is unknown, 
would be preposterous; and would place the 
buyer quite at the mercy of the seller, or his 
agents.—Besides, from the quick fluctuations of 
price in the European markets, such prospective 
contracts as these, would be downright gaming; 
unmixed with any portion of sober commercial 
calculation.—A man might as well bargain for 
English omnium in Japan. 

Without enumerating any more of these 
coarse impostures, I would remark, that the re¬ 
sort to them, is a striking proof of the difficulty 
these neutralizers found in making out a credible 
case , and that which gave occasion for them 
in the colonial trade, forms alone, a strong pre¬ 
sumption against the general truth of their claims. 
I mean the known fact, that the cargoes carried 


100 


to the hostile colonies, in general, are utterly in¬ 
sufficient to pay for the rich returns. In the trade 
of the sugar islands, especially, if the whole im¬ 
ports from Europe and America were taken col¬ 
lectively, they would hardly be equal in value to 
one-tenth part of the exports. 

For what purpose, it may be reasonably de¬ 
manded, should the planter sell more of his pro¬ 
duce in the colony than is requisite to pay for his 
supplies ?—It is not there, that his debts are to be 
paid, or his savings laid by; but in the mother 
country; and it is in that country also,—or in 
some part of Europe alone, that his produce can 
be advantageously sold. If, then, he sells more 
produce in the colony, than will serve to defray 
the expenses of his estate, it can only be to avoid 
the risk of sending it specifically on his own ac¬ 
count, to Europe.—But if a fictitious sale will al¬ 
most equally avoid that risk, it is obviously a far 
more advantageous expedient than the other; for 
in what form can he remit the proceeds, that of 
bills of exchange excepted, without encounter¬ 
ing an equal danger on the passage ? yet in tak¬ 
ing bills, especially from such persons as usually 
conduct this trade, he may sustain a risk more 
formidable than that of capture and discovery ; 
while he relinquishes to the drawer^ the benefit 
of the European market. 

But/’ it may be said, cc these claims of neu~- 


101 


tral property have often been established by 
“ the decrees of the supreme tribunal of prize 
“ —they were therefore believed, by those who 
“ were the most competent judges, to be true.”— 
I admit they have been so established, and even 
in some of the cases which I have instanced as 
peculiarly gross ; but not because they were be¬ 
lieved—it was only because they were supported 
by such direct and positive testimony, as judges 
bound to decide according to the evidence before 
them, are not at liberty to reject. 

The presumption that great part of the colo¬ 
nial produce goes to Europe on account of the 
enemy, is strongly fortified by the frequency of 
those collusive double voyages, the nature of 
which has been fully explained. 

Let it be admitted, that a real neutral specula¬ 
tor in West-Indian produce, might wish to buy in 
the colony, as well as to sell in Europe; still 
there seems no adequate reason for his choos¬ 
ing to send forward to the latter, at a considera¬ 
ble risk in the event of detection, the identical 
produce which he bought in the former, after it 
has been actually landed in his own country; 
when he might commute it, by sale or barter, 
for other produce of the same description, which 
might be exported with perfect security, and 
without the expense of perjury or falsehood. 

On the other hand, supposing the property to 


102 


remain in the enemy planter* from whom it was 
ostensibly purchased* the obstinate adherence to 
these double voyages, and the artifices employed 
for their protection* are perfectly natural. To 
exchange his produce in the American market, 
would be a trust too delicate to be willingly re¬ 
posed by the planter in his neutralizing agent; 
and besides, the identity of the goods shipped in 
the West-Indies* with those which shall be ulti¬ 
mately delivered to himself or his consignee in 
Europe* must be essential to his satisfaction and 
security; as well as to the obtaining those abate¬ 
ments or privileges on the importation into the 
mother country* to which the produce of its 
own colonies are entitled. 

After all* let it not be supposed that the impor¬ 
tant conclusions to which I reason, depend on 
the fact* that the trade in question is carried on 
chiefly, or in some degree, on account of our 
enemies. Were the contrary conceded, very lit¬ 
tle* if any* deduction need, on that score, be 
made from the sum of the mischiefs here as¬ 
cribed to the encroachments of the neutral flag. 

If the hostile colonies are supplied with all 
necessary imports, and their produce finds its 
way to market, the enemy is effectually relieved 
from the chief pressure of the war ; even though 
both branches of the trade should pass into fo¬ 
reign hands, in reality, as well as in form; nor 


103 


is this always, perhaps, the least advantageous 
course. 

Let it be supposed, that the neutral merchants 
really buy on their own account, at Martinique 
and the Havannah, the sugars which they sell at 
Bourdeaux and at Cadiz. In that case, their in¬ 
ducement is found in the hope of a commercial 
profit, instead of a factor’s commission; and it 
evidently depends on the average extent of that 
profit, compared with the ordinary commission 
on neutralization, whether the enemy is less ad¬ 
vantageously assisted in this mode, than the 
other. 

Let the common commission, for instance, be 
supposed to be 5 per cent.: then, if sugars 
bought for 1000 dollars at the Havannah, nett, 
on an average, 1050 dollars, clear of freight and 
all other expenses, in the market of Cadiz, it is 
indifferent between the enemy and the neutral 
merchant, whether the latter imports on his own 
account, or as agent for a Spanish subject. The 
service done to the individual enemy, and to the 
hostile state, is, in both case's, exactly the same ; 
and so is the detriment sustained by the adverse 
belligerent, against whom the commerce of the co¬ 
lony was protected. 

Is it, then, likely, that neutrals trading on their 
own account, would obtain a larger average pro¬ 
fit, than the amount of a neutralizing commission? 


104 


—Rather, I conceive, the reverse: for it is the 
natural and speedy effect of competition, in 
every branch of trade, to reduce the average 
profits of the adventurers, taken collectively, to 
the lowest rate at which any competitor can af¬ 
ford to prosecute the business ; and even below 
that level. More especially is this the event* 
when the gains are very precarious, and very un¬ 
equally divided: for the gaming propensity, in¬ 
duces men to give for chances in commerce, as 
well as in the lottery, much more than they are 
intrinsically worth.—Now, the enemy who ex¬ 
ports from the colony, and imports into the mo¬ 
ther country, produce of his own growth, paying 
a neutralizing commission on the carriage, is a 
competitor with the genuine neutral speculator 
in the same market, on equal terms, the difference 
of that commission excepted ; and as the planter, 
in sending home his own produce, looks to no 
mercantile gain on the voyage, but merely to 
the remittance of his property, the commission 
must soon become the measure of the average 
profit to neutral importers in general; and the 
gains of the speculator, will even have a ten¬ 
dency to fall below, though they will not perma¬ 
nently exceed, that standard. The commission 
will also feel the depreciating effect of competi¬ 
tion ; so that this regulator will, itself* progres¬ 
sively decline; but its fall will, at the same 


105 


time, further depress the speculator’s profit, and 
in an equal degree. 

If this reasoning, which seems to stand on the 
plainest principles of commercial arithmetic, be 
just, the profits of the genuine neutral merchants 
in this trade, must at present be very low : for let 
it be considered, that it has now been prosecuted 
by every neutral nation, no less than twelve 
years ; a brief interruption during the late peace 
excepted; so that competition has had ample 
time to work its natural effects. The enemy, 
probably therefore, is a gainer at present, rather 
than a loser, when delivered from the necessity 
of being his own exporter and importer, by a 
real sale to, and repurchase from, the neutral 
merchant. 

That this commerce, however conducted, is 
not a very costly vehicle for the colonial produce 
of a belligerent inferior at sea, is manifest from 
a single and highly important fact, to which I 
would next particularly call the reader’s atten* 
tion. 

The produce of the West-Indies , sells cheaper at 
present , clear of duties, in the ports of our enemies , 
than in our own *. 

* This statement also has reference to the month of August last, sincq 
which period, I believe, the late decisions in our prize courts have oc¬ 
casioned a material change. At that time, and for many preceding 
months, it was generally a losing game to export West-India produce 

P 


106 


Though the preceding statements and calcula¬ 
tions naturally lead to this result; it will, perhaps, 
be regarded with some astonishment. But the 
emotions that it ought to excite, are rather those 
of indignation and alarm. 

We defend our colonies at a vast expense—we 
maintain, at a still greater expense, an irresis¬ 
tible navy; we chase the flag of every enemy 
from every sea> and at the same moment, the 
hostile colonies are able, from the superior safety 
and cheapness of their new-found navigation, 
to undersell us in the continental markets of Eu¬ 
rope. 

Where is the partial compensation now, that 
our planters used to find, for the heavy burthens 
and dangers of war ? If the cost of their supplies 
were enormously enhanced, if war taxes pressed 
them hard, if freight and insurance were doubled 
or trebled, if their interior defence became ex¬ 
pensive as well as laborious, and if they were 
sometimes invaded or plundered by a hostile 
force, still their rivals and enemies in the neigh¬ 
bouring islands were in no capacity to mock at. 


from this country to Amsterdam or Flanders, even when the whole duty 
was drawn back; for the importer of French and Spanish produce of a like 
description, could afford to sell on cheaper terms - } yet the latter had paid 
considerable duties in the colonies it came from, which had not been 
drawn back. 


er profit by, these disasters. On the contrary, 
the superior pressure of the war upon the hos¬ 
tile colonies, insured to our ow T n, the benefit of 
markets more than commonly advantageous. 
While the benefit of the drawback gave them at 
least equality with their rivals, in the foreign 
and neutral markets of Europe, in regard to fiscal 
charges; in other respects the differences were 
all in their favour. The foreign sales, therefore, 
were highly beneficial; and the home-market, re¬ 
lieved by a copious exportation from all tempo¬ 
rary repletions, gave them in its large and ever 
advancing prices, some indemnity for the evils of 
the war. 

By the present unprecedented and artificial 
state of things, this compensation has been nar¬ 
rowed, and is likely to be totally lost. Much of 
the embarrassment under which our West-India 
merchants and planters have laboured, and much 
of that silently progressive ruin in our old 
colonies, the nature and extent of which are 
too little knowm in England, may be traced per¬ 
haps to this singular source. By circumstances 
which it would be too digressive to explain, the 
main evil has been much retarded in its progress, 
and is only now beginningto operate with its na^ 
tural force; but, unless the cause is removed, it 
will soon be severely felt. 

I am well informed, that the business of the 


108 


sugar refiner, the great customer of the West-In- 
dia merchant, has, of late, been very unsuccess¬ 
ful, Instead of obtaining a large annual profit as 
formerly, his accounts for the- last season have 
been wound up with a serious loss. 

A symptom more clearly indicatory than this, 
of the ill effects which I wish to expose, cannot 
be required.—From what sources result the chief 
gains of the sugar refiner ? From an advance 
pending his process, in the prices of the raw, 
and, of course, of the refined commodity, and 
this is chiefly occasioned by an increase in the 
difference of price between the home and the fo¬ 
reign market, when that difference is favourable 
to exportation: for the foreign in great measure 
regulates the home demand. When, therefore, 
the price of sugar in the continental markets is 
progressively declining, in the proportion it bears 
to the existing price in this country, which, of 
course, will naturally happen when the supply 
from the foreign colonies is progressively either 
enlarged or cheapened, the British refiner will 
find, as he has lately done, a loss instead of a 
profit on/his business. The consequences of such 
a progress, if continued, are not less obvious than 
alarming. 

It appears, then, on the whole, that our ene*- 
tnies carry on their colonial commerce under 


109 


the neutral flag, cheaply as well as safely; that 
they are enabled, not only to elude our hos¬ 
tilities, but to rival our merchants and planters, 
in the European markets; and that their compa¬ 
rative, as well as positive advantages, are such, 
as to injure our manufacturers, and threaten our 
colonies with ruin. 

That the hostile treasuries are fed by the 
same means with a copious stream of revenue, 
without any apparent pressure on the subject; 
a revenue which otherwise would be cut off 
by the war, or even turned into our own cof¬ 
fers, is a most obvious and vexatious conse¬ 
quence. Without the charge of defending his 
colonies, or their trade, by a single squadron or 
convoy, the enemy receives nearly all the tribute 
from them, that they would yield under the most 
expensive protection. 

Let it not be supposed, that even such produce 
as is imported bona fide into neutral countries, 
and sold there without re-shipment, fails to yield 
its portion of revenue to the hostile state. 

To prevent such a loss, our enemies have had 
recourse to various expedients; but chiefly to 
those, of either charging and receiving duties in 
the colony, on the exportation of the produce 
from thence; or taking bonds from persons resi¬ 
dent in the mother country, in respect of every 
^hip clearing out for, or intended to carry produce 


110 


from the colonies, with condition either to land 
such produce in a port of the mother country, or 
pay the duties there. 

Sometimes, in order to encourage the perform¬ 
ance of engagements to import into the mother 
country, which the proprietor, though an ene¬ 
my, might, for greater safety, wish to violate, the 
bond has been conditioned for payment of double 
tonnage or duties, in the event of the cargo be¬ 
ing landed in any foreign port *. 

But Bonaparte finding, I suppose, that the 
best way of securing an importation into France, 
was the actual previous payment of the whole 
French import duties, appears now to have gene¬ 
rally prescribed that course. By custom-house 
certificates, found on board a Gallo-Americaii 
East-Indiaman, from the isle of France, lately 
condemned in the Admiralty, it appeared, that 
the proprietors had actually paid all the French 
import duties in advance, in the colony, and 
were, therefore, to be allowed to import the cargo 
into Nantz, duty free. Yet this ship, as usual, 
was ostensibly destined for New-York f. 

Of the Spanish treasure shipped from South 
America, a great part may be reasonably re- 

* Cases of the Vrow Margaretta, Marcusson ; Speculation, Roe- 
lofs, &c. at the Cockpit, 1801. 

f Case of the Commerce, Park, master, at the Admiralty, August, 
1805. 


Ill 


garded as nett revenue passing on the king’s 
account; and from his treasury, it is, no doubt, 
copiously issued to supply the war chest of 
Bonaparte. Nor is his Spanish majesty at a loss 
to convert into specie, and draw over to Europe, 
those more cumbrous subjects of revenue, which 
he receives beyond the Atlantic ; or to commute 
them there, in such a manner as may serve for 
the support of the colonial government, by the aid 
of his neutral merchants. To a single commer¬ 
cial house, he sold, or pretended to sell, all the to¬ 
bacco in the royal warehouses in three of his 
South American provinces, for payment in dol¬ 
lars, or in such goods as could easily and advan¬ 
tageously be converted into specie in that coun- 
try*. 

After attending to these facts, it will not be 
easy to discover in what way the hostile govern¬ 
ments feel the pressure of the war, in regard to 
their colonial commerce. 

The private merchants, even scarcely seem to 
sustain any serious loss, except that their ships 
are unemployed. But transfers, real or ostensi¬ 
ble, to neutrals, have, for the most part, obviated 
this inconvenience: and the government itself 
has, no doubt, been a liberal freighter, or pur¬ 
chaser, of such disengaged native bottoms as 

* Case of the Anna Catharina, 4 Robinson^ 107. 


112 


were fit for the invasion of England; a service 
for which our neutral friends have obligingly set 
them at leisure. The usurper, therefore, might 
perhaps be as popular among his merchants, as 
he seems anxious to be, if it were not for those 
naval blockades, against which he is incessantly 
raving. If the British courts of admiralty would 
in that respect obligingly adopt his new code 6f 
maritime law, the commerce of France might 
cease to labour under any uneasy restraint. 


Hitherto, we have considered the abuse of neu¬ 
tral rights, chiefly, as a protection unduly imparted 
to our enemies, in respect of their colonial inte¬ 
rests, their trade, and commercial revenues. 

Were this great frustration of our maritime 
efforts in the war, the only prejudice we sustain, 
the evil would be sufficiently great. It would 
still be a wrong highly dangerous to our future 
safety, and adverse to the best hopes of our al¬ 
lies ; for to protect the financial means of Bona¬ 
parte and his confederates, is to nourish a mon¬ 
ster that threatens desolation, not to England on¬ 
ly, but to Europe. 

The mischief, however, by no means termi¬ 
nates in sustaining the French exchequer; it 
strikes in various directions at the very vitals of 
our national security; it tends powerfully and di- 


113 


rectly to the depression of our maritime power, 
and to the exaltation of the navy of France. 

Let it be considered, in the first place, that by 
this licentious use of the neutral flags, the enemy 
is enabled to employ his whole military marine, 
in purposes of offensive war. 

He is not obliged to maintain a squadron, or a 
ship, for the defence of his colonial ports ; nor 
does he, in fact, station so much as a frigate, in 
the East or West-Indies, except for the purpose 
of cruizing against our commerce. The nume¬ 
rous and frequent detachments of the convoy 
service, are also totally saved. 

While a great dispersion of his maritime force, 
and the consequent risk of its defeat and cap¬ 
ture, in detail, are thus avoided, he obtains by its 
concentration near the seat of empire a most for¬ 
midable advantage ; since the British navy has to 
guard our colonies, and our commerce, in all its 
branches, and is, consequently, widely dispersed 
in every quarter of the globe. 

During the last war, such considerations might 
seem of little moment, because the united ma¬ 
rine of France and her confederates, was reduced 
to so very feeble a state, and so little effort was 
made for its restoration, that no advantage of this 
kind could raise it from contempt; much less 
render it a subject of serious apprehension. 

But now, the case is widely different. The re¬ 
el 


114 


establishment of the French navy, and those of 
Spain and Holland, is a work on which Bona¬ 
parte is not only eagerly intent; but in which 
he has already made a very alarming progress. 
Already, the great inferiority of the confederates 
in point of actual force, has begun to disappear ; 
and so vast are their means of naval structure and 
equipment, that except through the precarious 
diversion of the approaching continental war, we 
cannot long expect to be superior to their united 
navies in the number of our ships, though we 
may hope long to be so, in the skill and bravery 
of our seamen* 

On our own side, also, I admit, improvement 
is to be expected; for our Admiralty is hap¬ 
pily placed under the auspices of a most able 
and active minister, who is indefatigable in his 
efforts for the increase of the navy; and whose 
comprehensive knowledge of the whole business 
of the marine department, in all its ramifications, 
peculiarly well qualifies him for that momentous 
Work. 

The venerable age of Lord Barham has been 
supposed to be a drawback on his qualifications 
for office, by those only who are ignorant of his 
still energetic powers, both of body and mind. 
It may even be truly said, that the lapse of years, 
during which his knowledge of the civil business 
of the Admiralty has been matured by observa- 


115 


tion and experience, has made him the fitter for 
his present most arduous station. He resembles 
the old, but sound and healthy oak, which time 
has qualified for the most important uses of our 
navy, by enlarging its girth and its dimensions, 
without having at all impaired its strength or 
elasticity. 

In calculating, therefore, on the effect of the 
enemy’s exertions, I allow for every possible 
counteraction in our own. I suppose that not 
one ship in our public dock-yards, or in those of 
the merchants, which is fit to receive the keel of 
a man of war, will be left unoccupied by the 
Admiralty, except from the want of means to 
employ it. But there are limits to the power of 
rapidly increasing our navy, of which the public 
at large is not perhaps fully aware. All the 
knowledge and activity of Lord Barham cannot 
immediately replenish our magazines with cer¬ 
tain materials necessary in the construction of 
large ships, of which there is a great and in¬ 
creasing scarcity, not only in England, but in 
every other maritime country; and which nature 
can but slowly re-produce. 

Bonaparte, from the immense extent of those 
European regions, which are now either placed 
under his yoke, or subjected to his irresistible 
influence, and from the effects of that commerce, 
falsely called neutral, which we fatally tolerate, 


116 


is well supplied with the largest and best timber, 
and with abundance of all other materials for 
ship-building ; especially in his northern ports— 
Witness the grand scale of his preparations at 
Antwerp; where he has at this moment on the 
stocks, eight ships of the line, and many of infe¬ 
rior dimensions. In this new port, the destined 
rival of Brest and Toulon, he is rapidly forming 
large naval magazines, which the interior navi¬ 
gation alone may very copiously supply; and 
which he purchases in the countries of the North, 
chiefly with the wine and brandy of France, and 
with the produce of the hostile colonies, carried 
in neutral bottoms. I am well informed, that 
the naval stores which he purchased in the Baltic 
alone, in the year 1804, amounted in value to 
eighty millions of livres. In short, he is, con¬ 
formably to the boast already quoted, employing 
all the resources of his power and his policy, for 
the augmentation of his marine ; and has not in¬ 
credibly declared, that before the commencement 
of a new year, he would add thirty line-of-battle 
ships to the navy of France. 

It is not easy to suppose, that the utmost exer¬ 
tions of our government can enable us to keep pace 
in the multiplication of ships, with all our united 
enemies; especially while they are enabled, by the 
neutralizing system, to preserve all the men-of- 
war they progressively acquire; keeping them 


117 


safely in port, until deemed numerous enough 
to enter on offensive operations. Even when that 
critical period arrives, they will, no doubt, still 
choose to commit their commerce to the safe keep¬ 
ing of their neutral friends; and not hoist again 
their mercantile flags, till they have attempted to 
overpower by concentrated attacks, the scattered 
navy of England. 

There is, however, another grand requisite of 
naval war, not less essential than ships ; and thatr 
is, a competent body of seamen to man them. 

Here also the increase of our navy beyond oik- 
dinary bounds, is found to be no easy work, and 
here Bonaparte, happily for us, is not less at a 
loss; but that pestilent source of evils, the abuse 
of neutral rights, in this most momentous point 
also, largely assists our enemies, and impairs our 
maritime strength. 

The worst consequence, perhaps, of the in¬ 
dependence and growing commerce of Ame¬ 
rica, is the seduction of our seamen. We heal 
continually of clamours in that country, on the 
score of its sailors being pressed at sea by our 
frigates. But when, and how, have these sailors 
become Americans ?—By engaging in her mer¬ 
chant service during the last and the present war ; 
and sometimes by obtaining that formal natural¬ 
ization, which is gratuitously given, after they 
have sailed two years from an American port. 


118 


If those who by birth, and by residence and em¬ 
ployment, prior to 1793, were confessedly British, 
ought still to be regarded as his Majesty’s subjects, 
a very considerable part of the navigators of Ame¬ 
rican ships, are such at this moment; though,un¬ 
fortunately, they are not easily distinguished from 
genuine American seamen. 

This is a growing, as well as a tremendous evil; 
the full consideration of which, would lead me 
too far from the main object of these sheets. 
I must confine myself to its immediate connex¬ 
ion with the abuse of neutral rights; and con¬ 
tent myself with merely hinting in regard to its 
more comprehensive relations, that it is a subject 
on which our municipal code is extremely de¬ 
fective. 

The unity of language, and the close affinity 
of manners, betweeen English and American 
seamen, are the strong inducements with our 
sailors, for preferring the service of that country, 
to any other foreign employment; or, to speak 
more correctly, these circumstances remove from 
the American service, in the minds of our sailors, 
those subjects of aversion which they find in 
other foreign ships; and which formerly coun¬ 
teracted, effectually, the general motives to de¬ 
sert from, or avoid, the naval service of their 
country. 

What these motives are, I need not explain. 


119 


They are strong, and not easy to be removed 
though they might perhaps be palliated, by 
alterations in our naval system; but the more 
difficult it is to remove this dangerous propensity 
in our seamen ; the more mischievous, obviously, 
is any new combination, which increases the 
disposition itself, or facilitates its indulgence. 
If we cannot remove the general causes of pre¬ 
dilection for the American service, or the dif¬ 
ficulty of detecting and reclaiming British sea¬ 
men when engaged in it; it is, therefore, the more 
unwise, to allow the merchants of that country, 
and other neutrals, to encroach on our maritime 
rights in time of war; because we thereby greatly 
and suddenly, increase their demand for mariners 
in general; and enlarge their means, as well as 
their motives, for seducing the sailors of Great- 
Britain. 

There is no w^ay of ascertaining, how many 
seamen were in the employ of the powers at 
present neutral, at the breaking out of the last 
war : and how many at this time navigate under 
their flags; but could these data be obtained, 
I doubt not, it would appear, that they have 
been multiplied at least tenfold * ; and to the 

* The ships and vessels of East Friesland, of 100 tons burthen, 
and upwards, prior to the present war, were estimated at loO ; now 
they are supposed greatly t.o exceed 2000. 


120 


increase, whatever be its amount, the relaxation 
of our belligerent rights # has, certainly, in a great 
degree, contributed. 

The legal and ordinary enlargement of neutral 
commerce, in time of war, would, indeed, have 
added greatly to the stock of American, as well as 
of Prussian and Danish mariners ; but when the 
great magnitude and value of the colonial trade 
are considered, and the many branches of naviga¬ 
tion that, directly or indirectly, spring from it; 
the admission into that commerce may, perhaps, 
be fairly estimated to have given to those neu¬ 
tral nations in general, but pre-eminently to 
America, two-thirds of the whole actual increase 
in their shipping. This extensive trade, it may 
further be observed, has, in the medium length 
of the voyages, and other known circumstances, 
peculiar attractions for our seamen; and, what 
is still more important, it enables the merchant, 
by the richness of the cargoes in general, to earn a 
high neutralizing freight, and consequently to of¬ 
fer a tempting rate of wages. 

It is truly vexatious to reflect, that, by this 
abdication of our belligerent rights, we not only 
give up the best means of annoying the enemy, 
but raise up, at the same time, a crowd of dan¬ 
gerous rivals for the seduction of our sailors, 
and put bribes into their hands for the purpose. 
We not only allow the trade of the hostile eolo- 


121 


nies to pass safely, in derision of our impotent 
warfare, but to be carried on by the mariners of 
Great-Britain. This illegitimate and noxious na¬ 
vigation, therefore, is nourished with the life¬ 
blood of our navy. 

Here again our views would be very inade¬ 
quate, if they were not extended from our own 
direct losses, to the correspondent gains of the 
enemy. 

The hostile navies, are more easily manned, 
through the same injurious cause which defrauds 
our own of its seamen. Having no commercial 
marine, their sailors can find no native employ¬ 
ment, privateering excepted, but in the public 
service; and it is notorious that very few of them 
are found on board neutral vessels *. The capa¬ 
city, therefore, of Bonaparte and his confederates 
to man their fleets, must, in some points, be great¬ 
er than if they were our equals at sea. 

In former wars, our prisons were generally 


* This is a striking fact, well known to those who are conversant with 
the business of the prize courts. In the colonial trade .especially, the 
chief subject of these remarks, it is rare to find among the private mari¬ 
ners on board a prize who happen to be examined, a single Frenchman, 
or a Spaniard ; though a large proportion of those who are taken on boanfc 
American vessels, avow themselves to have been by birth, and by domicile 
anterior to the war, subjects of Great-Britain. 

R 


122 


crowded with the mariners of France and Spain* 
taken for the most part on board of their mer¬ 
chantmen ; but now* this drawback on their ma¬ 
ritime resources, is wholly avoided. Except at 
the commencement of hostilities, we make not 
a single prisoner of war in any commercial bot¬ 
tom. As to their ships of war, they are so rare¬ 
ly to be found out of port, except when making 
depredations on our commerce, in the absence 
of any protecting force, that if the present sys¬ 
tem continues much longer, the British seamen, 
prisoners of war in hostile countries, will far out¬ 
number their enemies of the same description, in 
our hands. 

In the East and West-Indies* the effects of these 
advantages, on the side of the enemy, begin al¬ 
ready to be severely felt. Bonaparte has often, 
and not untruly, boasted, that the injury done to 
our commerce by the privateers of the Isle of 
France* of Martinique, and Guadaloupe, has 
been extremely great. Fie might also have 
praised his good allies of Cuba, for equal acti¬ 
vity. The little port of Baracoa alone, on the 
east end of that island, has no less than twelve 
privateers, who are continually annoying our 
trade in the Windward Passage *. Curat^oa also, 

* See an authentic account of their particular descriptions and force, 
in the London papers of September 17th, 1805. 


123 


and the harbour of Santo Domingo, are become 
most troublesome neighbours to Jamaica. 

Can we wonder that the colonial ports should 
furnish so many cruizers ? It will be a much 
greater cause of surprise, if they should not soon 
be multiplied tenfold. Nothing but the small de¬ 
gree of encouragement given by the Spanish go¬ 
vernment to offensive enterprises during the last 
war, and the known state of the French colonies 
at that period, could have saved our merchants 
and underwriters, from sooner smarting in this 
way very severely, through our complaisance to 
the neutral flag. 

Let it be considered, that the Creole seamen 
domiciled in the hostile colonies, who are em¬ 
ployed in time of peace in what may be called 
the interior navigation of the West-Indies, and 
the mariners of the isles of France and Bourbon, 
who usually pursue their occupation in the orien¬ 
tal seas, can now have no civil employment in 
those regions under their own flags; for the in¬ 
tercourse between the different colonies of the 
same state, as well as the colonial traffic with 
neighbouring foreigners, is, like the intercourse 
with Europe, carried on wholly in neutral ves¬ 
sels. 

These seamen, though pretty numerous, espe¬ 
cially in the Spanish settlements, very rarely en¬ 
gage under a foreign commercial flag; of which 


m 


their religious prejudices as bigotted papists, and 
their personal insecurity, as being mostly of Afri¬ 
can extraction, are probably the principal causes. 
The entering on board privateers therefore, for 
the purpose of cruizing against our commerce in 
the seas which they usually navigate, is with them 
a necessary, as well as lucrative occupation. 

If it be asked, how are a sufficient number of 
vessels of war, and the means of equipping 
them, procured in the colonial ports of the ene¬ 
my ? I answer, that many of our merchant ships, 
which they take, are easily adapted to the pri¬ 
vateering service; and that though we have not 
yet allowed neutrals to carry naval stores to the 
enemy, a sufficient quantity of them are clandes¬ 
tinely introduced by those obliging friends, under 
cover of their general trade. This is another col¬ 
lateral ill effect of our fatal indulgence to neutral 
commerce; for it is easy to conceal under a gene¬ 
ral cargo of permitted goods, small parcels of a 
contraband kind ; and so extensive is the trade of 
the colonies in proportion to their demand of na¬ 
val stores, that contributions from each neutral 
ship that arrives, small enough to pass as part of 
her own provision for the voyage, will make up 
an adequate total. 

But so great has been the audacity of the neu¬ 
tral merchants, that they have actually sent ships 
constructed solely for the purposes of war, and 


125 


pierced for the reception of guns, to the Havan- 
nah, and other ports of our enemies, for sale: 
and though it may astonish the reader, American 
claims for such vessels, when taken on the voy¬ 
age, have been pertinaciously prosecuted, not 
only in our vice-admiralty courts, but afterward 
in the court of appeals *. The argument was, 
that, though by our treaty with America, the 
materials of naval architecture are prohibited 
goods, yet ships ready built, not being expressly 
enumerated in the contraband catalogue, might 
be lawfully sent to our enemies, whether for car¬ 
riage or sale. 

Let us next regard this spurious neutral com¬ 
merce in another view, as a great discourage¬ 
ment to our naval service. 

The wise, liberal, and efficacious policy of this 
country, has been, to vest the property of mari¬ 
time prizes wholly in the captors; and hence, 
much of the vigilance, activity, and enterprise, 
that have so long characterized the British navy. 

Let us give full credit to our gallant officers, 
for that disinterested patriotism, and that love of 
glory, which ought to be the main springs of mi¬ 
litary character, and which they certainly pos¬ 
sess in a most eminent degree. But it would be 

* Case' of the Brutus, Rutherford, master, at the Cockpit, Jjjrty, 
-1-804. 


126 


romantic and absurd, to suppose that they do not 
feel the value of that additional encouragement, 
which his Majesty and the legislature hold out to 
them, in giving them the benefit of the captures 
they make. What else is to enable the veteran 
naval officer, to enjoy in the evening of his life, 
the comforts of an easy income; the father to 
provide for Jiis children ; or the husband for an 
affectionate wife, who, from the risks he runs in 
the service of his country, is peculiarly likely to 
survive him ? By what other means, can a victo¬ 
rious admiral, when raised as a reward of his il¬ 
lustrious actions, to civil and hereditary honours, 
hope to support his well earned rank, and provide 
for an ennobled posterity ? The pension he may ob¬ 
tain will be temporary, and scarcely adequate even 
to his own support, in his new and elevated sta¬ 
tion. It is from the enemies of his country, 
therefore, that he hopes to wrest the means of 
comfortably sustaining those honour^, which he 
lias gained at their expense. c # m . , ) 

As to the common seamen and mariners, the 
natural motives of dislike to the naval service, 
are in their breasts far more effectually combated 
by the hope of prize money, than by all the 
other inducements that are, or can be proposed 
to them. The nautical character is peculiarly 
of a kind to be influenced by such dazzling, 
but precarious prospects. They reason, however. 


127 


and calculate on the chances and the value of 
success ; witness the proverbial remark, that a 
Spanish war is the best mean of manning our 
navy. 

Never, surely, was the encouragement of our 
naval service more important than at the present 
period; and never were the rewards of that ser¬ 
vice more meritoriously or gloriously earned.— 
Yet what are now the rational hopes of our sea¬ 
men, in regard to the benefit of prizes? On 
whatever station they may be placed, and what¬ 
ever sea they may be crossing, they look out in 
vain for any subject of safe and uncontested cap¬ 
ture. 

Are they sent to the East or West-Indies ? 
These, though sickly, used to -be lucrative sta¬ 
tions ; especially in a war with Spain: but now 
the rich exports of the hostile colonies present to 
them only the cup of Tantalus. The^ see the 
same valuable cargoes passing continually under 
their sterns, which used formerly to make the for¬ 
tunes of the captors; but the ensigns of neu¬ 
trality now wave over them all, and prohibit a 
seizure. 

Do they, in concert with the land forces, at¬ 
tack and conquer a hostile island ? The reward of 
their successful valour is still wrested from them 
in the same vexatious way. They find none but 


m 


neutral flags in the harbour, and none but pro¬ 
perty alleged to be neutral afloat *. 

In short, except a small privateer or two, of 
little more value than may suffice to pay the 
charges of condemnation and sale, the richest 
seas of the globe, though bordered and thickly 
studded with the most flourishing colonies of our 
enemies, have no safe booty to yield to the sea¬ 
men of the British navy. It is painful to reflect, 
that these brave men lose the ancient fruits of 
distant service, while enduring more than its or¬ 
dinary hardships. In the West-Indies, particu¬ 
larly, they suffer far more by the ravages of dis¬ 
ease, than when the Spanish galleons, and the 
convoys from the French Antilles, consoled them 
and rallied their spirits. Then too, victory, either 
in possession or prospect, often enlivened that 
languid service, and reanimated the sickly crews; 
but now, they meet no enemy worthy of their 
valour. Their only, but most disheartening foes, 
are the fever and the neutral flag. 

If we look nearer home, the reverse, in the 
situation of our seamen, is not less singular or 
discouraging. The Mediterranean, the Bay of 


* The merchantmen taken by Lord St. Vinceat and Sir Charles 
Grey, at Martinique and Guadaloupe, were all of this description, 
and, with their cargoes, were ultimately restored. 


129 


Biscay, the Channel, the German Ocean, are 
covered with the exports of Spain, Holland, and 
France, and their colonies, and with shipping 
bound to their ports ; but where are the prizes of 
war ? Our cruizers search for them in vain, 
even on the hostile coasts ;—for even there, ves¬ 
sels, impudently called neutral, conduct, for the 
most part, that domestic intercourse between dif¬ 
ferent parts of the same hostile kingdom, which 
is called the coasting trade. 

The examination of our disguised enemies at sea 
is become every where, in general, a fruitless task ; 
since they are grown far too expert to be detected 
by such a scrutiny as can be made by a visiting of¬ 
ficer on shipboard. Yet, if they are sent into port, 
it is at the captors’ peril. Should, however, a com¬ 
manding officer, relying on the notoriety of some 
fraudulent practice, or on private information, 
venture to take that course, he and his ship¬ 
mates well know the difficulties they will have 
to encounter in obtaining a condemnation ; and 
that after a tedious contest in the original and 
appellate jurisdiction, they are likely at last to sit 
down with the loss of their expenses and costs. 

The consequence naturally is, that but a very 
few of those pseudo neutrals, which are met with 
and examined at sea, are brought in for judicial 
inquiry ; and that a still smaller proportion of 
them, are prosecuted as prize; though the law 
s 


130 


officers of the crown in the Admiralty, in a great 
majority of the cases they examine, have scarcely 
a doubt that the property is hostile. They know 
by experience the fraudulent nature of the pa¬ 
pers ; but they know also the artful and elabo¬ 
rate perjury by which those papers will be sup¬ 
ported, and which, however unsatisfactory out of 
court, it will be impossible judicially to resist.— 
Even when discoveries are made, such as will 
clearly justify a prosecution, the practice of let¬ 
ting in explanatory affidavits on the part of 
claimants, for the most part secures an ultimate 
acquittal, and frustrates the hopes of the captors. 

At the best, as every bottom, and every bale of 
goods, is now infallibly claimed by the neutraliz¬ 
ing agents, and every claim, however clear the 
detection of its falsehood may be, is pertina¬ 
ciously prosecuted, the rare event of a final con¬ 
demnation can only be obtained through the me¬ 
dium of a long contest at law—an evil peculiar¬ 
ly unpleasant to the sanguine mind of a sailor. 
It may be safely affirmed, that one prize taken, 
as in former wars, under the colours of an ene¬ 
my, and therefore promptly condemned and dis¬ 
tributed without litigation, would do more to¬ 
wards the encouragement of our navy, than 
three prizes of equal value, tardily, and with 
difficulty secured, as at present, by the detection 
of neutral impostures. 


131 


Almost the only class of captures, on which 
our seamen can now with any safety rely, are 
those which are founded on the breach of a block¬ 
ade. Even those, however, are rarely adjudged 
without an obstinate litigation in the Admiralty, 
if not also in the superior court. But the ordina¬ 
ry value of such prizes is small, and, on the 
whole, they are so far from making any amends 
to our navy at large for the loss of its legitimate 
preyj'in the colonial trade, that they are a very in¬ 
adequate recompense to the squadrons employed 
in the blockades, for the extraordinary severity 
of that service. Here also, a war, barren of gain, 
is peculiarly productive of hardships, and priva¬ 
tions to our gallant defenders. 

These discouragements have been very pa¬ 
tiently borne : our loyal and generous tars well 
know the difficulties of their country, and are 
content to defend it under every disadvantage 
that the exigencies of the times may impose on 
them. But if the present commerce with the hos¬ 
tile colonies be plainly such as we have a right to 
interdict, and if the great national considerations 
before suggested, concur in calling for its prohi¬ 
bition, the interests of our gallant officers and 
seamen may most reasonably fortify the call.— 
They ought not, without a clear obligation of 
national duty, or a plain and strong preponde¬ 
rance of public good, to be shut out from their 


132 


ancient advantages, to be jostled by every neu¬ 
tral in the chase of their lawful game, and to 
sit down in poverty at the next peace, after sus¬ 
taining, during two long wars, the dominion of 
the sea against three of the wealthiest of commer¬ 
cial nations. 

Far different is the case with the navy of our 
enemies. 

The field of capture to them is entirely open, 
and as fertile as British commerce can make it. 
Whatever enterprise or courage they display, 
has the promise of a brilliant reward; and even 
when flying from the name of Nelson with near¬ 
ly double his force, they could stumble on and 
seize a rich West-India convoy in their way.— 
Unless their cowardly haste really led them to 
destroy the booty, they may boast, perhaps, of 
commercial spoils more valuable than the hero, 
who intrepidly pursued them, has met with in 
both his wars. 

If France persists in her new system, if she 
does not again quite abandon the sea to us, this 
strange and most unnatural contrast will have 
serious effects. Our navy will still be loyal and 
active, but the difficulty of adding to its force 
w ill be formidably increased; while the enemy, 
when he begins in earnest to assail our com¬ 
merce, will be powerfully assisted in manning 
his ships, by the prospect of lucrative captures. 


133 


The sea abounds with adventurers, who have no 
settled national character, and these men, in ge¬ 
neral, will naturally flock to his standard. 

Already the injurious influence of this cause in 
one species of maritime war, is very visible. 

From the days of Elizabeth to the present 
time, much has always been done to the annoy¬ 
ance of our commercial enemies by the enter¬ 
prise of private subjects. Our own commerce, 
at the same time, has derived no inconsiderable, 
though an accidental protection from the same 
source; since the hostile cruizers have been kept 
in check, or taken, and our merchantmen, when 
captured, often rescued from the enemy by our 
private ships of war. 

But the unparalleled licence of the neutral flag 
has so discouraged privateering, that the prac¬ 
tice of it is nearly extinguished. It may be safe¬ 
ly affirmed, that in any war with Spain, prior to 
the last, one of our vice-admiralty courts alone, 
could have produced a longer list of commis¬ 
sions, taken out, not Tor armed merchantmen, 
but for efficient privateers, than all those judica¬ 
tures and the High Court of Admiralty together 
can now collectively furnish. The decline of 
this cheap and useful, though inferior, species of 
marine, is so natural an effect of the great sur¬ 
render which has been made of our belligerent 
rights, that the only ground of surprise is, to 


134 


find a single cruizer still in commission. Few 
though they now are, and very inconsiderable in 
force, their owners can only be influenced by that 
excessive spirit of adventure, which will sometimes 
prompt men to play the most disadvantageous and 
ruinous game. 

The enemy, on the other hand, abounds, as 
has been already noticed, in this irregular species 
of force. 

In no former war, perhaps, were so many pri¬ 
vateers fitted out from the colonies of France 
and Spain as now; and their number is daily in¬ 
creasing ; for, not only the mariners of those co¬ 
lonies, but all the freebooters in their neighbour¬ 
hood, are easily induced to man them. They 
are, in general, very small; but the fitter on that 
account, in the West-India seas, and in the nar¬ 
row channels of the Antilles, to escape from the 
pursuit of our frigates ; nor are they the less able 
to seize on our merchantmen, who, having now 
nothing better than an escape, to expect from the 
expense of carrying guns, 'and a letter of marque, 
are generally quite defenceless. The navigation 
of those seas was, perhaps, never so dangerous to 
British merchantmen sailing without convoy, as 
at present; and even our packets, are sometimes 
taken by French privateers on their passage from 
island to island. 

The catalogue of evils produced by the same 


1 35 


mischievous cause, might be still further en¬ 
larged. 

I might show in it a powerful inducement to 
that selfish neutrality, by which one, at least, of 
the continental states, has enhanced the common 
danger of Europe. The vain glory and the po¬ 
pularity attendant on a vast, though visionary, 
enlargement of commerce, may naturally have 
charms for a monarch not ambitious of more so¬ 
lid renown. 

I might also notice the great discouragement 
given to various important branches of our own 
exterior commerce; and, above all, might insist 
on the permanent detriment likely to be sus¬ 
tained by our commercial marine. The forced 
artificial growth of neutral shipping, both sup¬ 
posititious and real, will, no doubt, shrink back 
again in great measure, at a peace, but will not 
be entirely lost. 

In America, especially, the vast excrescence is 
daily absorbed into, and enlarges the natural bo¬ 
dy, which, in various quarters, is peculiarly likely 
to displace, by its extended dimensions, the mari¬ 
time interests of England. 

Where is the political providence, which dic¬ 
tated that wise measure, the Register Act of 
Lord Liverpool ? He justly called the naviga¬ 
tion act, “ a noble strain of commercial policy, 


136 


“ and one which alone had fortunately out- 
“ weighed all our national follies and extrava- 
“ gancies Though no indiscriminate ad¬ 

mirer of his lordship’s commercial principles, I 
do him the justice to say, that the act known by 
his name, was an essential and well-timed sup¬ 
port to the great law he justly celebrates , and 
the best preventive that human ingenuity could 
have devised of that decay, with which our 
navigation was threatened by the independency 
of America. 

But vain was this and every other effort to 
guard our maritime interests by law, if, by a sur¬ 
render of our belligerent rights, the carrying 
trade of the globe is to be thrown into the hands 
of our rivals; and a hot-bed made for the na¬ 
vigation of America, at the cost of the British 
navy. 

In the contemplation, however, of those nearer 
and more fatal consequences, the utter frustra¬ 
tion of our hostilities against the commerce and 
revenue of France, and the danger of losing our 
superiority at sea, during this momentous contest, 
all minor and distant evils lose their terrors. I 
will, therefore, search no further into the extent 
of this baneful and prolific mischief. 


* Discourse on the Conduct of the Government of Great-Britain, in 
respect to Neutral Nations. 


137 


2. Of the Remedy for these Evils , and the Right of 
applying it. 

For that grand evil, which it is my main object 
to consider, and which is one great source of all 
the rest, the remedy is sufficiently obvious. 

If neutrals have no right, but through our own 
gratuitous concession, to carry on the colonial 
trade of our enemies, we may, after a reasonable 
notice, withdraw that ruinous indulgence 3 and, 
meantime, hold those who claim the benefit of it, 
to a strict compliance with its terms. If, after 
the revocation of the licence, the commerce shall 
be still continued, we may justifiably punish the 
violaters of our belligerent rights, by the seizure 
and confiscation of such ships as shall be found 
engaged in the offence, together with their car¬ 
goes. 

That this is an allowable, course, will not be 
disputed, by those who admit the trade to be 
illegal. It is the present mode of proceeding 
against such neutrals as are detected in voyages 
-still held to be prohibited; and has, in their case, 
I believe, ceased to occasion complaint, by the 
states to which they belong. 

This remedy also, cannot fail to be effectual. 
There will be no room for fictitious pretences, 
T 


138 


when the immediate voyage itself, in respect to 
the place of departure, or destination, is a suffi¬ 
cient cause of forfeiture; for the illegal fact must 
be known to every man on board, must appear 
from the papers, unless all the public, a£ well as 
private instruments are fictitious, and besides, 
would, for the most part, be discoverable, not 
only from the place of capture, and the course the 
ship is steering, but from the nature of the cargo 
on board. 

The use, therefore, of neutral bottoms, in the 
colonial trade, would soon be found by our ene¬ 
mies, to yield them no protection. They would 
hoist again their own commercial colours; and 
either restore to us all the fair fruits of an un¬ 
resisted naval superiority, or, by sending out 
convoys for the protection of their trade, open 
to us again that ancient field of offensive war, 
in which we are sure to be victorious. Our 
seamen would be enriched, our imports would 
be very largely increased, and every western 
breeze would waft into the channel, not a neu¬ 
tral sail or two, to furnish diplomatic squabbles, 
and litigation in the admiralty, but numerous 
and valuable prizes, and sometimes entire fleets 
of merchantmen, with their convoys, taken from 
open enemies, and under hostile colours. The 
captive flags of France, Holland, and Spain, 
would again be incessantly seen at Plymouth 



139 


and Spithead, drooping below the British en¬ 
signs ; and the spectacle would recruit for 
our navy, far better than the,most liberal boun¬ 
ties. 

Then too, the enemy would be often obliged to 
hazard his squadrons, and fleets, for the relief of 
his colonies, as was usual in former wars; and 
the known partiality of Bonaparte to these pos¬ 
sessions, especially to the Windward Antilles, 
would perhaps induce him to incur risks for their 
protection, greater than those which their value 
in a national view, might warrant. 

Here dwell the native and nearest connexions 
of his august consort; and at Martinique, her 
imperial highness the empress mother, ci-devant 
Madame Lapagerie, has a court, and all the other 
splendid appendages of royalty, to the great local 
exaltation of that illustrious house. 

At Guadaloupe too, it is said, the emperor 
owns, in right of his consort, a flourishing planta¬ 
tion, the only dowry she has brought to the throne 
of the Bourbons; except a gang of negroes, im¬ 
proved in number, no doubt, since the restitu¬ 
tion of the slave trade. Their fate has been 
directly the reverse of that of the Roman slaves, 
who were always enfranchised on the elevation of 
their lord to the purple ; but though they do not 


Pursue the triumph, and partake the gale,’ 


they are cherished, with the rest of the patrimony 
in the Antilles, perhaps, with the providence of 
the visier Alibeg, when he preserved his shep¬ 
herd’s pipe and crook; and may they be an 
equal consolation on • a descent from imperial 
fortunes ! For my part, I see not why Bona¬ 
parte should not be as happy on his wife’s estate 
at Guadalottpe, as Dionysius in his school at 
Athens. 

I would ask the reader’s pardon for detaining 
him with such trifles, if it were not for the 
secret connexion they may have with the af¬ 
fairs of nations. I offer it as a serious opinion, 
that the court, the revenues, and feelings of the 
Lapageries, give to Martinique and Guada- 
loupe, at present, much adventitious importance; 
and I will even hazard a conjecture, that they 
had some share in producing the only great ma¬ 
ritime enterprise of the war, the strange expedi¬ 
tion to the Windward Islands. Martinique was 
strongly reinforced, the Diamond Rock was 
retaken, troops and arms were landed at Guada- 
loupe, and the combined fleets returned. Such 
were the effects of an enterprise, in which so 
much was hazarded; and Europe had been at a 
loss to discover unaccomplished objects, less 
disproportionate to the means employed. Per¬ 
haps, if we knew the force of local predilections 
in the breast of the empress, and the influence 


141 


of this Juno and her friends in the councils of the 
French Olympus, the wanderings of the Toulon, 
like those of the Trojan, fleet, would, if not quite 
explained, be rendered less mysterious. 

At least, however, the real importance of these, 
and the other hostile colonies, would compel the 
enemy to expose his marine frequently in their 
defence, when the rampart of neutral navigation 
no longer protected them from urgent distress 
and ruin. We should therefore, by the measure 
I have proposed, not only remedy most of the 
great and complicated evils which have been 
noticed, but restore to our navy the chance of 
frequently finding a hostile fleet to combat, and 
to conquer. 

In a word, by restoring the colonial trade of 
our enemies to its proper shape, and its native 
channels, we should recover very much, though 
by no means all, of those natural advantages in 
the war, which a belligerent, so decidedly supe¬ 
rior at sea, ought justly to enjoy; but which 
are at present most strangely reversed. 

But is this a case in which we have a right to 
any remedy at all ? In other words, is not the 
engaging in the colonial trade of our enemies 
lawful to neutral merchants, independently of the 
permission given by the royal instructions; and 


are not the evils which have been shown to arise 
from the practice, such as we are bound to sub¬ 
mit to, as flowing from the exercise of a right 
which we cannot justly restrain ? In short, 
is not this mischief, in the language of lawyers, 
V damnum absque injuria ?” 

This, if attended with doubt, would be in¬ 
deed a most important question. If it cannot be 
satisfactorily answered on the part of our country, 
there should be an end to every thought of re¬ 
sistance, if not also to complaint. In that case, 
let the noble conduct of the Athenian people, on 
a well known occasion, be a pattern for our own. 
Nothing can be more advantageous for us, than 
the suppression of this commerce; but if, ^like 
the advice censured by Aristides, it requires a 
breach of justice, let us inflexibly abstain. 

Would to God, (for that sacred name may be 
allowably invoked in behalf of the virtue he loves,) 
would to God, I say, that nations always prized 
the obligations of moral duty, far beyond every 
specious advantage, however great, that opposed 
them ; however seemingly essential even to the 
care of self-preservation. The sacrifice, though 
noble in design, would in its effect, not be costly; 
for never in the affairs of nations, was solid secu¬ 
rity, or true prosperity, purchased at the cost of 
virtuous principle. The page of history, if care¬ 
fully read for the purpose, w r ould establish this 


143 


important truth, and teach us to deride those 
shallow and unprincipled statesmen, who dream 
to the contrary; though, like Caiaphas, a great 
.master of their school, they are vain of their per- 
Inicious counsels, and say disdainfully to others. 

Ye know nothing at iall.” 

But in this case, moral right and visible expe¬ 
diency, will be found entirely to harmonise. 

The neutral powers, it should first be observed, 
have all assented to the rule of the war 1756, in 
point of principle, by submitting to its partial ap¬ 
plication. 

Their ships, when taken in a direct voyage 
to or from the hostile countries and their colo¬ 
nies, or in a trade between the latter and any 
other neutral country but their own, have been 
always condemned by our prize courts, both in* 
the last and the present war: and the practice, 
during many years, has ceased to occasion com¬ 
plaint. Yet these restrictions can be warranted 
by no other principle, than that on which they 
were expressly founded, “ the unlawfulness of 
trading with the colonies of a belligerent in 
time of war, in a way not permitted in time of 
peace.” 

On what other principle than this, could Great- 
Britain be allowed to say to a Dane or an Ame¬ 
rican, the owner of produce bought in a hos¬ 
tile colony, and passing on the high seas under 


144 


his own flag, in the one case, “ You shall not 
“ carry it to America in the other, “ You shall 
< c not carry it to Europe ?” The right can plain¬ 
ly stand on no other foundation than this, that 
Great-Britain might lawfully have prohibited the 
taking the cargo on board at the place of ship¬ 
ment, on any destination whatever; and, conse¬ 
quently, in waving the general prohibition, she 1 
had a right to prescribe to what places it should 
be carried. 

If I should dictate to a neighbour, that in 
crossing a certain field which lay between our 
respective tenements, he and his servants should 
confine themselves to a certain path which I 
had marked out for the purpose, and if he 
should for years comply with the restriction, or 
submit to be treated as a trespasser whenever he 
deviated from it; I might, consistently enough, 
if I found the passage a nuisance, shut it up alto¬ 
gether : but it would be grossly inconsistent in 
him, thereupon to deny my right to the field, and 
pretend that it was common land. 

Should it, however, be thought that the tacit 
admission of the principle, ought not to preclude 
the neutral powers from disputing, though in¬ 
consistently in point of theory, a practical ap¬ 
plication of it, more extensive than that in which 
they have so long acquiesced, it must at least 
be admitted, that in reverting to the rule of the 


145 


war 17«56, Great-Britain would have to assert no 
new claim of right; and would be only bound to 
assign a fair reason for withdrawing a voluntary 
modification of its use, 

Now, in the first place, we may truly allege as 
a reason for withdrawing the indulgence, that it 
has been very grossly abused: and in the next 
place, what is enough to create a right, and much 
more to defend the strict use of a right already ex¬ 
isting, that self-preservation demands from us the 
revocation of the licence we gave. 

It would be a most extraordinary and unpre¬ 
cedented situation for two friendly powers to stand 
in, if the one had a right to do any thing which 
is destructive to the other. Yet, since the trade 
in question has been shown to be ruinous to our 
hopes in the war, and may eventually give a 
superiority at sea, to an enemy already enormous¬ 
ly superior to us in land forces, and bent on our 
destruction, either the neutral powers and Great- 
Britain stand in that strange predicament in rela¬ 
tion to each other, or we have a right to restrain 
this trade. If we have no such right, then 
those states with whom we are in perfect friend¬ 
ship, have a right to persevere in conduct, which 
may, in its natural consequences, make England 
a province of France. 

If such be the offices of peace and amity, how 
U 


146 


differ they from those of war ? The harsh rights 
of war, may, indeed be exercised in a different 
manner; but their extreme extent, is to inflict on 
an enemy all the mischiefs that may be necessary 
to his subjugation ; and I do not see how these 
powers, if confederates of France, could contri¬ 
bute more effectual means to that end, than those 
they at present employ. 

Waving then, for a moment, the objections that 
arise to this commerce, in respect of its origin 
and objects, and supposing both to be unexcep- 
tionably lawful; still, if its further prosecution 
be inconsistent with our safety, the obligations 
of peace and amity, call on the neutral powers to 
abstain from it. When conflicting rights arise 
between nations, one party must give way, or 
war must be the issue; a right, therefore, which 
is essential to the existence of the possessor, 
ought to prevail over one which is not of such 
vital importance. Now, the neutral powers can 
subsist without this newly-acquired commerce; 
but Great-Britain cannot long exist as a nation, 
if bereft of her ancient means of offensive maritime 
war. 

That we are engaged in a contest, an adverse 
issue of which may be fatal to our national safety 
and independence, will hardly be denied; if 
then a necessary mean of preventing such an 


147 


issue be the cutting off of the colonial resource* 
of our enemies, to dispute our right of doing so 
is, in effect, to dispute the right of self-defence. 

It is by no means necessary, however, to resort 
to this primary law of nature and nations; for 
in truth there are, in the case before us, no con¬ 
flicting rights. Should we even consent to wave 
the ground of precedent and acquiescence, and 
examine in the fullest manner the original me¬ 
rits of this question, there will be found clear 
belligerent right, on the one side, and nothing 
but palpable encroachment on the other. 

The true principles on which the rule of the 
war 1756 was founded, have been already stated 
and enforced, in a manner which it would be easy 
to amplify, but difficult to improve*. 

I will not hazard such an attempt; but rather 
content myself with considering briefly, the most 
specious objections that have been offered on the 
other side. 

To the vague general invectives of the French 
government on this subject, no serious reply can 
be due. Bonaparte declaims on the maritime 
despotism of England, with the same good grace, 
with which he imputed assassinating principles 
to the Due D’Enghein, perfidy to Toussaint, and 
ambition to the House of Austria. It is his pe 


* See ^supra, Id to 16. 


148 


tuliar style, in all cases, not merely to defame his 
^enemies, but to impute to them the very crimes, 
which he is himself, at the same moment, per¬ 
petrating ; and of which they are the intended 
victims. He is quite in character, therefore, 
when he accuses us of trampling on the mari¬ 
time rights of other nations, while he, by the aid 
of those very nations, is subverting our own. 

He calls us the “ tyrants of the sea;” but 
if the throne is ours, he has filched away the 
sceptre; and our naval diadem, like his own 
iron crown of Lombardy, is, in a commercial 
view, cumbersome and worthless. This empire 
is not like his own; for the imperial family are 
less favoured in it than their enemies. We 
traverse the ocean at a greater charge, even for 
security on the passage, than those who have no 
share in the domain. 

The usurper’s favourite topic, of late, has been 
the liberty of navigation: he would be thought 
the champion of the common rights of all mari¬ 
time states. What! has he forgot, or does he 
expect Europe or America to forget, the recent 
conduct of France ? Nothing, it is obvious, but 
his own crafty policy, prevents his recurring, at 
this moment, to the full extent of that extrava¬ 
gant pretension on which the neutral powers 
were so shamefully plundered during the last 
war; and for a release of which his minister. 


149 


M. Talleyrand, demanded “ beaucoup del'argent” 
of America—I mean the monstrous pretension 
of a right to confiscate every neutral ship and 
cargo, in which one bale of English merchandize 
was found. 

Yes ! he will clamour for the freedom of the 
seas, as he did for the freedom of France, till 
his neutralizing friends shall have placed him in 
a condition to destroy it. But should his marine 
be ever restored by their means, they will feel, 
as Frenchmen have done, the heavy yoke of a 
jealous new-erected despotism, instead of those 
mild and ancient laws, which they were foolishly 
persuaded to reject. 

The only liberty which this impostor will for 
a moment patronise, either at sea or on shore, 
is that liberty which consists solely in the ab¬ 
sence of order, and in the power of invading with 
impunity the long-established rights of others. 
It is a jacobin liberty only which he would give 
to navigation, till his own iron bonds for it are 
forged. 

I decline also engaging with those objectors, 
who, without copying the invectives of Bona¬ 
parte, dispute, like him, our right to suppress 
the commerce in question, on principles that 
impeach the practice of maritime capture at 
large *. 

* If the reader wishes to be informed of the full extent of these 


150 


Those who have sublimated their imaginations 
so far, as really to think that war ought, in justice 
and mercy, to be banished from the boisterous 
ocean, that it may prey the better and the longer 
on the social cities or quiet plains ; are not likely 
to descend with me into the regions of sober in¬ 
vestigation. 

To those idolaters of the neutral flag also who 
hold a yard of bunting on the poop of a mer¬ 
chantman, more sacred than the veil of a vestal, 
I have nothing to offer. If this inviolable em¬ 
blem, ought absolutely to arrest the arms of con¬ 
tending nations, and preserve, in all -eases, the 
contents of its sanctuary from capture; it may 
with equal reason, I admit, receive under its safe¬ 
guard the colonial commerce, as the general pro¬ 
perty, of a belligerent. 

But there are some champions of neutral rights, 
who, without openly contending for these extra¬ 
vagant doctrines, maintain stoutly that neutral 
merchants have a right to trade with the powers 
at war wherever, and in whatsoever commodi¬ 
ties, they please. If contraband goods, and 
blockaded places be graciously excepted, this is 
the utmost extent of their abstinence. All other 


revolutionary doctrines, he may find them compendiously stated, and 
ably and learnedly refuted, in Mr. Ward’s Treatise on the Rights and 
Duties of Belligerent and Neutral Powers. 


151 


neutral commerce, they hold to be unquestion- 
ably legal. 

Such persons naturally enough quarrel with 
the rule of the war 1756, and they attempt to en¬ 
counter the powerful arguments which I have 
quoted on its behalf, by objecting, 

First—That neutral nations always suffer in 
their ordinary trade through the wars of those 
maritime friends with whom they have any com¬ 
mercial relations ; and therefore may be reason¬ 
ably allowed to acquire some compensatory ad¬ 
vantages on the other hand, by the opening of 
new branches of commerce. 

If neutrals were really losers by the wars of 
their neighbours, it would, perhaps, be fortunate 
for mankind; and would give them no right to 
indemnify themselves, by accepting in the form 
of commerce, a bribe from the weaker party, to 
protect him from the arms of the stronger. But 
in the last and present war at least, this pre¬ 
tence has no shadow of foundation. Let the 
neutral powers confess that their late vast ap¬ 
parent increase of commerce, is fictitious, 
and that the frauds also are gratuitous; or let 
them admit that independently of the trade in 
question, they have enormously profited by wars, 
which to their friends have been highly disastrous. 
There is no escaping from this dilemma. 

The neutral, however, has many fair indemni- 


152 


ties, without any trespass on belligerent rights.— 
The comparative cheapness of his navigation, 
gives him in every open market a decisive advan¬ 
tage. In the commerce of other neutral coun¬ 
tries, he cannot fail to supplant the belligerents; 
and the latter will naturally give him the carriage 
of such of his own commodities as he before 
usually supplied them with, partly or wholly 
through their own navigation. What they used 
formerly to buy in his ports, they wdll now be 
content to purchase from him, at an advanced 
price, in their own. 

He obtains also a still larger increase of com¬ 
merce, by purchasing from the one belligerent, 
and selling to his enemy, the merchandize for 
which in time of peace they mutually depended 
on each other. The decay of his old branches 
of trade, therefore, if any such decay arises from 
the war, is on the whole amply compensated. 

It has further been objected, “ that allowing 
“ the acquisition of this trade to be a gratu- 
“ itous benefit to neutrals, arising out of the 
« war, they obtain it by the gift of an inde- 
“ pendent nation, to which at the moment of 
« that gift it still belonged; and therefore may 
“ law fully accept the boon, without leave of the 
cf adverse belligerent. France, it is said, still re- 
“ tains possession of her colonies: and, there- 
“ fore, has a clear legislative right to regulate 


1 53 


“ their commerce. Great-Britain is not even at- 
“ tempting the reduction of those hostile terri- 
“ tories; nor are our ships now blockading their 
“ ports; to profit, therefore, by the change in their 
“ commercial laws, by trading with them when 
c< invited to do so, is not a violation of neutral- 
« ity.” 

This argument is plainly evasive. It is not 
the right of a belligerent to impart a benefit of 
this kind, but the right of a neutral to accept it, 
that is the point in controversy. The carrying 
of contraband to the enemy, or of provisions to a 
besieged place, might be defended in the same 
way; for the belligerent has an undoubted right 
to buy those articles, if carried to him, or to con¬ 
tract previously for their transmission by the 
neutral. 

But the belligerent has one set of obligations, 
and his neutral friend has another, of a very dif¬ 
ferent kind ; it is fallacious, therefore, to reason 
from the rights of the one, to the rights or duties 
of the other. 

If the legality of any branch of commerce, as 
between the enemy and a neutral, could entitle it 
to protection from our hostilities, its illegality, 
e co?iverso, might reasonably subject it to capture 
and condemnation. But neutral merchants know 
to their great advantage, that the latter is not the 
doctrine of the British prize court. Property 
x 


1 5k 


to an immense value was restored during the 
last war, which was avowedly the subject of a 
commerce with Spanish territories, contraband 
at the time of the transaction, by the law of Spain. 
If our belligerent rights cannot be enlarged by 
any regard to the commercial law of the enemy, 
considered merely as such, neither can they be 
abridged by it. 

Did the transfer in question create no preju¬ 
dice to the adverse belligerent, its lawfulness 
could not be disputed; but if, on the other 
hand, its direct tendency is to enable our enemy 
to elude our lawful hostilities, and to deliver him 
from the pressure of a maritime war, and if these 
were manifestly his only objects in the measure; 
to allege the right, or power of the enemy, to 
change his system, in justification of his neutral 
accomplice, is to offer in defence of a. wrongful 
act, no more than that there was an opportunity 
given for its perpetration. 

It is quite immaterial to the question, whether 
we are attempting to conquer the hostile colonies, 
or what is more doubtful perhaps, whether we 
might not successfully have made such attempts, 
if not prevented by the effects of the very mea¬ 
sure in question; for the commerce, not the 
sovereignty, of the colonies, is that object of 
hostile interest, which is wrongfully protected 
against us. The apologist, therefore, should go 


155 


on to allege, if he can, that the colonial naviga¬ 
tion and commerce, as well as the territory, were 
perfectly safe from our arms. 

If France should cede to the United States, the 
island of Martinique, or Spain the province of 
Mexico, it might perhaps be a material defence 
for their accepting the grant, though adverse to 
our interest in the war, that the enemy remained 
in possession when he made it ; and that the 
colony was not besieged or invaded; but since 
the cession now complained of, is not of the ter¬ 
ritory, but of its maritime trade, the foundation 
of the argument fails ; for the enemy is not in 
possession, much less in an uncontested posses¬ 
sion, of the commerce, which he affects to surren¬ 
der. He still holds, indeed, the key of his co¬ 
lonial ports; but the way to them, is occupied by 
an enemy, whom he can neither resist nor escape. 
Jt is not the mere right of landing and taking on 
board of goods, in the harbour of St. Pierre, or 
Vera Cruz, but the right of carriage from the qo- 
lony to the transmarine market, that is the subject 
of the grant to the neutral; and of this important 
franchise, the enemy found himself incapable to 
defend the possession, before he relinquished the 
right. 

The geographical way itself, indeed, is com¬ 
mon to all nations : and we are perpetually told, 
that the sea is open and free. But a right of car 


156 


riage may be restrained, in respect of the articles 
that, are carried, and the places to or from which 
they pass, as well as in respect to the path-way 
itself. 

The road from London to York, is open and 
common to all his Majesty’s subjects; but not 
for the carriage of a mail-bag, to or from any part 
of the realm, for the profit of private persons. The 
right of such carriage, notwithstanding the gene¬ 
ral freedom of the York road, belongs exclusive¬ 
ly to the Post-office; and so did the carriage of 
colonial produce or supplies* to the parent state, 
notwithstanding the general freedom of the sea. 
In this respect, the passage was not open in time 
of peace ; to allege the common right of navigat¬ 
ing the ocean, therefore, in defence of the insidi¬ 
ous assignment of the right of carriage, is not less 
preposterous, than if the freedom of the post¬ 
roads, should be offered as an excuse for the un¬ 
lawful acquisition or transfer of a post-office con¬ 
tract. 

To give the argument we are considering* 
all possible scope, let it be supposed that the 
enemy was in full immediate possession, not 
only of his colonies, but of his ordinary com¬ 
merce with them, at the time of relaxing his 
monopoly. This is certainly to concede much 
-more than is due; since he durst not, at the 
time, send a ship, under his own colours, to 



157 


or from the colonial ports; and therefore, the 
possession ,of the commercial franchise, by its 
actual exercise, the only mode of possession of 
which it is susceptible, was suspended. But 
supposing the reverse; still this great branch of 
commerce became a known subject of belli¬ 
gerent contest, on the commencement of a mari¬ 
time war; for it would be trifling to go about to 
prove, that Great-Britain must always look to 
the colonial trade of France and Spain, as the 
first object of her hostilities. When we drew 
the sword, it was notice to every neutral power, 
that this commerce was no longer an uncontested 
possession of our enemies; but rather a prize 
set up within the lists of war, the seizure or de¬ 
fence of which would be a principal aim of the 
combatants. If so, how can the assisting our 
enemies to withdraw the rich stake from the 
field, be reconciled with the duties of neutrali¬ 
ty ? 

Let it be supposed, that a large fleet of French 
and Spanish merchantmen, with their owners on 
board, were passing the sea under convoy; and 
that receiving information on their way, of the 
position of a British squadron sent out to take 
them, by which they must infallibly be inter¬ 
cepted in a few hours, they should avail them¬ 
selves of an opportunity to sell the ships and 
cargoes to some neutral merchants, whom they 


158 


met with at the moment at sea; it will hardly 
be thought that such a transfer would be valid 
against the British captors* if the squadron 
should afterwards fall in with and capture the * 
fleet. 

Yet what principle of natural justice makes it 
otherwise* that does not equally apply to the case 
of the colonial trade ? The purchase of ships and 
cargoes at sea* is not a wider departure from the 
ordinary course of commerce, than trading in su¬ 
gar and coffee under foreign flags* in the West- 
Indies ; the right of the owner to sell, in the one 
instance* may be alleged as plausibly as the right 
of the hostile state to open its ports* in the other; 
and the motive is in both cases the same. 

But when we advert to the principles, on which 
the trade in question is defended, this illustration 
is far too weak, to show their injustice. There is 
not one of them that would not serve to justify the 
sale of the merchantmen in the supposed case to 
the neutral* if made after the British squadron had 
come up, and when it was on the point of taking 
the convoy. 

The justice of municipal law* may furnish us 
here with some fair analogies. 

Is property of any kind, when the specific 
subject of litigation* aliened by the party in pos¬ 
session pending a suit for its recovery, and to a 
person who has notice of that suit; the accept- 


159 


ance of it, is a wrong to the adverse party; and 
he may assert against the grantee, though a 
purchaser at an adequate price, the sarfie specific 
rights which he had against his first opponent. 
With equal reason, Great-Britain may exercise 
against this commerce, though assigned to neu¬ 
trals, the right of maritime capture. 

Should it be objected, that there is no specific 
title vested in the adverse belligerent but only a 
general right of seizure, I answer, that this dis¬ 
tinction, though often allowed in favour of com¬ 
mercial convenience, is not held by municipal 
law to affect the equity of the rule when the 
intent of the transaction is, to defeat such ge¬ 
neral rights ; as might be shown by reference 
to the bankrupt laws, and other parts of our 
code. 

In the case, for instance, of goods removed by 
a tenant from his leasehold premises, to avoid a 
distress for rent, and sold for that purpose to a 
third person privy to the fraud, the landlord may 
follow, and seize them within a limited time, even 
in the hands of the purchaser. The latter also, 
if an accomplice in the contrivance, is regarded 
as a criminal, and punished by a forfeiture of 
double the value of the goods. 

In this, I apprehend, as in the former case, 
the rule of American law is conformable to that 
of England ; but should the general equity of it 


160 


appear at all doubtful, let the following further 
circumstances be added to the illegal transac¬ 
tion. Let it be supposed, that the tenant, in 
consequence of previous distresses, or from 
other causes, has no means of sending his own 
corn or hay to market, by his own waggons, as 
formerly, so as to avoid a seizure by the land¬ 
lord; and therefore, contrary to all ordinary 
usage, and to the necessary economy of his 
business, offers to sell them in the stack to his 
neighbours, at a low price, to be conveyed by 
them, on their own account, in their own ve¬ 
hicles, from the premises. Should they, know¬ 
ing his necessities, and his dishonest views, take 
the proffered advantage, and send, their own carts 
and waggons into his farm-yard for the purpose; 
surely the justice of the rule of law would, in 
such a case, be readily admitted. The applica¬ 
tion is sufficiently obvious. 

It has been further objected to the rule of the 
war 1756, cc that neutrals are allowed, without 
opposition, in other cases, to avail themselves 
“ of various alterations in the laws of the bel- 
“ ligerent states, to which the policy of war has 
“ given birth, and by virtue of which they are 
cc admitted into several branches of trade with 
“ the metropolitan country itself, which were 
“ not open before, as well as encouraged to 
“ engage more extensively in others, by greater 


161 


“ privilege and favour than the pacific system 
“ allowed. In some cases, therefore, it is argued, 
“ we ourselves admit, that it is lawful to trade 
fc with an enemy in time of war, in a way not 
“ permitted in time of peace: and should we 
<c now assert a contrary principle, many well- 
" established branches of neutral commerce in 
<c the European seas, and even with Great-Bri- 
“ tain herself, might be on the same ground 
fC abolished.” 

This is an argument of the same family with 
those modern political sophisms, by which na¬ 
tions have been convulsed, and kingdoms over¬ 
thrown. 

To confound practical moderation, with theo¬ 
retical inconsistency, to reject all principles that 
cannot be followed into their extreme conse¬ 
quences, and to justify one excess by the in¬ 
conveniences of another, are effectual weapons 
for the assault of every legal or political system, 
and for the defence of every innovation. 

I admit that partial changes in the commercial 
laws of a belligerent state, are occasionally made 
in favour of neutral commerce; and that when 
such changes are calculated to produce an effect 
on the war, advantageous to the party who makes 
them, and detrimental to his opponent, they fall 
in strictness within the principle of the rule of 
the war 1756, though the commerce of the 
Y 


162 


mother country only, not of the colonies, should 
be their subject. 

But of what nature have been these altera¬ 
tions ? Not an unqualified admission, as in the 
colonial case, of neutral ships, into ports where 
no foreign prow could enter for any commercial 
end before; not an entire surrender of a national 
privilege, or monopoly, which, in time of peace, 
was always jealously maintained; much less, an 
invocation of neutrals, to conduct an intercourse 
essential to the existence of one part of the em¬ 
pire, and which must, otherwise, be totally lost j 
but for the most part, only a reduction or remis¬ 
sion of duties, and at the utmost, a permission 
to import or export specific articles, to or from 
some foreign country, in a manner not allowed 
before. 

I except, of course, that indiscriminate admis¬ 
sion into every branch of the commerce of our 
enemies, including even their coasting trade, 
which has now taken place. The comprehensive 
enormity of the existing wrong itself, will hardly 
be objected, in defence of its most exceptionable 
branch ; besides, as to the coasting trade, the 
employment of neutral vessels in it, is treated 
by our prize tribunals as illegal, though the ex¬ 
treme penalty of confiscation, has not yet been 
applied*. Perhaps his Majesty’s government. 


* Case of the Emanuel, Soderstrom, 4 Robinson, 296. 


163 


finding the more lenient sanctions of a forfeiture 
of freight, and expenses, and such further dis¬ 
couragements as have been hitherto applied, to 
be wholly ineffectual, ought to consider this as 
a branch of illicit trade, to which the forfeiture 
of ship and cargo should in future be annexed, 
and to issue an instruction for that purpose *. 

In all other, and ordinary innovations of this 
kind, the change has rather been in the enlarge¬ 
ment of an existing intercourse, than the open¬ 
ing of one which had been quite interdicted 
before. But the change in the colonial com¬ 
merce, has amounted, in respect of the flag and 
the voyage, to an entire revolution; except in 
certain free ports, and in some special cases, the 
entry of a foreign vessel into a colonial port, for 
any mercantile purpose, is a kind of commercial 
adultery, to which, till the divorce occasioned 
by war, no colonizing power submitted. 

This distinction is important, not only to the 

# 

# The fact of hostile property in this trade, as in the rest, is co¬ 
vered by such abundant and accurate perjury, that unless a judge 
were at liberty to act on the firm persuasion of his mind, arising frotin 
general presumptions, against the fullest positive testimony, the cargoes 
can rarely be condemned ; and consequently forfeiture of freight, is a 
penalty that can rarely be applied. The further discouragement here 
alluded to, is the privation of such indulgences, in admission of future 
evidence, as claimants of property taken in a fair and lawful trade are 
entitled to. 


164 


nature and extent of the wrong, but to the con¬ 
venience of the remedy. 

The redress which the injured belligerent ob¬ 
tains, by the seizure of the offending vessels, is 
naturally offensive in its mode/ and liable to 
abuse in its application. The right of capture, 
therefore, ought not to be exercised against neu¬ 
trals, but in cases which admit of being broadly 
and clearly defined ; for it is better to submit to 
many palpable encroachments on the confines 
of our belligerent rights, than to guard them 
with a strictness which may be inconvenient to 
our peaceable neighbours. If it were resolved 
to apply the rule of the war 1756, to all the 
branches and modes of European commerce 
with our enemies, to which neutrals have been 
admitted during the war, and in consequence of 
the war, it would be a line of conduct difficult 
to draw with precision, even in the cabinet; 
nor however carefully delineated by specific in¬ 
structions to our cruizers, would its practical 
ajtplication be easy. It would also give birth to 
endless distinctions in judgment, and to an in¬ 
finity of petty and intricate disputes with the 
neutral nations; for let it be remembered, that 
not the novelty of the trade only, but the motive 
of its permission by the enemy, is essential to the 
rule in question. 


165 


And here let me point out by the way, a new 
reason for not allowing the particular manner 
and motive of an importation into a neutral 
country, to determine the right of re-exporting 
the same goods to a foreign market, or its lia¬ 
bility to seizure on the way. If the direct trade 
between the hostile countries and their colonies 
is to be legalized by nice distinctions, the fact 
of which a visiting officer can never with cer¬ 
tainty discover, it would be better at once to 
give up the whole of that important rule for 
which I contend, and allow the intercourse to 
be conducted by neutrals in a direct and single 
voyage. 

The colonial trade, however, is further distin¬ 
guishable from those other branches of com¬ 
merce,- which have been the subjects of a like 
belligerent policy, in some very essential fea¬ 
tures. 

It differs from them, not only in the peculiar 
strictness, and broad generical character of the 
monopoly by the parent state during peace, 
which is fraudulently suspended in war; but in 
the nature of those interests which it involves, 
and in the principles on which it is, in its natural 
course, conducted. 

Strictly speaking, it is not commerce; though, 
in conformity to common usage, and for want of 
an appropriate term, I have hitherto given it 



166 


that appellation; and I cannot help thinking, 
that the difficulty, (if to any impartial mind there 
really appears any difficulty at all, attendant on 
this plain question) would never have been ima¬ 
gined, if the anomalous intercourse between a 
mother country and its colony, had not been 
confounded in idea, through the use of a vague 
general name, with ordinary commerce or 
tjade. 

Commerce, in its proper signification, implies 
both buying and selling; and in a commercial 
vovage, goods are usually either transmitted 
from the seller in one country, to the buyer in 
another; or sent on the buyer’s account, for sale 
in a different market. 

But what is the general object of shipments 
in time of peace, from Europe to a West-India 
island ? To send for sale, merchandize which 
has been purchased or ordered, on account either 
of the shipper or consignee ? No such thing: 
If we except small quantities of provisions, cloath- 
ing, and other necessaries, destined for the sup¬ 
ply of the few white inhabitants, which are 
bought in Europe by the agents of the West-In¬ 
dia store-keepers, and sent to them on their ac¬ 
count, to be retailed in their stores or shops; the 
outward cargoes are all shipped by planters, or the 
agents of planters, and consigned to them, their at- 
tornies, or managers, for the use of their estates. 


167 


Again, on the return voyages, are the cargoes 
composed of goods, the subjects of mercantile en¬ 
terprise, which have been shipped by merchants 
in the colony on their own account, or on ac¬ 
count of merchants in Europe, by whom they have 
been ordered ? By no means: they consist al¬ 
most universally, of the produce of the planta¬ 
tions, sent by the planters to their own agents in 
the mother country; or which is much more com¬ 
mon, to the planter himself in that country, by his 
own manager in the colony. 

Am I asked how such transactions differ from 
commerce ? I answer—in the same degree, that 
a man sending his own wine, from his cellar in 
London to his house in the country, differs from 
commerce ; and in the same degree that a gentle¬ 
man farmer, who sends his own corn to his factor 
in the market town, differs from a merchant. 

In these cases, indeed, inland carriage is used, 
and in the former, a passage by sea, which, from 
habitual association of ideas, seems to us to give 
a mercantile character to the transaction ; but 
let us divest ourselves for a moment of this pre¬ 
judice, and that transmission of goods across the 
Atlantic by the owners, which we call the co¬ 
lonial trade, will be seen to be, it its general na¬ 
ture, no more commercial, than the carriage of 
the wine or the corn, in the cases I have men¬ 
tioned. 



168 


The plantation stores, indeed, are purchased by 
the planter, previous to their shipment; and the 
produce will be sent to market by the consignee- 
and sold, after its arrival: but the commercial 
transaction in the one case, was finished before 
the commencement of the voyage; in the other, 
it does not commence, till after the voyage has 
ended. Till the planter, or his agent, sends the 
produce from the warehouse to the market, it is 
not in any sense the subject of trade; and even 
the ultimate sale, on account of the grower of the 
commodity, cannot strictly be regarded as a mer¬ 
cantile transaction. If it be such, every farmer 
is a merchant. 

These are far from mere verbal distinctions. 
They go to the root of the pretences, such as 
they are, by which the neutral intercourse be¬ 
tween the enemy and his colonies is defended; 
for if the subject of acquisition by the neutral, 
is not of a commercial nature, or was not such 
till made so for the purpose of enabling him to 
acquire it, there is an end of all the arguments 
or declamations that turn on the variable and 
assignable nature of commerce in time of peace, 
and to all the supposed analogies between this 
commerce, and other new-born branches of neu¬ 
tral navigation. This is not, like the other cases, 
merely the carrying on of a trade in foreign bot¬ 
toms, and on foreign account, which before was 


169 


carried on in native bottoms, and on native ac- 
count; but it is the converting into a trade, of 
that which before was a mere removal of goods, 
without any transfer of property. 

A new character, as well as a new conveyance, 
is given to the exports and imports of the colo¬ 
nies. The alleged right to protect them, is found¬ 
ed on their being commercial; but they were 
first made commercial, in order to be protected; 
and if the neutral merchant really carries them 
on his own account, he does more than was 
done by the enemy merchants, before the war. 
Not only the ancient system of navigation, there¬ 
fore, but the ancient course of colonial econo¬ 
my, is inverted, for the sake of eluding our hostili¬ 
ties. 

But there is another, and perhaps a still stronger 
ground of distinction, between this and all the 
other branches of commerce, which neutrals have 
been allowed to conduct in time of war. 

The capital employed in colonial agriculture 
belongs, for the most part, to the mother coun¬ 
try, where the owners or mortgagees reside; 
and the produce sent to Europe is chiefly the 
returns on that capital; consequently the mother 
country has a beneficial interest in the remit¬ 
tance, quite distinct from its commercial use, 
and which equals or bears a large proportion to 
its entire value. It is not merely a medium or ve- 
Z 


170 


hide of commercial gain, or a subject of manu¬ 
facturing profit; but is, abstractedly from its 
specific form and use, substantial wealth and re¬ 
venue. It differs from ordinary commercial im¬ 
ports, as corn-rent paid to a land-holder, differs 
from the purchased corn of the miller or specula¬ 
tor in grain. 

Let the effects of this difference, as to the perils 
of carriage in war, be fairly considered. 

In other branches of trade, to destroy the com¬ 
mercial profit of an enemy, or highly aggravate 
the price of a particular commodity consumed by 
him, is to make him feel effectually the pressure 
of the war; and these ends may possibly be ac¬ 
complished, notwithstanding his resort to the pro¬ 
tection of neutral flags. 

In respect of goods which he buys to sell again 
to foreigners, either in the same or a meliorated 
state, and even in respect of manufactures for fo¬ 
reign markets, of which a native commodity is the 
basis, the enhanced price of maritime carriage 
may be fatal to his hopes of profit. You ruin the 
trade, when you cut off the gains of the merchant. 
But his colonial produce is, for the most part, the 
returns of a transmarine capital already laid out 
and invested. The importation of it, therefore, 
cannot cease to be beneficial to him, unless you 
could raise by your hostilities the price of car¬ 
riage, till it became equal to the entire gross 
value of the commodity. Nothing else, except 


171 


the actual interception of the produce by cap¬ 
ture, can make him feel the full effect of the war. 

In other cases also, to force him out of his 
ordinary methods, or established channels of 
trade, might be to destroy the trade itself. If he 
could no more import raw silk or cotton, by his 
own navigation into France, or could no longer 
buy goods in the Levant or the East-Indies, to 
sell them again in the north of Europe, his fac¬ 
tories at Smyrna and Canton might be abandoned. 
But the case is very different in respect of the 
returns of his colonial capital. As long as French 
or Spanish sugar and coffee, can pass from the 
West-Indies, under neutral colours, or even on 
neutral account, to any market on earth, so long 
the colonial interests of the planter, and of the 
state, will be partially, if not wholly, protected 
from the ruinous effects of war: the value of 
the produce will find its way to France and Spain, 
though the produce itself should be excluded. 

I infer, then, from these essential distinctions, 
that if we were bound to submit to all the other 
encroachments of the neutral flag, their admis¬ 
sion into the ports of the hostile colonies, might 
still be fairly and consistently resisted. 

Perhaps these flimsy defences may not be 
thought worthy of the time that has been spent 
in their refutation; and yet I know of none more 
specious that the apologists of neutral encroach- 


172 


merits have offered. In general, a Vague and 
senseless clamour, is their substitute for argu* 
ment. “ Piratical depredations,” and “ mari¬ 
time despotism,” are phrases which they inces¬ 
santly repeat ; and like the vociferations of “ stop 
thief,” by a pickpocket, it is a species of logic, 
which, if it proves not their innocence, at least 
favours their escape. 

After all that has been, or can be said* on this 
important subject, one plain question will proba¬ 
bly be felt to be decisive, by every equitable mind. 

Quo animo /’—With what intention, did the 
enemy open the ports of his colonies to foreign 
flags ? 

If it was with commercial views, or for the 
mere sake of imparting a benefit to friendly 
powers, their acceptance of the boon may, per¬ 
haps, be justifiable: but if the single, manifest, 
undissembled, object was to obtain protection 
and advantage in the war, to preserve his colonial 
interests without the risk of defending them, 
and to shield himself in this most vulnerable 
part, against the naval hostilities of England; I 
say, if such was the manifest, and known pur¬ 
pose of the measure, I see not how any dispas¬ 
sionate mind can doubt for a moment, that a co¬ 
operation in such an expedient, by powers in 
amity with England, was a violation of the duties 
t>f neutrality. 


173 


The motive, indeed, on their part, may not have 
been hostile; it was the covetous desire, perhaps, 
only of commercial gain; but if they give effect 
to a belligerent stratagem of our enemy, whether 
of an offensive, or defensive kind, knowing it to 
be such, they become instruments of his insidious 
purpose, and accomplices in his hostile act. If 
the commercial motive can defend them from 
the charge of inimical conduct, then let the hired 
assassin, who acts without malice to the victim, be 
absolved from the guilt of the murder. 

Is it then a doubt, I will not say with any 
statesman, but with any individual merchant, in 
America, Prussia, or Denmark, that security and 
advantage in the war, were the sole objects of this 
measure with the belligerent governments that 
adopted it ? They themselves have never lent 
their neutral accomplices so much countenance, 
as to pretend the contrary. Some of them did 
not scruple even to recite the obvious truth, in 
the public instruments, by which their ports were 
opened. 

But the avowal was unnecessary: and could 
a doubt on this subject have existed during the 
last war, it would have been precluded in the 
present, by the intermediate conduct of those 
powers, after the peace of Amiens. So far was 
the change of system from being permanent, as 
was argued, on behalf of the neutral claimants 


174 . 


in the last war, that orders were sent to reverse 
it, the moment the sword was sheathed. Even 
those foreigners,‘who had a right to remove their 
property from the hostile colonies, within a limit¬ 
ed time, by virtue of the treaty of Amiens, could 
not obtain liberty to use their own ships for the 
purpose: nay, Bonaparte, with all his predilec¬ 
tion for the slave trade, refused permission to 
the planters of Tobago, to import negroes on 
their own account in foreign bottoms. 

On the other hand, the first advices of a new 
war with Great-Britain, were accompanied, in all 
the colonies, with orders to open their ports again 
to all the former extent.' 

The hardiest champion of this commerce then, 
will now scarcely venture to deny, that it not only 
grew out of, but is to end with the war. Should 
we, however, hear again of any doubt on that 
point, or of the title to commercial advantages 
under a grant from our enemies, let the grant it¬ 
self be produced; let a treaty between our 
enemies and any neutral power be shown, by 
which the possession of these advantages is secur¬ 
ed for a single moment. 

Some engagement of that kind, might seem 
necessary, even to the security of the neutral 
merchants, if they really carry on the colonial 
trade, as they pretend, with their own capitals, 
and on their own account: for how are they to 


175 


collect and bring away the immense funds, which 
they are continually representing, in our prize 
courts, to have been intrusted by them to their 
correspondents in the coloiiies, and to purchasers 
of their outward cargoes, resident there, if the 
ports, on the cessation of war, are suddenly sub¬ 
jected again to the ancient monopoly ? We have, 
however, I admit, heard of no inconvenience 
having arisen from this source, subsequent to the 
treaty of Amiens. The doors were suddenly 
shut, but there have been no complaints that any 
neutral wealth was shut in. It had vanished, no 
doubt, like the gold and jewels of an Arabian 
tale, on the reversal of the talisman that pro¬ 
duced it. 

If then this trade has not the promise, or hope 
of existing beyond the war that gave it birth, 
the advantage arising from it in the war, is the 
palpable and only object of the enemy in open¬ 
ing it, and the neutral cannot in this, as in for¬ 
mer cases, pretend that there was a different, or 
even a concurrent motive, such as may excuse 
his acceptance of the benefit. The service to 
the enemy, in a belligerent view, is the rent 
paid for the possession of a commerce, which is 
strangely pretended to be neutral: and the term 
is by tacit compact to cease, when that rent can 
be rendered no longer. 

But, it is not only in its motive and purpose 


176 


that the transaction is of a hostile character. I 
have shown, also, that the effects actually produc¬ 
ed, are of a kind most directly hostile and injuri¬ 
ous ; that the commerce in question, not only pro¬ 
tects, but strengthens our enemies, and puts ma¬ 
ritime arms again into their hands, for our future 
annoyance and ruin. 

This neutrality, is like that of the poetic dei¬ 
ties, who, when it is unlawful to them to engage 
in the battle, not only cover their favourite hero 
with a cloud, and withdraw him from the pur¬ 
suit of his opponent, but restore to him the 
sword, which he had previously lost in the com¬ 
bat. 

Let me, however, refer our Christian, though 
very unreasonable friends, to a better standard, 
than that of poetic divinity. St. Paul holds him¬ 
self an accomplice in the murder of Stephen, 
though he took no active part in it beyond keep¬ 
ing the clothes of the assassins : but on the prin¬ 
ciple of the pretensions I am combating, this 
was neutrality. Nay, St. Paul might have in¬ 
nocently gone much further, than thus to faci¬ 
litate the act, by the accommodation of those who 
were engaged in it. He might not only have 
taken care of their clothes, but furnished them 
atones for their purpose. 


1 11 


Without attempting further to illustrate this 
very plain, though controverted subject, I con¬ 
clude, that the illegality of this commerce, is as 
certain as its mischievous tendency; that to en¬ 
gage in it, is to interpose in the war, for the pur¬ 
pose of rescuing our enemy from our superior na¬ 
val force ; or, in the terms of an expressive meta¬ 
phor sometimes applied to it, “ hosti imminenti 
eripere Jiostem j” and that the merchants who thus 
grossly violate the duties* have no claim to the 
rights of neutrality* 


Such is the obvious remedy for this grand evil 
in the war, and such our right of applying it. 

The other abuses of the neutral flag, a parti¬ 
cular examination of which does not belong to 
my present plan, admit not of so simple a cure; 
for they chiefly consist in the fraudulent carriage 
of hostile property, under the cloak of a fictitious 
neutrality, in voyages which fall within the law¬ 
ful range of neutral navigation. To these, there¬ 
fore, no general remedy can be applied, unless 
a method could be found of either increasing, in 
the minds of neutral merchants, respect for the 
obligation of veracity, or obviating in our courts 
of prize, the deceptious influence of false¬ 
hood. 

2 A 


178 


In truth, the 'unprecedented extent and success 
of fraudulent claims, is a natural and almost un¬ 
avoidable effect of the long duration of maritime 
war, especially in a war, the circumstances of 
which have excited, beyond all former example, 
the efforts of deceit in our enemies and their 
neutralizing agents. 

To make this truth perfectly intelligible and 
clear, it would be necessary to spend more time 
than I or my readers can spare, in an exposition 
of the practice of the prize courts. I must be 
contented with observing, that the original evi¬ 
dence which is to justify a capture, and lead to 
condemnation, must be obtained from the cap¬ 
tured vessel, either in the papers which are put 
on board by the alleged owners and shippers 
themselves, or in the testimony of the master 
and the other persons on board, when examined 
on standing interrogatories. Since then the evi¬ 
dence all proceeds from the ostensible proprietors 
themselves, or from their agents, or witnesses in 
their service and pay, it cannot be supposed that 
facts will often be brought to light intentional¬ 
ly, which the true owners may desire to conceal. 
It may even create surprise, that a captor is 
ever able to establish a case in point of evidence, 
which will entitle him to a favourable sentence: 
nor would this often happen, if the standing in¬ 
terrogatories were not very numerous and close. 


179 


and so wisely framed by the light of progressive 
experience, that it is difficult for a witness, not 
previously apprized of their terms, so to answer 
them all, as to support consistently, in all its parts, 
the necessary tale of falsehood. 

But, unhappily, after a war has lasted long, the 
neutralizing agents, and the masters and officers 
they employ, become perfectly well acquainted 
with the nature of this ordeal of the prize court; 
so that the witnesses have a preconcerted answer 
ready to every interrogatory that is proposed to 
them. It is a well known fact, that in certain 
eminent neutralizing ports on the continent, the 
master and other officers, usually interrogated in 
the Admiralty, are rigidly and repeatedly examin¬ 
ed by their employers, before the vessel sails, on 
our standing interrogatories, till they have learnt 
to answer in all points, promptly and accurately, 
and consistently with the colourable case which is 
in the event of capture to be supported. 

With equal skill and care, are those affidavits 
and documents now prepared in neutral coun¬ 
tries, which the British prize court usually re¬ 
quires on a decree for further proofs.—In short, 
every neutralizer of eminence, is become al¬ 
most as expert in the rules of our Admiralty, 
in regard to evidence, as a proctor at Doctors’ 
Commons. 


180 


It is evidently not easy to remedy evils like these ; 
and the more difficult it is, the more indispensa¬ 
bly necessary is it not to widen their range, by 
suffering that of the neutral flag to be unlawfully 
extended. 

The growing cunning and dexterity of those 
who are the ordinary and fraudulent suitors in 
the prize court, can only be in any degree coun¬ 
teracted, by an increasing vigilance and patience 
of investigation, as well as increasing experience, 
in the judges ; and for this, as well as othey rea¬ 
sons, it was wise to appoint men of professional 
talents, with salaries adequate to the full value 
of their time, to preside in the vice-admiralty 
courts. 

Is there after all, it may reasonably be demand¬ 
ed, no other redress for violations of neutral du¬ 
ties, than capture and condemnation in the prize 
court ? I answer, that though the offending 
party certainly ought to be punished by his own 
government, on the complaint of the injured bel¬ 
ligerent, yet mutual convenience has given rise 
to the usage of leaving the latter, in ordinary cases, 
to avenge himself, by treating as hostile the pro¬ 
perty which is engaged in the offence; for other¬ 
wise, the trespasses of individuals, might furnish 
endless occasions of diplomatic controversy be¬ 
tween friendly nations. 


181 


New or extreme cases, however, generally 
.demand a departure from ordinary rules; and 
the unprecedented grossness of the abuses which 
now exist, seems to me to demand, in this in¬ 
stance, an appeal to the justice of the neutral 
states, against their offending subjects. Such a 
resort seems to be the more proper and neces¬ 
sary, on account of the querulous and conten¬ 
tious disposition which is said to have been lately 
exhibited by some of those powers, notwithstandi¬ 
ng the extreme licence in which they have been 
hitherto indulged. 

It is highly disadvantageous for an accused, 
but much injured party, to stand wholly on the 
defensive; and in a case like this, it tends perhaps 
to give colour to the accusation in the eyes of 
indifferent judges ; nay, the people of the neutral 
country itself may be misled, by the reiterated 
and noisy complaints of their own merchants, 
and of the disguised agents of our enemies re¬ 
sident among them, when unopposed by any ex¬ 
postulation on our part, or any exposure of our 
wrongs*. 

Their ambassadors and consuls in England 


* There is great reason to believe that the ministers or emissaries; 
of the French government, procure the insertion in the American papers 
©f many of those false and incendiary paragraphs, by which this 
pountry, in spite of her extreme indulgence, is insulted and defamed ip 
that country. 


182 


also, are perpetually solicited and stimulated by 
the captured neutralizers, to whose frauds they 
are no doubt strangers, to represent their imagi¬ 
nary wrongs. These parties are always more 
troublesome than the genuine neutral merchant; 
and are the most clamorous asserters of the re¬ 
spect due to their flag, for the same reason that 
a fashionable sharper is, in his quarrels, often 
more punctilious than a real gentleman, in main¬ 
taining the point of honour. It is not his senti¬ 
ment, but his trade. The neutral ministers, in 
consequence, present memorials and remon¬ 
strances ; and their governments, perhaps, are in¬ 
duced to take up the dispute. But if abuses of 
the neutral flag, were made grounds not merely 
of defence, but of voluntary and original accusa¬ 
tion, and'if the punishment of the offenders were 
firmly demanded, the latter would often deem it 
prudent to be silent; while the neutral govern¬ 
ments and their ministers, if they had serious 
and frequent complaints to answer, would have 
less leisure, and less inclination to complain; 
they ought therefore, I think, under present 
circumstances, to be put in their turn on the de¬ 
fensive. 

Our only effectual remedy, however, must be 
found in that ancient and just resort, the seizure 
and confiscation of the property which is the 
subject of illicit transactions. 


183 


3d. Of the prudence of applying the proposed Re¬ 
medy, in regard to the Colonial Trade . 

It remains only to consider, as I proposed to do 
in the last place, whether it is prudent to resort to 
that remedy for the evils which have been delineat¬ 
ed, our right of applying which has, I trust, been 
sufficiently shown. 

In this as in most other questions of practical 
policy, especially in the present very difficult 
times, it is vain to expect that the alternative to 
existing evil, should he complete and unqualified 
good. AVe are sailing in a tempestuous sea, sur¬ 
rounded with rocks and shoals ; and the ques¬ 
tion is not, whether, by changing our course, 
we shall certainly have a prosperous voyage; 
but whether the ship will labour less, and the 
breakers in sight be avoided. 

It has been shown, that the extreme licence 
of the neutral flags, teems with mischiefs of a 
ruinous and fatal tendency to our commerce, to 
our colonies, to our wooden walls themselves, 
and to our best hopes in the war; and it remains 
to see, what new evils or dangers must be en¬ 
countered, should this pernicious licence be re¬ 
strained. 

The sum of all these opposing considerations 
seems to be this, " we may provoke a quarrel 


184 


u with the neutral powers.” I propose, there¬ 
fore, briefly to consider, first, the degree of this 
danger; and next, whether the evils of such a 
quarrel, if certain, would be greater than those 
to which we at present submit. 

It is certain, that should his Majesty’s govern¬ 
ment think fit to recal the indulgent instruction 
that has been so much abused, and revert to the 
rule of the war 1756, with such modifications 
only as can be safely allowed, great clamours 
would immediately arise in the tieutral coun¬ 
tries. The neutralizing agents, deprived of a 
large portion of their fraudulent gains, would 
exclaim aloud against the measure; and even 
such merchants as have carried on the colonial 
trade on their own account, would not be well 
satisfied to find their field of commerce ma¬ 
terially narrowed by the assertion of our bellige¬ 
rent rights. 

The neutral governments therefore would no 
doubt complain and remonstrate; “ but would 
“ they, if firmly, though temperately, resisted, 

push the controversy into a quarrel ?” would 
they maintain their pretensions to the trade in 
question, at the expense of a war with Great- 
Britain ? I firmly believe they would not; be¬ 
cause I am sure they ought not, whether they 
regard their honour, their duty, or their interest/ 


185 


Much though the principles of justice are un¬ 
happily made to bend to political convenience in 
the conduct of nations, they have not yet wholly 
lost their force. Like the merits of an honorary 
quarrel among gentlemen, they may at least serve 
for a basis of conciliation between parties who 
have no very urgent motive, or determined 
inclination, to fight. They will save the point of 
honour; for a nation cannot be disgraced by re¬ 
ceding from pretensions which are demonstrably 
groundless and unjust. 

I cannot help hoping, however, that with our 
late fellow-subjects of America at least, the equity 
of our cause will have a more direct and powerful 
influence ; for I have marked as an auspicious 
omen, in this vernal season of their power, a re¬ 
verence for moral principle prevailing in their su¬ 
preme representative assembly, and triumphing, 
in matters of interior legislation at least, over the 
suggestions of an ungenerous policy. 

It cannot be supposed, that the great body of 
the American people are at this period partial to 
France, or inimically disposed to Great-Britain. 
If they are insensible to the ties of a common 
extraction, and if the various sympathies of re¬ 
ligion, language, and manners, that ought to in¬ 
cline them favourably towards us, have lost their 
natural influence, they still cannot be regardless 
of the interesting fact, that we alone, of all the na- 
3 B 


186 


lions in the old world, now sustain the sinking 
cause of civil liberty, to which they are so fondly 
attached. They see that the iron yoke of a mili¬ 
tary despotism is now rivetted on the neck of that 
powerful people, which aspires to universal do¬ 
mination ; and which has already deprived its de¬ 
fenceless neighbours of the freedom they formerly 
enjoyed; nor can they doubt that the subjugation 
of England, would be fatal to the last hope of li¬ 
berty in Europe. 

Is the Atlantic thought a sufficient rampart for 
themselves, against the same despotic system ? 
The people of America are neither so ungene¬ 
rous, nor so anwise,. as to act on that mistaken 
confidence. They will advert to the state of 
things, which a disastrous issue of the present 
war might produce. They will contemplate the 
possible approach of a political prodigy, more 
terrific than any that earth has yet beheld— 
France lord of the navies, as well as the armies, 
of Europe. They will look to the South, and 
see the resources of the Spanish American em¬ 
pire in the hand of this Colossus; they will 
look behind them, and regard a large country, 
in which, were the British government sub¬ 
verted, religion, extraction, and language, would 
favour the ambition of France. Nor will they 
forget, that this unprincipled power is crafty, 
as well as audacious; that she well knows howto 
divide those whom she means to subdue; and 


187 


has already broken confederations as sacred, a# 
that of the American states. 

It will not be thought, that the new world 
has no adequate temptations to attract the am¬ 
bition of the French government, or to excite it 
to arduous efforts. The arnyes of St. Domingo 
will be remembered. Nor will the constrained 
and prudent cession of Louisiana, efface the 
recollection of that alarming line of policy, by 
which it was acquired. 

But should America be safe, in her distance, 
in her unanimity, and in her interior defensive 
resources, still what would become of her com¬ 
merce, if France were enabled to give law to the 
maritime world ? 

Is it supposed that Bonaparte, or his imperial 
successors, will tolerate in their ports, a moment 
longer than is necessary, a republican flag ? Vain 
imagination ! Had he even no antipathy to free¬ 
dom, the plague, or the yellow fever, would have 
less terrors, than such a mischievous memento to 

his best and greatest of peoples.” At this mo¬ 
ment he relies on the evident necessity of re¬ 
moving such dangerous examples, as a sufficient 
apology to Europe for putting crowns on the 
heads of the nominal republics around him*. 

The citizens of the United States are a sa¬ 
gacious people, and will reflect on these things. 


* See one of bis answers to the Austrian manifesto. 


IBS 


They will see that they have a commercial in* 
terest, at least, if not interests of far greater im¬ 
portance, which forbid their aiding France at this 
alarming conjuncture/ to overthrow the indepen¬ 
dence of Europe. 

Widely different .was the face of affairs in 1794 
and 1795, when their commerce with the French 
colonies was a subject of dispute with Great- 
Britain. It was natural at that period, that the 
people of America should have good wishes for 
the liberty of France, and some jealousy of the 
confederated powers. Yet even then, thejr were 
too wise, and too just, to rush into a quarrel with 
this country, in support of their present extreme 
and unfounded pretensions; though the instruc¬ 
tion of November 1793 had, as I have already 
admitted, given them some specious grounds of 
complaint. The legal merits of the question 
were then, as I fear they still are, very little 
understood in America; but the moderation of 
Mr. Jay found a middle point of agreement; 
and though, unfortunately, the same spirit did 
not prevail among his constituents, so far as to 
induce them to ratify the treaty throughout, we 
may reasonably regard the conduct of the Ameri¬ 
can government at that time, as a proof of the 
pacific temper of the people; and as a pledge, 
that the strong equity of our present case will 
not, under the more favourable circumstances of 
the times, be obstinately disregarded. 


189 


Happily, we have not here to do with a people* 
to whose understandings and feelings no open ap¬ 
peal can be made. 

I regard it as not the least perilous circum¬ 
stance, in the present situation of Europe, that 
by the unprecedented despotism exercised over 
the press in France, in a positive, as well as 
negative mode, an ardent and intelligent people 
cannot only be kept in profound ignorance of 
the true nature of public events, and the real 
conduct of their government towards foreign 
nations, but impressed with a belief of facts 
diametrically opposite to the truth ; for by these 
means they can be made to engage cordially in 
any measures, however contrary to their own 
honour and interest, as ^well as to the safety of 
their neighbours. The case seems absolutely 
new; not only in degree, but in species ; for the 
ministers of France^ professing only to direct an 
official corner in one of their many newspapers, 
are in truth the political editors of all; and they 
even oblige such foreign prints, as they allow to 
be brought into the country, to usher in or con¬ 
firm their own mendacious statements; so that a 
curious public is actually starved into the diges¬ 
tion of their poisonous intelligence, from the want 
of any other food. 

Under other despotic governments, if the peo¬ 
ple have had no means, they have had as little 
inclination, to canvass affairs of state. Ignorant 


190 


and indifferent, their bodies have been at the dis¬ 
posal of the sovereign; but popular opinion, and 
feeling,’ are powerful engines in the hands of a go¬ 
vernment, which their characters could not sup¬ 
ply ; and hence the strength of an absolute, has 
been counterpoised by the spirit and energy of a 
free constitution ; but by inviting a highly civiliz¬ 
ed people to reason, and cheating them with fal¬ 
lacious premises, both these advantages are for¬ 
midably united. The public, in this unnatural 
state, becomes a centaur, in which brutal force is 
monstrously associated with the powers of a ra¬ 
tional agent. 

But in America, the government, if it could be 
supposed to feel the wish, has not the power, 
so to influence popular opinion. The grounds 
of every public measure, more especially a mea¬ 
sure so awfully serious as war, must be fairly 
known, and freely canvassed by the people. 
They will hear, and examine, the reasons which 
demonstrate the commerce in question to be an 
invasion of the rights, and dangerous to the se¬ 
curity of England; and if, unlike the Carthage- 
nians, they feel no wish to succour their parent 
country, when fighting for her liberty and her ex¬ 
istence, they will at least desist from wrongs which 
augment her dangers, and frustrate her defensive 
efforts. 

On the probable feelings and conduct of the 
neutral courts in Europe, I forbear to hazard 



m 


so confident an opinion. While I write, every 
wind wafts over from the continent rumours of 
new wars, new alliances, new declarations of neu¬ 
trality, and new breaches of those declarations; 
so that it is impossible for any private judgment to 
foresee, whether any, and what European powers 
will sustain the neutral character, when these 
sheets issue from the press. 

Beyond doubt, the accession of new parties to 
the war, will materially affect the tone of neu¬ 
tral pretensions on this side of the Atlantic; and, 
I trust, not unfavourably to the true principles 
of the maritime code. The generous and mag¬ 
nanimous policy of our allies, will induce them 
to respect the rights of neutral nations; but they 
can have no wish to favour abuses which tend 
to feed the revenues of France, and to defeat the 
best efforts in offensive war, that can be contri¬ 
buted on the part of Great-Britain. It is their 
part, chiefly to oppose the armies of the com¬ 
mon enemy in the field; it is ours, to diminish 
greatly the resources by which those armies are 
maintained, and to make the French people feel 
in their commerce, the evils of war, in spite of 
their lying gazettes; but to countenance the 
present encroachments of the neutral powers, 
would be to forbid that essential assistance; and 
to render our active co-operation feeble, if not ab¬ 
solutely useless. 


192 


Both in Europe, however, and in America, we 
have still stronger grounds of hope, that our just 
rights/ if firmly asserted, will not be resisted at 
the cost of a war; for the plain interest of the neu¬ 
tral powers themselves, will incline them to an op¬ 
posite course. 

What, after all, is to them the value of this 
new commerce, by which our enemies profit 
so largely? A few merchants, or pretended 
merchants, are enriched by it, chiefly through 
fraudulent means; but their ill-gotten wealth, 
will, with the common fate of opulence sudden¬ 
ly and unjustly acquired,, speedily vanish away; 
without leaving any lasting effect on the com¬ 
merce of their country, except the taint of their 
immoral practices, and their exotic luxury of man¬ 
ners. 

In North America especially, such will be the 
certain result. A great many of her most emi¬ 
nent neutralizers, and West-India merchants, are 
natives, either of the belligerent countries which 
they trade with, or of other parts of Europe; 
and when the business of the war is finished, 
they will not stay to contend, in the permanent 
commerce of America, with her frugal and in¬ 
dustrious citizens; but return to more congenial 
regions, with the fortunes they have rapidly ac¬ 
quired. Even with the native Americans them¬ 
selves, the effect of wealth forced in this com¬ 
mercial hot-bed, will be a strong disposition to 


193 


migrate, when peace puts an end to their trade; 
for it is not to be dissembled, that this new coun¬ 
try has not such attractions as Europe, for mer¬ 
chants who have grown suddenly rich in it, by 
means of exterior connexions. 

Far superior in every country, but especially 
in one that is newly and imperfectly settled, 
is the value of that commerce which is the 
natural growth of the place, which feeds on, 
or sustains, its manufactures, its agriculture, and 
the industry of its people, and is therefore per¬ 
manently affixed, as it were, to the soil; to that 
of a commerce temporary and extraneous, which 
is prosecuted to and from a foreign land, and has 
no connexion with the country of the merchant, 
but that of mere passage and sale. Yet, in the 
neutral countries, the former and more estimable 
species of commerce, is impeded in its growth, 
and even reduced in its extent, by the artificial 
increase of the latter. That which may be called 
the native commerce of the country, is kept 
down and discouraged, by the diversion of ca¬ 
pitals, the increase of freight and wages, the 
advanced price of warehouse-room, and inland 
carriage, and of the^.other various expenses at¬ 
tendant on the importation or exportation of 
goods; all which are necessary effects of a great 
and sudden increase of mercantile operations, at 
a neutral port, through its trade with belligerent 
countries. 


L 1 € 


194 


Besides, it unavoidably happens, that the frauds 
which are committed in the new branches of 
commerce opened with belligerents, fall sometimes 
heavily, in their effects, on the honest part of 
the mercantile body in the neutral country, even 
when conducting their ancient and natural com¬ 
merce. Their ships and cargoes are involved in 
the general suspicion deservedly attached to their 
flags, and to their commercial documents, and the 
public testimonials they carry. 

They are consequently seized, brought into 
port, and perhaps, on examination, discharged. 
But they have sustained considerable loss by de¬ 
tention ; and what is to be done ? Is a captor 
to be punished for suspecting the truth of docu¬ 
ments, which, in a great majority of similar 
cases, are notoriously false ? It would be like 
punishing an officer for taking up on suspicion 
an honest man, but a stranger to him, whom he 
found in company with felons. Were captors 
to pay costs and damages in such cases, it would 
be charity to our naval officers to renounce alto¬ 
gether the right of maritime capture; yet, if the 
capture is held justifiable, a fair trader smarts 
for the sins of his countrymen—the rate of in¬ 
surance as well as all other charges, is conse¬ 
quently raised on neutral shipments in general. 

The old and genuine Prussian merchants, as 
I am well informed, complain greatly of these 


195 


evils; and murmur at the improper use that is 
made of their flag, as freely as they dare. 

But in the case of America, able as she is to 
enlarge her permanent commercial establish¬ 
ments in various directions, to the utmost ex¬ 
tent that her capital or credit can afford, and 
unable, from the want of hands, to promote 
sufficiently that vital interest, the extension of her 
agriculture, the encouragement of a temporary 
carrying trade, at the expense of her native com¬ 
merce, must be peculiarly impolitic. It is, as if 
a landholder should take a scanty provision of 
manure from his freehold lands, which are in ur¬ 
gent want of it, to dress a field of which he is 
tenant at will. 

I cannot believe, therefore, that the intelli¬ 
gent citizens of the United States, unengaged 
in the new-found colonial commerce, would be 
very sorry to see it restrained ; much less that 
they would tenaciously defend it, at the cost 
of an evil so destructive to their growing pros¬ 
perity as a war with Great-Britain. 

Let it be considered, that the trade in ques¬ 
tion is but a part of that new and lucrative 
commerce, which the war has conferred on the 
neutral nations in general. Were their trade with 
the colonies of our enemies wholly cut off, many 
other very valuable branches of commerce would 
remain, which they hold by no other tenure than 
the neutrality of their flag. 


196 


But it is not my purpose to recommend a total 
and unqualified prohibition, of even the colonial 
trade; I have maintained, indeed, our right to 
interdict it without reserve, on the assumption 
that it was wholly prohibited by the enemy in 
time of peace; a proposition generally true, but 
which is liable to an exception, that I have hither¬ 
to forborne to notice. 

To one particular nation, and at certain free 
ports in the French islands, the importation and 
exportation of certain specified articles under a 
foreign flag, were allowed, before the commence¬ 
ment or contemplation, of the last war. Ameri¬ 
cans, could import their native provisions and lum¬ 
ber in their own vessels; and could receive in re¬ 
turn those inferior articles of colonial produce, 
rum, tafiia, and molasses. Thus far, therefore, an 
exception to the rule of the war 17*56 is, perhaps, 
demanded by the principle of that rule; and it 
seems due also on another score ; for we have re¬ 
laxed our own colonial monopoly, in an irregular 
manner, to the same extent; and it is right to 
admit the principle of equality in such cases.—* 
“ In jure belli , quod quis sibi snmit , hostibus tribu - 
endum est .” 

But we might even, as a voluntary sacrifice to 
amity,with the neutral powers, go considerably 
further: we might, perhaps, without any very 
serious mischief, extend to all the ports of the 
French colonies, and to every neutral nation. 


197 


the privileges enjoyed by Americans at some of 
those ports in time of peace. Nay, we might, 
perhaps, allow an intercourse of the same spe¬ 
cies, and subject to similar restrictions, with the 
colonies of Spain and Holland. 

By such concessions, it is true, our belligerent 
rights would be narrowed, and the hostile colo¬ 
nies, in some measure, relieved from the pressure 
of the war ; but if the more valuable articles of 
their produce, their sugar, coffee, cotton, cocoa, 
indigo, and bullion, were prevented from eluding 
our hostilities under the neutral flags, the greater 
part of the evils which I have noticed would be 
remedied; and the farmers of America, having 
the same markets for their produce, as under the 
present licentious system, would all find their in¬ 
terests on the side of conciliation and peace. 

If permitted to retain such a portion of the 
trade in question, together with all the rest of 
such existing commerce, as is the fair fruit of 
their neutrality in every quarter of the globe, 
what motive could these nations find for asserting 
their further, and unjust pretensions by arms? 
To suppose that commercial interest would excite 
them to do so, is to suppose, that for the sake ot 
a part, they would wilfully sacrifice the whole. 

The neutralizing agents themselves, would be 
the first to shrink from a definitive quarrel.— 
They would clamour, while they hoped to pro- 


198 


vail in extorting from our fears or our prudence, 
acquiescence in all their lucrative encroachments; 
but when convinced by our firmness that this end 
is not attainable, they would become, instead of 
sticklers for war, the staunchest advocates for 
peace. They will not be so simple as to ruin 
their own business, by exchanging the neutial* 
for the belligerent character. 

I rely not, however, on these men, but on the 
equity and good sense of their countrymen at 
large, who know how to distinguish between the 
selfish clamours of individuals, and the dictates 
of national prudence. Our brethren of Ame¬ 
rica, especially, know how to value the bless¬ 
ings of peace ; and the w ise government of that 
country has show r n itself, in this and all other 
points, in unison with the sense of the people. 
They will not, therefore, suffer their passions to 
be inflamed by groundless suggestions, and 
plunge into a war, against the clearest dictates 
both of policy and justice. 


Since, however, it is right in so important a case 
to calculate on every c hance, and to be prepared 
for every possible consequence, of a change of 
system, I will, in the last place, suppose, that the 
only alternative to the sacrifice of our maritime 
rights, is a quarrel with the neutral powers. 


199 


If so, the question is, which of these two great 
evils is the worst ? and I hesitate not to answer, 
beyond all comparison, the former. 

The arms of the powers now neutral, added to 
those of the present confederates, if so mon¬ 
strous a coalition could be imagined, would add 
something, no doubt, to our immediate dan¬ 
gers ; but acquiescence in the present abuses, 
must, unless the power of France be broken 
on the continent, ultimately insure our ruin. 
Looking forward, as we are bound in prudence 
to do, to a long-protracted war, it is demonstra¬ 
ble, from the premises I have shown, that we 
must, before the close of it, lose our naval su¬ 
periority, if the enemy is allowed to retain, and 
still continue to improve, his present oppressive 
advantages. 

While he is preparing the means of active ma¬ 
ritime enterprises, we are reduced at sea, as well 
as on shore, to a mere defensive war. While our 
colonies, and our colonial commerce, are labour¬ 
ing under great and increasing burthens, those 
of the enemy, comparatively unincumbered, are 
thriving at their expense. While freight, war 
duties, and insurance,, are advancing in England, 
the expense of neutralization is daily diminishing 
in France, Flolland, and Spain. Competition, 
and the safety of neutral carriage, are reducing 
it every day. Meantime, the hostile navies are 
nursed, augmented, and reserved in safety for a 


day of advantageous trial; while our own is sus-* 
taining all the most laborious duties of war, with 
scarcely any of its ancient encouragements; our 
seamen, also, are debauched into foreign employ* 
to carry on the trade of our enemies. In what 
must this progress end ? 

“ But our trade would be materially injured 
“ by a w r ar with the neutral powers.” It would, 
probably, be so in some degree; at least in the 
beginning; nor am I insensible of the great im¬ 
portance of such an inconvenience, in a view to 
immediate revenue. 

But these considerations, important though 
they are, may be justly superseded by others. To 
sacrifice our maritime rights, for the sake of our 
custom-house entries, would be like keeping up 
the pulse of a hectic patient, at the expense of his 
vital organs, instead of that more rational treats 
ment which, though weakening at the moment, 
can alone lead to a cure. 

Our two great rival statesmen, though their 
views unhappily do not often coincide, have 
agreed in declaring our unexhausted means of* 
finance to be still copious; and the opinion is 
highly consoling. But, if w r e dare not assert our 
essential maritime rights, for fear of reducing 
our exports, they are both greatly mistaken. 
We are already at the end of our resources. It 
is idle to say that we are still able to carry on the 
war, if we cannot carry it on without renoun c- 


201 


ing, for the sake of revenue, the means of making 
war with effect. It is like a soldier selling his 
arms, to enable him to continue his march. 

The notion, however, that any great diminu¬ 
tion of our trade, would result from the supposed 
quarrel, is not better founded than the fear of the 
quarrel itself. 

Is it asked, <c who would afterwards carry our 
<c manufactures to market ?” I answer, our allies, 
our fellow-subjects, our old and new enemies 
themselves. In the last war, nothing prevented 
the supplying of Spanish America with British 
manufactures, in British bottoms, even when they 
were liable to confiscation by both the belligerent 
parties for the act, but that the field of commerce 
was pre-occupied, and the markets glutted by the 
importations under neutral flags *. 

« But would I advise a toleration of these new 
“ modes of relieving the hostile colonies ?” Its to¬ 
leration would not be necessary. Even your own 
hostilities would not be able to overcome the ex¬ 
pansive force of your own commerce, when deli¬ 
vered from the unnatural and ruinous competition 
of its present privileged enemies. You might of¬ 
ten capture the carriers of it, and condemn their 
cargoes; but the effect would chiefly be to raise 
the price upon the enemy, and the difference 


* Case ofthe Chesterfield, at the Cockpit, 18Q4, 

2 D 


202 


would go into the purses of your seamen. The 
prize goods themselves, would find their way from 
your colonies into the hostile territories. 

But I do not affirm, that it would be necessary 
or proper in the case supposed, absolutely, and 
universally to refuse protection to British mer¬ 
chandize, when passing to the enemy, or colonial 
produce received in exchange for it, in British, 
or even in hostile bottoms. 

At present, the royal prerogative of suspending 
the rights of war, in favour of particular branches 
of commerce or particular merchants, is very li¬ 
berally exercised. Papal dispensations, were not 
more easily obtained in the days of Luther, than 
dispensations from the law of war, now are from, 
his majesty’s government: but let it be remem¬ 
bered, that when the Pope thus relaxed the ancient 
war of the church against sin, he shook his own su¬ 
premacy 5 and these salt-water indulgences, tend 
perhaps to produce a similar effect, on the mari¬ 
time greatness of England. I am far from blaming 
the exercise of this wholesome prerogative, in a 
moderate degree, and upon well investigated 
grounds 3 as for instance, when it enabled our 
merchants to import corn, during a scarcity, from 
Holland; but when it is used for the mere con¬ 
venience and profit of every merchant who chooses 
to apply for it, and who can offer some flimsy ex 


parte suggestion of public utility, in his petition 
for a licence; the practice becomes a new and 
dangerous inroad on that great maritime system, 
which it behoves us so much to maintain. 

Should, however, the neutral powers be in¬ 
sane enough to go to war with us, for the sake 
of the colonial trade, the well regulated use of 
this prerogative would soon show them their 
folly ; and obviate every inconvenience to which 
our own commerce might, in consequence of the 
new war, be exposed. Though I cannot under¬ 
take to defend the consistency of licensing to Bri¬ 
tish subjects a trade with the enemy, from which 
we claim a right to exclude neutral nations, yet 
should those nations attempt to compel a surren¬ 
der of that important right, by cutting off our 
commerce, the remedy would be consistent and 
just. The distress of the hostile colonies would 
soon present most tempting markets for our mer¬ 
chandizethe demand also would be great in 
the United States; and America would be una¬ 
ble to prevent even her own merchants, from be¬ 
ing the carriers of British manufactures to her 
own ill-guarded coast, as well as to the ports ot 
our present enemies. If the strict revenue laws, 
and naval force of Great-Britain, cannot prevent 
smuggling and trading with an enemy by her 
own subjects, how is this new power, with its 


lax government and feeble marine, to restrain its 
merchants from similar practices ? 

Should it be found necessary in the case sup¬ 
posed, to licence any commerce of this kind, 
whether in British, or foreign bottoms, we might, 
as far as respects the trade of the hostile colonies, 
have the benefit without the disadvantage of the 
present traffic. Not a hogshead of sugar, in the 
case supposed, ought to be protected from the 
hostile West-Indies, except in its way to the Bri¬ 
tish market; there to be taxed in such a degree 
as would preclude the present superiority of the 
enemy in a competition with our own planters. 
Neither ought a single article to be carried by li¬ 
cence to those colonies that can serve to extend 
their existing scale of cultivation. 

I protest, in every event, on behalf of the 
British planter, against the further settlement 
of Cuba, by a relaxation in any mode, of the 
rules of maritime war. During the last war, 
the produce of that vast island was at least dou¬ 
bled ; and if the present system continues, it will 
soon be doubled again to the destruction of our 
own sugar colonies; for the consumption of 
West-India produce in Europe, has natural limits; 
and the Jamaica Assembly has satisfactorily shown 
that those limits are scarcely now wide enough 
to receive the actual supply, at such prices as 
the British planter can possibly afford to accept. 


207 


with the United States. America, it has been 
said, is much indebted to our merchants; and 
she will confiscate their property. America, I 
answer, is too wise, and I believe, also, too ob¬ 
servant of national honour and justice, to adopt 
so opprobrious a measure. It would be an act 
subversive of all future faith and confidence, 
between herself and the merchants of Europe: 
It would not only stain her character, but mate¬ 
rially retard the growth of her commercial inte¬ 
rests, in every part of the globe. She will now, 
should a quarrel ensue, have no pretence for 
any other resort, than that of honourable war. 
At the period of 1794, she pretended, with some 
show of reason, that she had been unfairly sur¬ 
prised, by an order to capture her vessels, with¬ 
out previous notice or complaint: but no room, 
of course, will be given for such a charge at this 
time, should our government wisely resolve to 
assert our belligerent rights *. If the citizens of 
the United States can possibly be persuaded to 
think, that we are bound to submit to the ruinous 
effects of that assistance to our enemies, which 


* Let it not be supposed, however, that there is any shadow of 
ground for the complaints now making of want of notice respecting the 
collusive double voyages: the judgments in the cases of the Essex, the 
Enoch, and Rowena, were founded on a rule already known in Ame¬ 
rica ■, and which the claimants were fraudulently attempting to elude. 


206 


But the intelligent reader will dispense with all 
such arguments. He may not, indeed, be able 
to foresee clearly what will be the new channels 
of our trade, when the old are forcibly obstruct¬ 
ed ; but he can look down on the level below 
the regions of the existing demand and consump¬ 
tion, and be certain that there the stream will 
soon meet his eye again, in spite of the new ar¬ 
tificial mounds and embankments. 

In a word, take care of your maritime system, 
and your commerce will take care of itself. 

Were it not necessary to hasten to a conclusion, 
I might show, that the commerce of the country, 
is much more endangered by the existence of 
the present abuses, than it could possibly be by 
any effects of their correction. The case of our co¬ 
lonial trade, has been the only commercial evil 
which I have distinctly considered; but that of 
the merchants trading with Germany and Flan¬ 
ders might afford another striking instance of 
the mischiefs of a licentious neutrality: it has 
been lately stated to the public, in a compen¬ 
dious, but forcible manner, on the part of the 
suffering merchants, and apparently by one of 
their body*. 

It may be right to notice another alarm, 
that has been grafted on the idea of a quarrel 


* See some essays in the Times, in September last. 


207 


with the United States. America, it has been 
said, is much indebted to our merchants; and 
she will confiscate their property. America, I 
answer, is too wise, and I believe, also, too ob¬ 
servant of national honour and justice, to adopt 
so opprobrious a measure. It would be an act 
subversive of all future faith and confidence, 
between herself and the merchants of Europe: 
It would not only stain her character, but mate¬ 
rially retard the growth of her commercial inte¬ 
rests, in every part of the globe. She will now, 
should a quarrel ensue, have no pretence for 
any other resort, than that of honourable war. 
At the period of 1794, she pretended, with some 
show of reason, that she had been unfairly sur¬ 
prised, by an order to capture her vessels, with¬ 
out previous notice or complaint: but no room, 
of course, will be given for such a charge at this 
time, should our government wisely resolve to 
assert our belligerent rights *. If the citizens of 
the United States can possibly be persuaded to 
think, that we are bound to submit to the ruinous 
effects of that assistance to our enemies, which 


* Let it not be supposed, however, that there is any shadow of 
ground for the complaints now making of want of notice respecting the 
collusive double voyages: the judgments in the cases of the Essex, the 
Enoch, and Rowena, were founded on a rule already known in Ame¬ 
rica i and wjrich the claimants were fraudulently attempting to elude. 


20 $ 


they choose to call neutral commerce, at least it 
will be felt that our resistance is no act of wanton 
enmity, much less a provocation to more than le¬ 
gitimate war. 

There is, however, another security against 
such an injurious and disgraceful act on the 
part of America; or rather against any quarrel 
whatever with that power at the present con¬ 
juncture. The property under the American 
flag, which would be now exposed to our hos¬ 
tilities in every part of the world, is immense. 
In 1794, the merchants of the United States were 
few and poor; now, they are many and rich: 
then, the collective value of their property at 
sea, might be very small in comparison with 
what they owed to our merchants ; at this time, 
after the large deductions that ought to be made 
for property which is but nominally their own, the 
former must bear a large proportion of the latter- 

But America, though rich in commerce, is not 
so in revenue; and were her trade destroyed by 
the effects of a rupture with this country, a 
great burthen of war taxes must be immediately 
imposed on the landholders; who have no debts 
to English merchants to retain; who, as I have 
shown, would have no interest in the war ; and 
who are neither very able, nor very well disposed, 
to submit to a heavy taxation. 

Those, in short, who suppose that America 


209 


would be easily now brought to engage in a war 
with any great maritime power of Europe, know 
little of the commerce, and less of the interior 
state of that country. 

Such are my reasons for believing, that a quarrel 
with the neutral powers, would not be the price 
of asserting our maritime rights in respect of the 
colonial trade; and for concluding that such a 
quarrel, if certain, would be a less formidable 
evil, than those to which we at present submit. 

Should any reader be disposed to dissent from 
both these propositions; he will, perhaps, sub¬ 
scribe to a third—It would be better, by an ex¬ 
press and entire surrender of that ancient mari¬ 
time system on which all our greatness has been 
founded, to put ourselves on a par with the ene¬ 
my, as to the advantages and disadvantages of 
neutral commerce; than continue to submit to 
these ruinous innovations, of which all the bene¬ 
fit is his, and all the evil our own. 

Let us subscribe at once to the extravagant 
doctrines of Sehlegel, or to those of Bonaparte 
himself; let us admit the old pretension of 
“ free ships free goods,” and that the seizing hos¬ 
tile property under a neutral flag, is piracy, or ma¬ 
ritime despotism—then, following the exam¬ 
ple of our enemies, let us suspend our naviga¬ 
tion laws, that we also may have the benefit of 
n eutral carriage in all the branches of our trade 
2 E 


210 


— let brooms be put at the mast-heads of all our 
merchantmen, and their seamen be sent to the 
fleets. 

By no means short of these, can we be deliver¬ 
ed from the ruinous inequalities under which we 
at present labour; and these, alarming though 
their novel aspect may be, would in truth be less 
evils, than those which the present system, if long 
persevered in, must unavoidably produce. 

It would, however, be a still better expedient, 
if the enemy would kindly concur in it, to ab¬ 
jure, on both sides, the right of capturing the 
merchant ships, or private effects of an enemy 
__in other words, to reconcile, as some visiona¬ 
ries have proposed, a naval war with a commer¬ 
cial peace. Our neutral friends might then be 
dismissed by both parties; and would, perhaps, 
in the next war, be content to gather up the chief 
part of the spoils of the weaker belligerent, with¬ 
out wrangling, as now, for the whole. 

But the French government is, probably, too 
conscious of its present advantages, to concur in 
this arrangement: nor would it, I verily believe, 
consent to respect British property when passing 
under the neutral flag, if we were disposed to an 
equal forbearance. 

‘ What then remains to be done ?—to make peace 
with Bonaparte ? 


211 


It is the utter impracticability of such an ex¬ 
pedient that gives to my subject its most anx¬ 
ious and awful importance. His power and his 
pride may possibly be broken by a new war on 
the continent, or new revolutions may deliver 
France from his yoke; but if not, we are only 
at the commencement of a war, which our long- 
continued maritime efforts alone can bring to a 
safe, much less a prosperous close. You may 
make treaties with Bonaparte, but you cannot 
make peace. He may sheath the sword, but the 
olive-branch is not in his power. Austria may have 
peace with France; Russia may have peace with 
France ; but Great-Britain can have no real peace 
with that power, while the present, or any other 
military usurper, brandishes the iron sceptre he 
has formed, and is in a condition to hope for our 
ruin. 

Am I asked, what is the insuperable obstacle ? 
I answer, the British constitution. I can repeat, 
ex ammo , with the church, that we are fighting 
“ for our liberty and our laws,” for I believe that 
their surrender alone could obtain more than a 
nominal peace. 

France, under her ancient monarchy, could 
look across the streights of Dover without envy 
or discontent ; for her golden chains, burnished 
as they were by the splendour of genuine royalty, 
rivetted by the gentle hand of time, and hallow- 


212 


ed by a reverence for ancient hereditary right, 
were worn with pride, rather than humiliation or 
dislike. The throne stood upon foundations too 
strong, as its posssesors fully thought, to be en¬ 
dangered by the example, or by the contagious 
sentiment of freedom. 

But can the new dynasty entertain a similar 
confidence ?—Let Bonaparte's conduct and lan¬ 
guage attest, that he at least, is not so simple. 
During that brief term of pretended peace, to 
which he reluctantly submitted, what was his 
employment out of France, as well as within 
that country, but the subversion of every thing, 
which approached the nature, or bore the name 
of freedom? In his treatment of the little states 
around him, he was even ostentatious of his con¬ 
tempt of the civil liberty they enjoyed or affect¬ 
ed : and he does not scruple now to avow, in the 
face of Europe, the very principle I am ascrib¬ 
ing to him, though in different language, in his 
apology for his treatment of Genoa and the Ita¬ 
lian republic. 

English liberty was happily beyond his reach; 
and it was necessary to temporize, while a con¬ 
test with the negroes suspended those prepara¬ 
tions for a new war, which he would soon have 
made in the western world, and in India; but 
his gazettes exhibited incessantly, not only his 
hostile mind, but the true caus’e of its hostility. 


Our freedom, especially the freedom of our press, 
was the subject of bitter invective. By political 
hints, lectures, and addresses, he laboured inces¬ 
santly to convince Frenchmen, that there is no 
possible medium in society between anarchy and 
his own military despotism ; but, as the known 
case of England was an unlucky knot in this theo¬ 
ry, which he could not immediately cut asunder 
with his sword, his next, and anxious purpose, 
was to confound our freedom with licentiousness, 
to render it odious, and to hint, as he broadly did, 
that it is incompatible with the common peace 
and security of Europe. 

FIad he not even the audacity to remonstrate 
to his Majesty’s government, against the freedom 
of our newspapers, and to demand that our 
press should be restrained ? But we cannot be 
surprised at this—Darkness, as well as chains, 
is necessary for this system; and while it is light 
at Dover, he knows it cannot be quite dark at 
Calais. 

The enmity of this usurper, then, is rooted in 
a cause which, I trust, will never be removed, 
unless by the ruin of his power. Fie says, “ there 
is room enough in the world both for himself and 
us.” ’Tis false—there is not room enough in it, 
for his own despotism and the liberties of Eng¬ 
land. He will cant, however, and even treat, 


214 


perhaps, in order to regain the opportunity which 
he threw r away by his folly and guilt at St. Domin¬ 
go, and his splenetic temper at Paris.—He would 
make peace, I doubt not, anew, that he might re¬ 
cover the means of preparing better for war; but 
would be impatient and alarmed, till he could 
again place the fence of national enmity, between 
the people of England and France. 

These prospects, I admit, are cheerless; but 
let us not make them quite desperate, by surren¬ 
dering our natural arms. There are conjunctures 
in which 


“ Fear, admitted into public councils, 

“ Betrays like treason.” 

—But the reins are in no timid hands; and, after 
all, unless we mean to abandon all that remains 
yet unsurrendered of our maritime rights, peace 
is more likely to be maintained with the neutral 
powers, by a firm than a pusillanimous conduct; 
for experience has shown that they w ill not be 
content, w T hile any restriction whatever remains 
on their intercourse w ith the enemy, which fraud 
cannot wholly elude. 

To conclude.—A temperate assertion of the 
true principles of the law r of war in regard to 
neutral commerce, seems, as far as human fore¬ 
sight can penetrate, essential to our public safety. 


In Him, at whose command <c nations and 
“ empires rise and fall, flourish and decay,’’ let 
our humble confidence be placed; and may we 
be convinced, that to obey his righteous laws, 
is the soundest political wisdom, the best provi¬ 
sion we can make for our national safety, at this 
momentous period. 

But, if he wills the end, he wills also the ade¬ 
quate means—Let us not, therefore, abandon 
the best means of defence he has given; let us 
cherish OUR VOLUNTEERS, OUR NAVY, AND 
Maritime Rights. 


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